United States v. $133,420.00 in United States Currency

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-16727
$133,420.00 IN UNITED STATES D.C. No.
CURRENCY,  3:09-cv-08096-
Defendant, NVW
and OPINION
DAMON J. LOUIS,
Claimant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
October 26, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed February 21, 2012

Before: Susan P. Graber and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges,
and Lewis A. Kaplan,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

*The Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

1905
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1909

COUNSEL

David M. Michael (argued) and Edward M. Burch, Law
Offices of David M. Michael, San Francisco, California, for
claimant-appellant Damon J. Louis.

Reid C. Pixler, Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix,
Arizona, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises in the context of a civil forfeiture action
instituted by the government after it seized $133,420 found in
Damon Louis’s car. Louis asserts that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to the government after deter-
mining that Louis lacked standing. Because the district court
did not err in striking Louis’s interrogatory response claiming
ownership of the property, and because the remaining evi-
dence was inadequate to establish that Louis had standing, we
affirm.

I

This appeal arises in the context of a civil forfeiture action.
Such actions are governed by statute, the Supplemental Rules
for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture
Actions, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We begin
by briefly describing the applicable statutory and procedural
provisions.
1910 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), certain property is “subject to
forfeiture to the United States.” Relevant here, § 881(a)(6)
provides that “moneys . . . furnished or intended to be fur-
nished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance”
and “all proceeds traceable to such an exchange” are subject
to forfeiture. Once such property has been seized, it is
“deemed to be in the custody of the Attorney General.” 21
U.S.C. § 881(c). The Attorney General may then seek either
criminal forfeiture, see 18 U.S.C. § 982, or (as in this case)
civil forfeiture, see id. § 983.

The government begins a judicial civil forfeiture action by
filing an in rem complaint against the property (sometimes
referred to as the “defendant property”) in the appropriate dis-
trict court. Id. § 983(a)(3)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1395. The
complaint must be verified, state the grounds for jurisdiction,
describe the property and its location, identify the statute
under which forfeiture is sought, and state facts sufficient to
“support a reasonable belief that the government will be able
to meet its burden at trial.” Supp. R. G(2)(f); see also 18
U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A).

Any person wishing to intervene and assert an interest in
the property must file two responsive pleadings: a verified
claim and an answer. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A), (B); Supp. R.
G(5). The verified claim must (1) “identify the specific prop-
erty claimed,” (2) “identify the claimant and state the claim-
ant’s interest in the property,” (3) “be signed by the claimant
under penalty of perjury,” and (4) be served on the govern-
ment’s attorney. Supp. R. G(5)(a)(i). In the answer, the claim-
ant may admit or deny the allegations in the complaint and set
forth defenses.

Unlike in typical civil proceedings, the government may
commence limited discovery immediately after a verified
claim is filed. Supplemental Rule G(6)(a) provides that “[t]he
government may serve special interrogatories limited to the
claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1911
without the court’s leave at any time after the claim is filed
and before discovery is closed.”1 The purpose of the rule is
“to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at
any time after the claim is filed to gather information that
bears on the claimant’s standing.” Supp. R. G advisory com-
mittee’s note (subdivision (6)). The claimant must respond to
these special interrogatories within 21 days. Supp. R. G(6)(b).
The general civil discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure otherwise apply. Supp. R. G(1).

At any time before trial, the government may move to
strike the claimant’s claim or answer on the grounds that the
claim or answer does not comply with Supplemental Rule
G(5), that the claimant has not responded to special interroga-
tories propounded pursuant to Rule G(6)(a), or that the claim-
ant lacks standing. Supp. R. G(8)(c).2 The motion to strike
1
Supplemental Rule G(6)(a) states, in full:
Time and Scope. The government may serve special interroga-
tories limited to the claimant’s identity and relationship to the
defendant property without the court’s leave at any time after the
claim is filed and before discovery is closed. But if the claimant
serves a motion to dismiss the action, the government must serve
the interrogatories within 21 days after the motion is served.
2
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c) provides:
Motion To Strike a Claim or Answer.
(i) At any time before trial, the government may move to strike
a claim or answer:
(A) for failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6), or
(B) because the claimant lacks standing.
(ii) The motion:
(A) must be decided before any motion by the claimant to dis-
miss the action; and
(B) may be presented as a motion for judgment on the pleadings
or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary judg-
ment whether the claimant can carry the burden of establishing
standing by a preponderance of the evidence.
1912 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
may be presented as a motion for summary judgment. Supp.
R. G(8)(c)(ii)(B). The court must decide the motion to strike
before reaching a claimant’s motion to dismiss. Supp. R.
G(8)(c)(ii)(A).

