FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 24, 2012
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 10-1499
SALVADOR MENDOZA-LOPEZ, also
known as Ramon Hernandez, also known
as Ramon Chavez-Gomez, also known as
Ramon Ramirez-Mendosa, also known as
Salvador Mendoza, also known as
Salvadore Mendoza-Lopez,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:10-CR-00011-MSK-1)
O. Dean Sanderford, Research and Writing Specialist (Raymond P. Moore,
Federal Public Defender, Brian R. Leedy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and
Barbara L. Costa, Research and Writing Specialist, on the brief), Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant.
Andrew A. Vogt, Assistant United States Attorney (John F. Walsh, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
Salvador Mendoza-Lopez appeals his sentence, arguing the district court
denied him his right of allocution. Applying the plain error standard of review,
this court concludes the district court erred by inviting Mendoza-Lopez to speak
only with respect to where within the Guidelines range the court should sentence
him. This error, however, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), this court affirms the sentence imposed
by the district court.
II. Background
Mendoza-Lopez pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful re-entry after
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
calculated Mendoza-Lopez’s total offense level at twenty-one and placed him in
criminal history category V, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of seventy
to eighty-seven months. The PSR recommended a sentence of seventy months.
Mendoza-Lopez filed motions for departure and variance, seeking a
sentence of forty months. He argued he qualified for a downward departure under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) because criminal history category V over-represented the
seriousness of his prior record. He argued he qualified for a variance primarily
because a sixteen-level increase in his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2 was unwarranted as it was not the product of the Sentencing
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Commission’s expertise and institutional role. The PSR disagreed with Mendoza-
Lopez’s request for a downward departure but took no position on whether a
variance was warranted. At sentencing, Mendoza-Lopez’s counsel reiterated at
length his arguments for a departure and variance. The district court, in a lengthy
statement from the bench, denied both motions and accepted the PSR’s
recommended Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months.
Immediately thereafter the court said: “It’s the Court[’s] intention to
sentence within that Guideline range.” It then invited both Mendoza-Lopez’s
counsel, and Mendoza-Lopez himself to address “where within that range this
Court should sentence.” Following these statements, Mendoza-Lopez’s counsel
reiterated his arguments for a departure and variance, asserting that an
individualized analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported a sentence
below the advisory Guidelines range. The court assured Mendoza-Lopez’s
counsel it had taken into account the § 3553(a) factors and would continue to do
so “when it now imposes sentence within the Guideline range.” The court then
addressed Mendoza-Lopez, saying “you have the opportunity to address the Court
now if you wish.” Mendoza-Lopez said: “I would simply like to say that I
apologize, I’m sorry for having come back. I’d like you to know that I have small
children in Mexico who need me to support them by working. That’s really all.”
After Mendoza-Lopez’s allocution, the government argued that a sentence
within the advisory Guidelines range was appropriate and the PSR’s
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recommendation of seventy months was also appropriate. The government
ultimately requested a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. The
district court sentenced Mendoza-Lopez to seventy months. The court stated that,
in arriving at this sentence, it considered Mendoza-Lopez’s previous removals
and illegal reentries and other criminal offenses, the argument his counsel made
for a variance, and that it was “sympathetic with the fact that the defendant has a
wife and two small children that very much need him back home.”
Mendoza-Lopez appeals his sentence, arguing the district court violated his
right of allocution by definitively announcing its intention to impose a sentence
within the advisory Guidelines range before inviting him to speak. He argues the
district court effectively communicated to him that he would not have a
meaningful opportunity to persuade the district court to consider a below-
Guidelines sentence.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Both parties recognize that because Mendoza-Lopez did not object to the
district court’s alleged denial of his right of allocution, this court reviews for
plain error. See United States v. Rausch, 638 F.3d 1296, 1299 & n.1 (10th Cir.
2011) (adopting the plain error standard of review for alleged violations of the
right of allocution when the defendant failed to object below). “Plain error
occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects the defendant’s
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substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1299 (quotation and alteration
omitted).
