UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4440
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REX DEAN PENLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00025-NCT-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Graham T.
Green, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rex Dean Penland appeals the 120-month sentence
imposed by the district court upon his plea of guilty to one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). We
affirm.
Penland claims his above-Guidelines sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonableness. We review a
sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step
in this review requires us to inspect for procedural
reasonableness by ensuring that the district court committed no
significant procedural errors, such as improperly calculating
the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th
Cir. 2010). We then consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. No presumption of
unreasonableness attaches to a sentence outside of a properly-
calculated Guidelines range. Id.
Penland contends that the district court inadequately
explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. We do not find
that to be the case. The district court set forth a cogent and
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lengthy explanation laying out its rationale for Penland’s
sentence. Its reasoning clearly appears on the record: the
court found that no sentence would deter Penland from committing
future crimes upon release and therefore the statutory maximum
sentence was necessary to protect the public. We therefore deny
Penland’s procedural challenge.
Penland’s substantive challenge claims that the
district court erred in its assessment of Penland and the threat
that he poses to society. From our appellate perch, we
recognize that deference is due to the district court’s
sentence, even if we would have arrived at a somewhat different
balancing of the § 3553(a) factors in the first instance. See
United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 187 (2011). Although Penland’s statutory
maximum sentence represents a significant variance from the
Guidelines range, the record supports the necessity of the
variance in this case. To find otherwise would imbue the
Guidelines with more than an advisory weight.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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