UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4857
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TERRY WIGGS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00048-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 21, 2012
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia; Kristen Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld
II, United States Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United
States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terry Lee Wiggs appeals from his twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. On
appeal, Wiggs alleges that his sentence was plainly
unreasonable. We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
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sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The
twenty-four month prison term does not exceed the applicable
maximum allowed by statute. The district court considered the
argument of Wiggs’ counsel, the Guidelines advisory range, the
recommendation of the Government, and relevant § 3553(a)
factors, addressing on the record Wiggs’ history and
characteristics, the nature and circumstances of his violative
behavior, the need for the sentence to deter Wiggs, and Wiggs’
breach of trust following prior lenient treatment. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2010). The
district court adequately explained its rationale for imposing
sentence, and the reasons relied upon are proper bases for the
sentence imposed.
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Accordingly, we conclude that Wiggs’ sentence was
reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s order imposing
the twenty-four-month prison sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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