UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6903
WARREN CHASE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GOVERNOR MARTIN J. O'MALLEY; LIEUTENANT ANTHONY G. BROWN;
SECRETARY GARY D. MAYNARD; ACTING CHIEF JUDY PRESTON; RACHEL
QUEEN,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-7192
WARREN CHASE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WARDEN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:11-cv-01414-CCB; 1:08-cv-01790-CCB)
Submitted: February 10, 2012 Decided: February 17, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Warren Chase, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith Lane Weber,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Warren Chase appeals a
district court order dismissing his complaint because he did not
show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury
(No. 11-6903), see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006), and an order
dismissing complaints that were consolidated by the court (No.
11-7192). We affirm.
No. 11-6903
This court reviews de novo a district court’s finding
that the “three striker” did not show that he was in imminent
danger of serious physical injury in order to proceed under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006). Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118
(9th Cir. 2005); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th
Cir. 2003). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner
who brings a civil action or an appeal who has had three or more
actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, may
not proceed without prepayment of fees unless he is “under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). It is undisputed that Chase is a “three striker.”
We note that “the requisite imminent danger of serious
physical injury must exist at the time the complaint or the
appeal is filed . . . . Moreover, the exception focuses on the
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risk that the conduct complained of threatens continuing or
future injury, not on whether the inmate deserves a remedy for
past misconduct.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883,
885 (5th Cir. 1998) (imminent danger must exist at the time the
plaintiff files the complaint). In Martin, the court stated
that an inmate must make “specific fact allegations of ongoing
serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct
evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.”
Martin, 319 F.3d at 1050.
We have reviewed the record and affirm the district
court’s order. We conclude Chase did not make specific
allegations that would support a finding that when he filed his
complaint he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
No. 11-7192
Chase filed a series of complaints and other filings
that were consolidated by the district court. He alleged that
his food was poisoned by prison guards, that he was being denied
his meals and that his incoming and outgoing legal mail was
being destroyed by prison authorities or being tampered with.
The district court dismissed the allegations regarding the
prison meals under the doctrine of res judicata, because Chase
raised these allegations in a prior complaint dealing with the
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same time period. The court also found that Chase’s allegations
concerning his mail were without merit.
This court limits review to issues raised in the
informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Issues not raised in
the brief are considered abandoned. Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that issues not raised in opening brief are deemed abandoned).
In his pro se informal brief, Chase does not challenge
the finding that he previously litigated his claim regarding the
treatment of his meals to his detriment. Accordingly, we
consider the issue abandoned.
We also conclude that the district court did not err
in finding that Chase’s claim regarding his legal mail was
without merit. In order to establish a claim of denial of
access to the courts, an inmate cannot rely on conclusory
allegations but must instead allege an actual injury or specific
harm or prejudice that has resulted from the denial. Cochran v.
Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Chase
failed to allege any actual injury resulting from the alleged
conduct of prison authorities with regard to his legal mail.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
We also deny as moot the motion to consolidate. We also deny
the motion for a TRO/Protective order. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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