The opinion of the court was delivered, by
Strong, J.The objects sought to be attained by the bill are mainly such as are attainable by a writ of quo warranto, and it might perhaps he questioned whether they can be secured in a court of equity. ■ A portion of the relief sought, however, is such as a court of law cannot give, and it is not assigned as one of the grounds of the demurrer that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy *275at law. We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the hill exhibits a case entitling the plaintiff to relief.
It avers in substance that the Erie and Pittsburg Railroad Company, of which the plaintiff is a stockholder, having a portion of its authorized capital stock undisposed of, prescribed a time and manner for subscription. of that which had previously remained untalcen; that afterwards, and, so far as it appears, at the time and in the manner prescribed, John Van McCullom, one of the defendants, subscribed for all the stock that remained untaken, to wit, 7460 shares; that the company received his subscription, that he then paid on account of each share $5 ; that the company-issued certificates of stock for the stock thus taken ; and that at the annual election next succeeding he was permitted to vote such shares. It is not averred that there was any fraud in the subscription or that the plaintiff or any other person was denied the privilege of subscribing or that the stock taken by McCullom was worth more than its par value at which he took it, but the bill rests upon the assumption that the directors of the company had no power thus to dispose of their untaken stock, and that McCullom could not thus acquire the rights of a stockholder to vote at an election.
The bill also avers that an Act of Assembly was passed pn the 10th day of February 1865, by which it was enacted that the board of directors of the Erie and Pittsburg Railroad Company be authorized to receive subscriptions for all or any part of the unsubscribed stock of said company under such regulations as to time and manner of such subscription as said directors should prescribe, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding, and that the subscribers to said stock should have the same rights in said company as if they had been original subscribers thereto. Provided, that any person subscribing therefor should pay at the time of subscribing $5 on each share so subscribed. But the plaintiff insists that this act is of no force because it is an unwarranted infringement upon the rights of those who were stockholders at the time of its passage. And much of the argument has been expended in assailing and sustaining the validity of the enactment. We are of opinion, however, that the discussion was unnecessary, for without the act the directors of the company had power to receive subscriptions for all the untaken stock and issue certificates therefor. And the moment this was done the holder became a stockholder and entitled to the rights of a stockholder. The company was incorporated without any appointment of commissioners to receive subscriptions for stock, but it was enacted that the stock should consist of 20,000 shares of $50 each. It was not required that any portion of it should be subscribed or paid in before the organization of the company, but the corporation was endowed at once with all the rights and privileges conferred *276by the General Railroad Act and its supplements. Of course subscriptions for stock were authorized after the organization until the authorized amount had been taken. And what else do new subscribers become than stockholders having equal rights with others ? The law authorizes no distinction between the rights of one stockholder and those of another. If one has not paid his subscription in full he is a debtor for so much as remains unpaid, but he is none the less a shareholder.
It is insisted, however, that the directors had no right to allow McCullom to subscribe and thus obtain the untaken stock because it belonged to the old stockholders, and it should have been sold for their benefit, or they should have been allowed to take it in proportion to the shares they held. It would be a sufficient answer to this to say the bill does not allege that the plaintiff or any of the old stockholders offered or that they are willing to take it at par, nor does it allege that the stock could have been sold at a higher price than par. It therefore sets forth nothing that is injurious to the complainant. But when it is said that the untaken stock belonged to the old stockholders, more is meant than can be admitted. In a certain sense the assertion is true. But it is not to be admitted that an old stockholder had a right to subscribe to the untaken stock superior to the right of one who owned no stock. If this were so a first subscriber might compel all the remaining untaken stock to be sold, or, at least, would have a right to exclude any other person from subscribing.
The cases upon which the plaintiff relies are inapplicable to the case now in hand. In Gray v. The Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, it was held that when a banking company had been incorporated with a capital not less than one sum and not greater than another and had commenced business with the smaller capital, and after-wards voted to increase to the largest, those who held the stock in the capital first raised had a prior right to subscribe to the new stock. The case was really decided by two judges of a court consisting of five, but assuming its ruling to be sound law, it is unlike the case we have. Here is no increase of capital but a filling up of one both authorized and required. This is a substantial difference. So the case of Reese v. The Bank of Montgomery County, 7 Casey 78, decides nothing more than that untaken stock is-held by the corporation in trust for the corporators, and must be disposed of for the benefit of all; that it cannot be disposed of unequally to the corporators, and that if so disposed of, each corporator injured may have his action against the corporation. Neither of these cases decides that a stockholder has any greater right than a stranger to subscribe to original stock untaken. And we are unable to see why the directors of the Erie and Pittsburg Railroad could not permit McCullom to subscribe for all the untaken stock, why they could not issue certificates to him when he *277had subscribed, and why, having become thus a stockholder, he could not vote at an election. The Act of 1865 was then unnecessary, it was but a re-enactment of that which had been previously enacted.
The bill also assails another Act of Assembly, passed on the 21st day of March 1865, by which the board of directors of the company was authorized to issue preferred stock. It avers that the plaintiff never agreed to any such issue, that the act was procured without his assent and that he did not know of its passage until months after it had been enacted. It also charges that it is the intention of the company to issue such preferred stock. But why this is illegal or how it is injurious to the plaintiff the bill does not show. Doubtless the Act of Assembly did not effect an alteration in the charter until accepted, but the hill does not deny that it was accepted by the stockholders. It admits it was by the board of directors. 'Clearly if accepted by the stockholders, the directors are authorized to issue a preferred stock, and their doing so is no wrong to the complainant, though he may be opposed to their action. It is not to be questioned that the legislature may confer enlarged powers upon the managers of a corporation with the assent of the shareholders, and that no one stockholder, by refusing his assent, can hinder the exercise of the enlarged powers.
From what has been said it will be seen that, in our opinion, the plaintiff’s bill exhibits no case calling upon a court of equity to grant him relief. The demurrer must, therefore, be sustained and the bill dismissed.