B. Discussion
Before imposing sentence, the sentencing court must “address the defendant
personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to
mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). This court has held the
sentencing court “actually must take steps to communicate effectively to the
defendant, that, through his statement, he has a meaningful opportunity to
influence the sentence.” United States v. Landeros-Lopez, 615 F. 3d 1260, 1266,
1268 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “Belatedly inviting the defendant to
speak after announcing his sentence does not satisfy this standard, even if the
sentence has yet to be formally imposed.” Id. at 1266. In Landeros-Lopez, prior
to inviting the defendant to allocute, the district court announced “it is and will be
the judgment of this Court that the defendant . . . be imprisoned for a term of 115
months.” Id. at 1265. The court also stated the defendant “shall be placed on
supervised release for a term of five years.” Id. This court noted that after
making “these seemingly conclusive pronouncements, the court then described the
conditions of confinement and supervised release, informed Landeros of his right
to appeal, and stated: ‘That is the sentence the Court intends to impose in this
matter. Does the defendant have anything to say before the Court imposes this
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sentence?’” Id. The defendant proceeded to allocute and the court filed a
judgment imposing the sentence several days later. Id. at 1265-66. We held that
the district court violated the defendant’s right of allocution:
By definitively announcing Landeros’ sentence before providing him
with an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, the district court
prematurely adjudged his sentence. The court’s conclusive
statements effectively communicated to Landeros that his sentence
had already been determined, and that he would not have a
meaningful opportunity to influence that sentence through his
statements to the court.
Id. at 1268. We also concluded “the court’s later remark that it merely ‘intended’
to impose this sentence did not cure its initial error” because this statement
“failed to indicate that the court would genuinely reconsider the adjudged
sentence in light of any remarks made by the defendant.” Id.
This court has also held that a defendant’s right of allocution is violated if
a district court indicates it is unwilling to listen to the statements or information a
defendant wishes to offer in mitigation of his sentence. United States v. Jarvi,
537 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2008). In Jarvi, the defendant filed a written
pro se motion prior to sentencing, objecting to several recommendations made in
the PSR which served to substantially increase his offense level. Id. at 1258. The
district court, however, refused to consider the pro se motion because the
defendant was represented by counsel. Id. At sentencing the court addressed the
defendant, stating: “Keeping in mind that I’m not going to consider these pro se
objections that you’ve made to the presentence report, are there any other aspects
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of the presentence report that you would object to?” Id. at 1259 (alteration
omitted). The defendant then twice attempted to present arguments made in his
pro se motion. Id. Both times, however, the district court told the defendant it
was “not going to listen” to those arguments. Id. This court noted that a
defendant’s right of allocution is “a broad right to ‘present any information to
mitigate the sentence.’” Id. at 1262 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii)).
We observed that both times the defendant “attempted to speak to one of the
issues he thought most relevant to his sentence,” the district court told him it was
not going to listen to arguments on that issue. Id. at 1261. The defendant,
however, “evidently regarded the arguments in his motion as his best case for
mitigating [his] sentence.” Id. at 1262. Thus, “[b]y ordering him not to make
those arguments, the [district court] . . . failed to ‘permit the defendant to speak
or present any information to mitigate the sentence,’” and therefore violated the
defendant’s right of allocution. Id. at 1261-62 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii)).
In support of this holding, we pointed to a Ninth Circuit case, which held
that a defendant’s right of allocution was denied “when the court invited him to
speak, but only as to ‘what would be the appropriate sentence within the
Guidelines range.’” Id. at 1262 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v.
Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1995)). We stated: “If that was an error
when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, it is even more important now
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that the Guidelines are advisory to allow the defendant an opportunity to argue for
a variance from the Guidelines range.” Id.
In this case, the court announced its “intention to sentence within [the]
Guideline range” before it invited Mendoza-Lopez to allocute. Mendoza-Lopez
argues that this statement, standing alone, is sufficient for this court to conclude
the district court abridged his right of allocution. This statement is not conclusive
like those made in Landeros-Lopez, where the court announced “it is and will be
the judgment of this Court that the defendant . . . be imprisoned for a term of 115
months,” and the defendant “shall be placed on supervised release for a term of
five years.” 615 F.3d at 1265. Thus, Mendoza-Lopez has not met his burden of
showing the district court plainly erred by making this narrow statement of
“intention.” He has not shown the court, by its mere statement of intention,
prematurely adjudged his sentence or communicated to him his sentence was
predetermined and he had no meaningful opportunity to influence that sentence
through his statements to the court. Indeed, in Landeros-Lopez, this court
suggested it is not error for a district court to announce its mere intention to
impose a particular sentence. Id. at 1268 (considering whether, despite the
court’s “conclusive statements” regarding sentence, its “later remark that it
merely ‘intended’ to impose this sentence” cured the court’s original error).