If the case proceeds to trial, “the burden of proof is on the
Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the property is subject to forfeiture.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(c)(1).

II

We now turn to the facts of this case. On January 6, 2009,
Arizona Department of Public Safety Officer Mace Craft
stopped Louis on Interstate 40 for failure to use his turn sig-
nal. In response to questioning, Louis told Officer Craft that
he was driving back to San Francisco from Albuquerque after
attending a friend’s wedding. He also stated that there was
nothing illegal in the vehicle and twice denied that there was
a large amount of currency in the vehicle.

Officer Craft led his canine, who was trained to alert to the
scent of various illegal drugs, around the vehicle. The dog
alerted, and Officer Craft told Louis that he had probable
cause to search the vehicle. In the search that followed, Offi-
cer Craft found three cardboard boxes in Louis’s trunk. Two
of those boxes contained decorative rocks. The third con-
tained a set of black throwing daggers and $133,420 in United
States currency. No other contraband was found. Officer Craft
seized the money, which he suspected was the proceeds of
illegal drug trafficking, and transported Louis to the Flagstaff
police station. At the station, Louis told the officers that he
knew the currency was in the trunk of his car, but he gave no
clear answer when asked whether the money was his. He
refused to sign a form disclaiming ownership of the currency.
The officers released Louis and returned his vehicle.

On June 5, 2009, the government began a civil forfeiture
action by filing a complaint in district court that sought forfei-
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1913
ture of the currency seized from Louis’s car as proceeds trace-
able to controlled substances offenses under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). Louis filed a veri-
fied claim on August 12, 2009, which read, in full: “The
undersigned hereby claims an ownership and/or a possessory
interest in, and the right to exercise dominion and control
over, all or part of the defendant property.”

In response, the government served seven interrogatories,
a request for production of documents, and twelve requests
for admissions on Louis under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a).
The discovery requests sought information and documents
relating to Louis’s identity, his claimed interest in the defen-
dant property, his manner of acquiring that interest, his
sources of income, and his and the currency’s relationship to
drug trafficking. Interrogatory No. 2 read:

State the extent and describe with particularity the
nature of your interest in the defendant currency, and
identify how you acquired that interest. Your answer
should include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) The date(s), time, place and manner in which
the defendant currency[ ] was obtained, including the
names, address and telephone numbers of the per-
son(s) from whom the currency was obtained.

(b) the circumstances of each transaction by which
you acquired or obtained any interest in the defen-
dant currency.

(c) the reason(s) the defendant currency was
obtained, and witnesses, including the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of such witnesses,
to any of the transactions by which the defendant
currency was obtained.

(d) produce each and every document evidencing,
recording, facilitating, or otherwise relating to any
1914 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
transaction identified in response to Interrogatory
No. 2 (a) through (c) above.

Louis responded to the discovery requests on December 9,
2009. He objected to Interrogatory No. 2, as well as every
other discovery request, on three grounds: (1) the discovery
request exceeded the scope of Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), (2)
the discovery request sought information in violation of his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and sei-
zure, and (3) the discovery request sought information in vio-
lation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Louis did provide a limited response to Inter-
rogatory 2: “Without waiving said objections, my interest in
the defendant property is as the owner and possessor of said
property, with a right to exercise dominion and control over
said property.”

