[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 2, 2008
No. 07-15759 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 06-00859-CV-W-N
CASSANDRA L. MILNER,
a.k.a. Cassandra L. Dean,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant,
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 2, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cassandra Milner appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383. On appeal, Milner argues that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by (1) finding that her mental impairment
did not meet or equal Listing 12.05(C); (2) not giving substantial weight to the
opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Pineda; and (3) giving substantial weight to
the opinions of non-examining physicians, Dr. Rankart and Dr. McKeown.
We review a social security appeal to determine whether the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997).
Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In
conducting this limited review, we may not decide the facts anew, make credibility
determinations, or re-weigh the evidence. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233,
1239 (11th Cir. 1983). We review de novo the Commissioner’s legal conclusions.
Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Having reviewed the record and considered the briefs of the parties, we find
no reversible error in applying these standards. First, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that Milner did not meet Listing 12.05(C) because Milner’s IQ
score of 67 was inconsistent with her daily activities and behavior, and her severe
mental impairment of schizophrenia was controlled by medication and did not
significantly interfere with her ability to maintain daily living activities, function
socially, or maintain concentration. Second, we find no error in the ALJ’s decision
to accord little weight to the opinion of Dr. Pineda because there was no evidence
that Dr. Pineda treated Milner more than once, his opinion was conclusory, and his
opinion was inconsistent with Milner’s treatment record and other medical
opinions. Because the ALJ stated specific reasons discrediting the treating
physician’s opinion, and his reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is
no reversible error.
Finally, the ALJ did not err by giving substantial weight to the opinions of
the non-examining physicians. The ALJ is required to consider the opinions of
non-examining state agency medical and psychological consultants because they
“are highly qualified physicians and psychologists who are also experts in Social
Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i). The ALJ may rely
on opinions of non-examining sources when they do not conflict with those of
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examining sources. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584–85 (11th Cir. 1991).
In this case, because those opinions did not conflict with the opinions of examining
sources, the ALJ did not err in giving these opinions significant weight.
AFFIRMED.
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