The opinion of the court was delivered,
by
Williams, J.We have no doubt of the validity of such a contract, as is alleged in the bill, if founded on a sufficient consideration, or of the power of the court to restrain its breach by injunction. Our doubt in this case arises from the insufficiency of the proof to establish the existence of the alleged agreement. It cannot be inferred from the sale of the good-will of the business, and it is expressly denied in the answer. The sealed agreement between the parties, given in evidence by the plaintiff, contains no stipulation or covenant on the part of the defendant, either to retire from the business or not to resume it again in the city of Philadelphia; and in this respect it fully corroborates and sustains the answer. Nor is there any sufficient evidence that such a stipulation was omitted through the fraud of the defendant, or the mistake of the parties. The only evidence from which such an inference could possibly arise is the testimony of Joseph R. and Alexander Black, but neither of these witnesses proves that it was one of the express terms and conditions of the sale, that the defendant was to retire from the business, and not to resume it again in the city of Philadelphia. On the contrary, their testimony amounts to no more than the declaration of the defendant’s intention not to go into the business again in Philadelphia on account of the state of his health, which had compelled him to give it up. The fair inference from their testimony in connection with the blank left in the agreement is, that while the defendant declared it to be his intention and purpose not to resume the business, he was unwilling and refused to bind himself by a positive stipula*463tion not to resume it at any time thereafter. This inference is greatly strengthened by the plaintiff’s admissions to Balderston and Fogg, after the defendant had resumed the business, and by the fact that he furnished him, without remonstrance or objection, goods to carry on the business for two or three months after he had resumed it. As the alleged agreement is in restraint of trade, its existence should be established by clear and satisfactory evidence in order to justify the court in restraining its breach by injunction. There should be no doubt or uncertainty in regard to its terms, or the consideration upon which it was founded. Here the parties have put their contract in writing, and it must be allowed to speak for itself, unless it is clearly shown that the stipulation in question was omitted through fraud or mistake. Under the proofs in this case, a court of equity would not reform the agreement as written and sealed by the parties; and if they had not reduced their contract to writing, the evidence would be wholly insufficient to establish it, as alleged by the plaintiff.
But there is more of substance in the complaint as to the manner in which the defendant is carrying on the business- of an undertaker. He sold the good-will of his business to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration, and good faith requires that he should do nothing which directly tends to deprive him of its benefits and advantages. The bill charges, and the evidence shows, that he is holding himself out to the public by advertisements, as having removed from his former place of business, No. 1313 Vine street, to his present place of business, No. 1539 Yine street, where he will continue his former business. It is clear that he had no right to hold himself out as continuing the business which he sold to the plaintiff, or as carrying on his former business at another place to which he has removed: Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Ch. Rep. 214; Chinton v. Douglas, 1 John. Eng. Ch. Rep. 174. While, therefore, the appellant is entitled to have the decree of the court below, restraining him from conducting or carrying on his business of undertaking, &c., within the limits of the city of _ Philadelphia, reversed, it must be so modified, as to restrain him from holding himself out to the public by advertisement or otherwise as continuing his former business, or as carrying it on at another place.
Let the decree be drawn up under the rule.