The government filed a motion to strike Louis’s claim and
answer on the theory that Louis lacked Article III standing to
contest the forfeiture. After filing this motion to strike, the
government made several efforts to obtain additional discov-
ery information from Louis, including filing an emergency
motion to compel discovery. Louis refused to provide any fur-
ther information, even after the court granted the motion to
compel. The government then filed a motion to strike Louis’s
December 2009 discovery responses. The district court
granted that motion, holding that Louis had impermissibly
used the privilege as both a shield and a sword in that he had
used the interrogatory responses to claim an ownership inter-
est in the property (which benefited his cause) but refused to
respond to “follow-up questions about the details of that own-
ership interest, including how, why, or where he obtained the
funds.”

After striking Louis’s discovery response, the court deter-
mined that the only evidence remaining in the record support-
ing Louis’s standing was Louis’s physical possession of the
currency when it was seized. The unexplained fact of posses-
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1915
sion, the district court held, was insufficient to establish Arti-
cle III standing at any stage of a forfeiture proceeding.
Treating the government’s motion to strike Louis’s claim and
answer as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Sup-
plemental Rule G(8)(c), the district court struck Louis’s veri-
fied claim and answer and subsequently denied Louis’s
motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, Louis argues that the district court erred in strik-
ing his discovery responses and that, even with those
responses stricken, his verified claim was sufficient to with-
stand the government’s motion for summary judgment based
on his lack of Article III standing.

III

We have jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review summary judgment orders de novo.
Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 739 (9th Cir. 1997).
“In reviewing the court’s order we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to [the non-moving party] and deter-
mine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the court correctly applied the relevant substantive
law.” Id. We review the district court’s rulings on motions to
strike for abuse of discretion, El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim,
316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003), and its interpretations of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo, Whittlestone,
Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010).

[1] In order to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III, a plaintiff (including a civil forfeiture claimant)
must establish the three elements of standing, namely, that the
plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, that there is a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct complained of,
and that it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992); see also United States v. 5208 Los Franciscos
Way, 385 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004). Claimants in civil
1916 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
forfeiture actions can satisfy this test by showing that they
have “a colorable interest in the property,” 5208 Los Francis-
cos Way, 385 F.3d at 1191, which includes an ownership
interest or a possessory interest, United States v. $191,910.00,
16 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in United States v. $80,180.00, 303
F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). “Article III’s standing
requirement is thereby satisfied because an owner or posses-
sor of property that has been seized necessarily suffers an
injury that can be redressed at least in part by the return of the
seized property.” United States v. $515,060.42, 152 F.3d 491,
497 (6th Cir. 1998).

The elements of standing “must be supported in the same
way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561. This rule applies equally in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings. See United States v. $148,840.00, 521 F.3d 1268,
1273 (10th Cir. 2008) (contrasting the requirements to estab-
lish standing at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment
stages of civil forfeiture proceedings).

We have previously delineated the burdens on a claimant
at the motion to dismiss and trial stages of a civil forfeiture
action. At the motion to dismiss stage, a claimant’s unequivo-
cal assertion of an ownership interest in the property is suffi-
cient by itself to establish standing. United States v. 475
Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008);
$191,910.00, 16 F.3d at 1058. If the claimant instead asserts
a possessory interest at the motion to dismiss stage, the claim-
ant must offer some “factual allegations regarding how the
claimant came to possess the property, the nature of the
claimant’s relationship to the property, and/or the story
behind the claimant’s control of the property.” $515,060.42,
152 F.3d at 498. “Mere unexplained possession will not be
sufficient.” $191,910.00, 16 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis in origi-
nal). At trial, “[t]he claimant has the burden of establishing,
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1917
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has an interest in
the property.” United States v. Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 520
(9th Cir. 1992).

[2] Although we have not yet expressly identified the bur-
den on a claimant at the summary judgment stage of a civil
forfeiture action, several general principles apply. As stated in
Lujan, to withstand a motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the plaintiff lacks standing, a plaintiff cannot rely
on mere allegations but rather must “ ‘set forth’ by affidavit
or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the
summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” 504 U.S.
at 561 (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). At
the summary judgment stage, the district court must ask itself
whether “a fair-minded jury” could find that the claimant had
standing on the evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); United States v.
$42,500.00, 283 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2002) “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plain-
tiff ’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Ander-
son, 477 U.S. at 252.

