UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5244
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL DEVON BAILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00152-RJC-1)
Submitted: February 13, 2012 Decided: February 17, 2012
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Angela Parrot, Acting Executive Director, Ross H. Richardson,
Assistant Federal Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Nathaniel Devon Bailey of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006);
two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006); possession of a firearm
after sustaining a conviction for an offense punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). The district court sentenced Bailey to
a total of 135 months of imprisonment and he now appeals. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm Bailey’s conviction but
vacate the portion of the sentence pertaining to reimbursement
of attorney’s fees, and remand for resentencing.
Bailey first argues that the district court violated
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in refusing to admit
evidence of his coconspirator’s guilty plea to possession of
some of the crack in state court. We review evidentiary rulings
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 433,
436 (4th Cir. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs only when
“the [district] court acted arbitrarily or irrationally in
admitting evidence.” United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724,
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732 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
“Whether grounded in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of compulsory process, or the more general Fifth Amendment
guarantee of due process, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.” United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 358 (4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 451 (2011) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). While this guarantee includes the
right to present evidence to the jury that might influence the
determination of guilt, the “right to present a defense is not
absolute[, and] criminal defendants do not have a right to
present evidence that the district court, in its discretion,
deems irrelevant or immaterial.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to admit evidence of Bailey’s
coconspirator’s state guilty plea.
Bailey next argues that the district court erred in
denying his suppression motion based on the search of his
vehicle and deficiencies in the arrest warrant. “In considering
a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review conclusions of law
de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007)
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(citation omitted). When the district court has denied a
defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). “It is well
established that officers who have probable cause can search a
vehicle without a warrant.” United States v. White, 549 F.3d
946, 949 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). District courts
must “assess whether officers had probable cause by examining
all of the facts known to officers leading up to the arrest, and
then asking whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount
to probable cause.” Id. at 950 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In addition, if a warrant is found to be defective,
the evidence obtained from the defective warrant may
nevertheless be admitted under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922-23 (1984). Evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant
will not be suppressed unless: (1) the affidavit contains
knowing or reckless falsity; (2) the magistrate acts as a rubber
stamp for the police; (3) the affidavit does not provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause; or (4) the warrant is so facially
deficient that an officer could not reasonably rely on it.
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United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1996).
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Bailey’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of
his vehicle.
Finally, Bailey argues that the district court erred
in ordering that he partially reimburse the United States for
the costs of court-appointed counsel. “In reviewing the
district court’s application of the factual findings, as in the
reimbursement order here, we apply an abuse of discretion
standard.” United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, ___, 2012 WL
208041, *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(c) (2006), “[i]f at any time after appointment of counsel
the . . . [district] court finds that the person is financially
able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the
representation, it may . . . authorize payment as provided in
subsection (f).” Before the court orders reimbursement of
court-appointed counsel fees, however, it must “find[] that
funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person
furnished representation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (2006).
We have recently held that in making this finding, the
district court “must base the reimbursement order on a finding
that there are specific funds, assets, or asset streams (or the
fixed right to those funds, assets or asset streams) that are
(1) identified by the court and (2) available to the defendant
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for the repayment of the court-appointed attorney’s fees.”
Moore, 2010 WL 208041 at *6. Here, the court made no such
findings. As in Moore, the facts contained in the presentence
report, that Bailey had a high school degree and a history of
employment, do not support a finding of Bailey’s present ability
to make payments in light of the report’s findings that Bailey
had no significant assets and no present ability to pay criminal
penalties. Moreover, the district court also found that Bailey
did not have the ability to pay fines and interest in this case.
See id. at *8. We conclude, therefore, that the district court
erred in determining that Bailey had the present ability to pay
the costs of court-appointed counsel based on the findings in
the presentence report.
Accordingly, we affirm Bailey’s conviction but vacate
the sentence as to the order directing reimbursement of
attorney’s fees and remand to the district court for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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