UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4594
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN D. EADDY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:10-cr-00278-HEH-1)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 21, 2012
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan D. Eaddy appeals the district court’s 120-
month sentence following his guilty plea to two counts of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006).
On appeal, Eaddy contends that his sentence was unreasonable
because the district court erred in converting cash recovered
from his pockets following his arrest to cocaine base equivalent
for the purpose of calculating his base offense level. Finding
no error, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence, we must ensure that the
district court did not commit any “significant procedural
error,” such as failing to properly calculate the applicable
Guidelines range. The district court is permitted to convert
cash to its drug equivalent if the cash can be “linked credibly
to the defendant’s purchase or sale of narcotics.” United
States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1998). The
Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the
connection between the money seized and the drug-related
activity. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 953 F.2d 1184,
1187 (9th Cir. 1992).
Applying these standards to the record before us, we
conclude that the Government proved by a preponderance of the
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evidence the connection between the cash seized from Eaddy’s
pockets and his drug activity. See United States v. Thomas, 913
F.2d 1111, 1117-18 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that possession of
large amount of cash may be circumstantial evidence of drug
trafficking). Therefore, the district court did not clearly err
by converting the seized cash into its cocaine base equivalent
for the purpose of calculating Eaddy’s base offense level. See
United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1991)
(stating standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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