[3] Applying these principles, we conclude that, in a civil
forfeiture action, a claimant’s bare assertion of an ownership
or possessory interest, in the absence of some other evidence,
is not enough to survive a motion for summary judgment. As
we have explained, “a conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lack-
ing detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact,” FTC v. Publ’g
Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997); cf.
United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 695 (9th Cir. 2010);
Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating that summary judgment is inappropriate where
the plaintiff set forth facts directly relevant to claim with
“great specificity”). A claimant asserting an ownership inter-
est in the defendant property, therefore, must also present
“some evidence of ownership” beyond the mere assertion in
1918 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
order to survive a motion for summary judgment. United
States v. $81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
United States v. $38,570, 950 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (5th Cir.
1992). The fact that property was seized from the claimant’s
possession, for example, may be sufficient evidence, when
coupled with a claim of ownership, to establish standing at the
summary judgment stage. See $148,840.00, 521 F.3d at 1277
(“[B]ecause [claimant’s] assertion of ownership is assumed to
be true on this record, and because the currency was indispu-
tably seized from a vehicle that [claimant] was driving, we
hold that [claimant] has established constitutional standing at
this stage of the litigation.”).

[4] Similarly, a claimant asserting a possessory interest
must provide some “evidence supporting his assertion that he
has a lawful possessory interest in the money seized” to sur-
vive a summary judgment motion. United States v.
$321,470.00, 874 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1989). “Unex-
plained naked possession of a cash hoard . . . does not rise to
the level of the possessory interest requisite for standing to
attack the forfeiture proceeding” at the summary judgment
stage. $42,500.00, 283 F.3d at 983 (quoting $321,470.00, 874
F.2d at 304).

IV

We apply these principles to determine whether Louis has
met his burden of providing evidence of an ownership or pos-
sessory interest in the cash at issue that is sufficient to with-
stand the government’s summary judgment motion. Louis
relies on two pieces of evidence in addition to the undisputed
fact that the currency was seized from his possession: his veri-
fied claim and his response to Interrogatory No. 2. We must
determine whether these two pieces of evidence were properly
before the district court and whether the evidence before the
court is sufficient to carry Louis’s burden.
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1919
A

[5] Louis’s verified claim, filed pursuant to Supplemental
Rule G(5)(a), asserted that he had an “ownership and/or a
possessory interest in, and the right to exercise dominion and
control over, all or part of the defendant property.” The gov-
ernment argues that this verified claim is not evidence for pur-
poses of the summary judgment motion.3 We disagree.
Although allegations in pleadings are generally not part of the
factual record for purposes of summary judgment, see Long
Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach,
603 F.3d 684, 690 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 329
(2010), affidavits or declarations that are “made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,
and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify
on the matters stated” are cognizable evidence for purposes of
supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Here, Supplemental Rule G(5)(a)(i)(C)
requires claims in a civil forfeiture case to be “signed by the
claimant under penalty of perjury,” and Louis’s claim was
verified in this manner. Therefore, it constitutes evidence for
purposes of opposing the government’s motion for summary
judgment.

[6] Although Louis’s verified claim was admissible evi-
dence, its statement that Louis had an “ownership and/or a
possessory interest” in the defendant property is not sufficient
to establish his standing. As we have explained, the claimant
must make clear whether he is asserting “a possessory inter-
est, an ownership interest, or something else.” $191,910.00,
16 F.3d at 1057. Because Louis’s claim used “and/or,” it was
3
At oral argument, the government raised the additional argument that
the district court should not have considered Louis’s verified claim
because it was facially deficient under Supplemental Rule G(5). Because
the government did not raise this argument to the district court, or in its
brief, we will not consider it on appeal. See United States v. Kama, 394
F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005); Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953
F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992).
1920 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
not sufficiently specific regarding the nature of Louis’s
claimed interest in the property. More important, the term
“and/or” left open the possibility that Louis was claiming only
a possessory interest, and the evidence before the district
court was inadequate to create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding such an interest: Louis never offered any explana-
tion of how he came to possess the money seized from his
vehicle, and an unexplained possessory interest is insufficient
to establish standing at any stage of a forfeiture proceeding.
Id. at 1058. Because Louis did not unequivocally state he had
an ownership interest in the property, and did not provide suf-
ficient information to establish a lawful possessory interest,
Louis’s statement in the verified claim does not carry his bur-
den.