The district court did plainly err, however, by inviting Mendoza-Lopez to
address only “where within [the Guidelines] range this Court should sentence.”
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This statement indicates the court was not willing to listen to any statements or
information Mendoza-Lopez might wish to offer in support of a sentence below
the advisory Guidelines range. Thus, the court violated Mendoza-Lopez’s right of
allocution by failing to permit him to “speak or present any information to
mitigate the sentence.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
Moreover, this error is plain in light of Jarvi. See United States v. Thornburgh,
645 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011) (“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious
under current, well-settled law.” (quotation omitted)).
With regard to the third prong of the plain error test, our prior precedent
appears to “presume prejudice for allocution errors.” Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1301
n.2. Even presuming Mendoza-Lopez’s substantial rights were affected, however,
he failed to show the district court’s error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (“We note . . . that
establishing prejudice does not necessarily mean that the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Indeed, the
third and fourth prongs of plain-error review are independent inquiries.”
(quotation omitted)). This court has stated that denial of the right of allocution
“‘is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage
of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.’” Id. at 1301 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). In determining whether the fourth prong of the plain error
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test is met, the seriousness of the error must be examined in the context of the
case as a whole. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997); see also
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985) (“[E]ach case necessarily turns on
its own facts.” (quotation omitted)). In this case, the district court’s error did not
result in a total denial of Mendoza-Lopez’s right of allocution. The district court
addressed Mendoza-Lopez personally, inviting him to speak or present
information to mitigate his sentence. Mendoza-Lopez did so; he apologized for
committing the offense and said that he had small children in Mexico who relied
on him for support. Moreover, the record shows the court considered this
mitigating information in arriving at Mendoza-Lopez’s ultimate sentence of
seventy months. On these particular facts, we are satisfied the district court’s
error in inviting Mendoza-Lopez to address only where within the advisory
Guidelines range the court should sentence him does not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the sentencing proceeding.
This case is distinguishable from both Landeros-Lopez and Jarvi, where
this court remanded for resentencing after concluding the district court violated
the defendant’s right of allocution. Unlike in Landeros-Lopez, the district court
in this case did not conclusively adjudge Mendoza-Lopez’s sentence prior to
allocution so as to leave the impression anything Mendoza-Lopez said would be
disregarded out of hand. See Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1267-68. Further,
while similar to the error in Jarvi, the error in this case does not warrant remand
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for resentencing. In Jarvi, this court did not decide whether the fourth prong of
the plain error test was met because we did not apply the plain error standard of
review. See Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1299 n.1 (noting that, as of 2011, this court had
not yet expressly adopted a standard of review for alleged violations of the right
of allocution when the defendant failed to object below). Moreover, unlike in
Jarvi, the district court in this case did not expressly forbid Mendoza-Lopez from
speaking or presenting any mitigating information, much less order him not to
make arguments he regarded as his “best case” for mitigating his sentence. See
Jarvi, 537 F.3d at 1261-62. Additionally, in Jarvi, we noted the defendant’s
objections to the PSR’s recommendations regarding his base offense level
essentially went unheard because the district court not only refused to consider
the defendant’s pro se motions but also refused to hear arguments in support of
those objections via the defendant’s allocution. See id. at 1262 (“Mr. Jarvi is
entitled to have considered—at least once—his arguments for mitigation of his
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”). In contrast, the district court in this case
heard and carefully considered Mendoza-Lopez’s arguments for a downward
departure and variance.
Our conclusion is also supported by Mendoza-Lopez’s failure to either set
forth what he would have said to the district court prior to sentencing that might
have mitigated his sentence or show some objective basis that would have moved
the trial court to grant a lower sentence. See Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1302; United
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States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States
v. Magwood, 445 F.3d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[D]efendants have to show
some basis that would have moved the trial court to grant a lower sentence;
otherwise, it can hardly be said that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.”
(quotation omitted)).
IV. Conclusion
We are not persuaded the error in this case, when examined in the context
of the record as a whole, was “particularly egregious” or that failure to correct it
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta,
403 F.3d 727, 736-37 (10th Cir. 2005). We therefore affirm Mendoza-Lopez’s
sentence.
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