UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4628
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER HASAN GAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00277-BO-1)
Submitted: February 8, 2012 Decided: February 17, 2012
Before KING, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Hasan Gay appeals the 120-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924 (2006). On appeal, Gay argues that the district court
imposed an unreasonable sentence, erring in applying three
Guidelines enhancements and in failing to explain its chosen
sentence. We vacate Gay’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court under
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard of review
applicable when defendant properly preserves a claim of
sentencing error “[b]y drawing arguments from [18 U.S.C.] § 3553
[(2006)] for a sentence different than the one ultimately
imposed”). We must first review the sentence for significant
procedural error, including such errors as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In reviewing the district court’s application of the
Guidelines, we review findings of fact for clear error and
questions of law de novo. United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
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330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009). In applying a sentencing enhancement,
the district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the conduct underlying the enhancement occurred. See
United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 803 (4th Cir. 2009).
Gay contends that the district court erred in applying
enhancements pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 2K2.1(b)(6), 3A1.2(c)(1), and 3C1.2 (2010), because the court
adopted the presentence report’s (“PSR”) calculations without
requiring the Government to present additional evidence at
sentencing to support the PSR’s factual findings. When a
defendant disputes information contained in a PSR, he has “an
affirmative duty to make a showing that the information . . . is
unreliable, and articulate the reasons why the facts contained
therein are untrue or inaccurate.” United States v. Terry, 916
F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990). Without such an affirmative
showing, a district court is free to adopt the PSR’s factual
findings. Id. Because Gay did not present any evidence other
than his own conclusory allegations to contradict the reports on
which the PSR’s findings were based, we conclude that he failed
to make an affirmative showing that the PSR’s findings were
untrue or inaccurate, and the district court did not err in
adopting those findings.
Because Gay preserved his challenge to the district
court’s explanation of his sentence by requesting a sentence
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different than the 120-month sentence he received, we review the
explanation for abuse of discretion. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578.
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly,
a sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s explanation
need not be exhaustive; it must be “sufficient ‘to satisfy the
appellate court that [the district court] has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v.
Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (alterations in
Boulware). Moreover, the explanation must be sufficient to
allow for “meaningful appellate review” such that the appellate
court need “not guess at the district court’s rationale.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, in announcing the judgment, the district court
did not state any reasons to support its chosen sentence or make
any reference to the Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, or the
arguments of the parties. The court did not otherwise indicate
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that it had made an individualized assessment; for example, the
court did not address defense counsel’s argument that, at the
time of the offense, Gay had suffered from a mental infirmity
rendering him less culpable for his conduct. Contrary to the
Government’s argument, the error was not harmless, as we cannot
conclude from the record before us that the district court’s
consideration of Gay’s arguments would not have affected the
sentence imposed. See Boulware, 604 F.3d at 838. Given the
lack of explanation for the 120-month sentence, we conclude that
the district court erred in imposing a procedurally unreasonable
sentence.
We therefore vacate Gay’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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