B

[7] Louis argues that his response to Interrogatory No. 2,
which stated that he had an “interest in the defendant property
. . . as the owner and possessor of said property, with a right
to exercise dominion and control over said property,” pro-
vided evidence of his ownership interest sufficient to with-
stand summary judgment. Unlike Louis’s verified claim, this
interrogatory response included an unequivocal assertion that
Louis was the owner of the defendant property. That assertion
of ownership, combined with Louis’s possession of the cur-
rency at the time it was seized, would be enough to establish
Louis’s standing for purposes of a motion for summary judg-
ment. See $148,840.00, 521 F.3d at 1277. But the district
court did not consider this evidence; rather, it struck Louis’s
response to Interrogatory No. 2, holding that it was improper
to allow Louis to rely on this response to bolster his case for
standing when he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to refuse to respond to further ques-
tioning about the nature of his alleged ownership interest.

[8] We have long held that a district court may strike the
testimony of a witness in a criminal proceeding to avoid a
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1921
witness’s improper use of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination as a sword as well as a shield. See
United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1980).
The purpose of this rule is to protect the integrity and truth-
seeking function of the judicial system from the distortions
that could occur if a witness could testify and then use the
Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent any adversarial testing
of the truth of that testimony. See Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d
737, 742 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that a criminal defendant,
like any other witness, must “comply with the procedures
used to give the jury a fair chance to evaluate [the testimo-
ny’s] truth”); Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“Where a defense witness refuses to answer ques-
tions that go to the heart of the direct testimony on a central
issue, . . . the truth-seeking function of the court is
impaired.”); see also Lawson v. Murray, 837 F.2d 653, 656
(4th Cir. 1988) (“Important public policy protects even the
prosecution’s right to fair trials and the pursuit of truth, so that
a similar principle should govern whether the recalcitrant wit-
ness was offered by the prosecution or by the defendant.”). By
striking testimony that a party shields from cross-
examination, a court can respect the witness’s constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination while still preventing the
witness from using the privilege to “ ‘mutilate the truth a
party offers to tell.’ ” Lawson, 837 F.2d at 656 (quoting
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)); see also
United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Hand, J.) (stating that, although the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “deprives the
parties of evidence, it should not furnish one side with what
may be false evidence and deprive the other of any means of
detecting the imposition”); cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 84 (1970) (“That the defendant faces such a dilemma
demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting
a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.”). A district court may
strike such testimony “if invocation of the privilege blocks
1922 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
inquiry into matters which are ‘direct’ and are not merely
‘collateral’ ” to the proceeding. Seifert, 648 F.2d at 561.

[9] Although we have not yet considered a district court’s
application of this rule in a civil proceeding, we see no reason
to depart from our long-standing doctrine here. As five of our
sister circuits have held, the rule is equally applicable in civil
proceedings. See $148,840.00, 521 F.3d at 1277 (10th Cir.)
(“It is well established that in a civil case a district court may
strike conclusory testimony if the witness asserts the Fifth
Amendment privilege to avoid answering relevant questions,
yet freely responds to questions that are advantageous to his
cause.”); United States v. 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d 78,
84-85 (2d Cir. 1995) (“If it appears that a litigant has sought
to use the Fifth Amendment to abuse or obstruct the discovery
process, trial courts, to prevent prejudice to opposing parties,
may adopt remedial procedures or impose sanctions.”);
Edmond v. Consumer Prot. Div. (In re Edmond), 934 F.2d
1304, 1308 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privi-
lege cannot be invoked as a shield to oppose depositions
while discarding it for the limited purpose of making state-
ments to support a summary judgment motion.”); United
States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding in a civil forfeiture action that “a witness’ direct tes-
timony can be stricken if she invokes the fifth amendment on
cross-examination to shield that testimony from scrutiny”);
United States v. Baker, 721 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam); see also Lawson, 837 F.2d at 656. Preserving the
integrity and the truth-seeking function of the judicial process
is as important in civil as in criminal proceedings. See Nation-
wide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir.
2008) (affirming district court’s refusal to allow witness to
testify on particular subject at trial when the Fifth Amend-
ment had been used to block inquiry into that subject during
a deposition).

[10] We next consider Louis’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion in striking his interrogatory
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1923
response.4 In responding to Interrogatory No. 2, Louis
asserted that he had an ownership interest in the cash seized
from his vehicle, an assertion that was crucial for him to
prove standing. Louis’s standing to contest the government’s
civil forfeiture action was the central issue at that stage of the
proceedings. The issue of standing is subject to adversarial
testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the
government the right to question the claimant regarding the
“claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant proper-
ty,” Supp. R. G(6)(a) and to “gather information that bears on
the claimant’s standing,” id. advisory committee’s note (sub-
division (6)). Louis used the Fifth Amendment privilege to
avoid answering further questions as to the “date(s), time,
place and manner in which the defendant currency[ ] was
obtained” and the “circumstances of each transaction by
which [he] acquired or obtained any interest in the defendant
currency,” thereby frustrating the government’s attempts to
test the veracity of his claim of ownership. In so doing, Louis
impaired the truth-seeking function of the judicial process.
Indeed, his claim of privilege here raises the core concern that
his testimony may “furnish one side with what may be false
evidence and deprive the other of any means of detecting the
imposition.” St. Pierre, 132 F.2d at 840. Because Louis’s tes-
timony regarding his ownership was central to the issue
before the court, and because his refusal to respond to the
government’s questions threatened to “mutilate the truth a
party offers to tell,” Lawson, 837 F.2d at 656, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by striking Louis’s response
to Interrogatory No. 2.
4
The parties do not dispute that the rule allowing a district court to
strike testimony to avoid an abuse of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies equally to written testimony. See
Edmond, 934 F.2d at 1308 (“The same principle applies when a party
seeks to invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid discovery while offering an
affidavit to compel a certain result on summary judgment.”); Parcels of
Land, 903 F.2d at 43 (“What matters is whether a testimonial statement
was involved.”).
1924 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
C

Additionally, Louis argues that the government’s interroga-
tories went beyond the scope of Supplemental Rule G(6)(a)
and that he properly objected to them on that basis. In other
words, Louis invites us to interpret Supplemental Rule
G(6)(a) narrowly so that his refusal to answer various inter-
rogatories would not constitute an impermissible use of the
Fifth Amendment. According to Louis, because a claimant
can establish standing merely by asserting an interest in the
property, and because the advisory committee’s note to Sup-
plemental Rule G(6) limits the interrogatories to questions
“bearing on a claimant’s standing,” it follows that Rule G(6)
allows only questions regarding the identity of the claimant
and the type of legal interest asserted. Therefore, Louis
asserts, the rule does not allow the government to pose any
questions about the circumstances in which the claimant
obtained an interest in the property, and the government’s
interrogatories here were well beyond the scope of Rule G(6).

[11] We reject this argument because it is contrary to the
text of Rule G(6)(a) itself, which broadly allows the govern-
ment to collect information regarding the claimant’s “relation-
ship to the defendant property.” Moreover, the advisory
committee’s note to this rule contemplates that the govern-
ment may seek information beyond the claimant’s identity
and type of property interest, stating that when “the claimant
asserts a relationship to the property as bailee, the interrogato-
ries can inquire into the bailor’s interest in the property and
the bailee’s relationship to the bailor.” Supp. R. G advisory
committee’s note (subsection (6)). Furthermore, Louis’s lim-
ited interpretation would make Supplemental Rule G(6)(a)
superfluous because Supplemental Rule G(5)(a)(i)(B) already
requires the verified claim to “identify the claimant and state
the claimant’s interest in the property.” It is a “ ‘cardinal rule
of statutory interpretation that no provision should be con-
strued to be entirely redundant.’ ” Spencer Enters., Inc. v.
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1925
United States, 345 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)).5

Additionally, Louis’s premise that the only information rel-
evant to standing is the claimant’s identity and interest in the
defendant property is simply incorrect, as is made plain by the
facts of this case. As explained above, a claimant seeking to
establish standing on the basis of a possessory interest must
explain the circumstances of that possession. See $42,500.00,
283 F.3d at 983. Here, Louis did not unequivocally claim an
ownership interest in the currency until he responded to the
interrogatories. Until then, Louis had left open the possibility
that he was claiming only a possessory interest in the defen-
dant property. Thus, information as to the circumstances
under which the currency was obtained is information that
“bears on [Louis’s] standing.” Supp. R. G advisory commit-
tee’s note (subdivision (6)).

[12] Louis further argues that, rather than striking his inter-
rogatory responses, the district court should have found a way
5
We agree with Louis that many of the government’s discovery requests
were beyond the scope of Rule G(6)(a); for example, the government
requested the production of documents and admissions when the rule per-
mits only interrogatories, and it requested that Louis “list the sources of
all other income that [he] received, whether earned or unearned, from any
source(s) for the last five years” and “[e]xplain why anyone would travel
anywhere with more than $133,420 in U.S. currency in a rented vehicle,”
when the rule allows only information as to Louis’s “identity and relation-
ship to the defendant property.” Supp. R. G(6)(a). This overreaching does
not, however, affect our analysis of Interrogatory No. 2, which was well
within the scope of the rule. Moreover, the argument that these interroga-
tories exceeded the scope of Rule G(6) gives Louis little assistance here
because the government served an identical set of discovery requests on
Louis pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before the district
court struck Louis’s responses, and Louis would not have been entitled to
refrain from answering such discovery requests because of their scope. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
. . . .”).
1926 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS
to protect his Fifth Amendment rights while still allowing him
to maintain his claim for the property, even though Louis did
not request any such accommodation. We have recognized
that “courts must seek to accommodate the defendant’s right
against self-incrimination in a civil forfeiture proceeding.”
United States v. Thirteen (13) Mach. Guns, 689 F.2d 861, 864
(9th Cir. 1982); see also 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84
(courts should “explore all possible measures in order to
‘select that means which strikes a fair balance . . . and . . .
accommodates both parties’ ”) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 16 (6th Cir.
1980)). But it is the claimant, and not the district court, who
has the duty of seeking such accommodation in the first
instance. See 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84 (noting that
a district court is required to consider accommodation “if
there is a timely request made to the court”); United States v.
566 Hendrickson Blvd., 986 F.2d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that claimant’s accommodation argument failed
because “at no time did claimant request any such relief from
the District Court”). Because Louis failed to seek such accom-
modation, he cannot now claim that the district court erred in
failing to provide it.

[13] Louis’s remaining arguments also fail. First, he argues
that the district court’s decision to strike his discovery
responses was equivalent to making an adverse inference
against him for failure to testify. “It is well established that in
a criminal trial a judge or prosecutor may not suggest that the
jury draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to
testify,” United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 962
(9th Cir. 1997), and Louis argues that the bar on such adverse
inferences should also apply to claimants in civil forfeiture
actions, cf. United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24
F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). This argument
fails. The district court did not draw an adverse inference
against Louis; rather, it held that there was not sufficient evi-
dence on the record for him to withstand summary judgment.
 UNITED STATES v. LOUIS 1927
[14] Second, Louis argues that requiring him to answer
questions about his relationship to the currency at an early
stage of the forfeiture proceeding improperly shifts the burden
of proof and requires him to “prove the merits” of his claim
in order to establish Article III standing. Again, Louis is
wrong. Although the burden of proving that the property is
subject to forfeiture is on the government, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c),
the burden of establishing standing is on the claimant, see
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Supp. R. G(8)(c)(ii)(B).

[15] Finally, Louis argues that the district court erred by
failing to consider his Fourth Amendment objections before
striking his responses. Because Louis has not offered any
coherent support for those objections, we reject this argument.

V

Although, at the summary judgment stage of a civil forfei-
ture proceeding, Louis needed only show some evidence that
he owned or lawfully possessed the defendant property, he
failed to do so here. Louis’s ambiguous verified claim was not
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his
Article III standing, and the district court permissibly struck
his response to the government’s Interrogatory No. 2 to pre-
vent him from improperly using the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination as both a sword and shield.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the gov-
ernment’s motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.