FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 28 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR A. COFFMAN, III, No. 11-35009
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05174-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Arthur A. Coffman III appeals from the district court’s decision affirming
the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision, which
concluded that Coffman is not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits under Title
II or Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
U.S.C. §§ 401–34, 1381–83. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
AFFIRM.
The Commissioner’s decision may be reversed only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). Coffman contends that the Appeals Council erred by
not remanding in light of new evidence that Coffman submitted to the Appeals
Council. When the Appeals Council denies a request for review, the ALJ’s
decision becomes the final decision of the Commissioner, which we review on this
appeal. The denial of review itself is a non-final agency action not subject to
judicial review. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th
Cir. 2011). However, we can and here do consider the evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council “to determine whether, in light of the record as a whole, the
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free of legal error.”
Id. at 1232.
Coffman contends that the ALJ improperly rejected his testimony because
the reasons he gave were not clear and convincing. See Reddick v. Chater, 157
F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ discounted Coffman’s credibility based on
inconsistent statements he made to his treatment providers and to the
Commissioner. For example, Coffman denied substance abuse to some health care
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providers but reported it to others; and his account of his disabling head injury is
inconsistent with his earning records and with the report of his employer, who did
not mention a head injury or note any change in his behavior at the time of the
head injury. These findings are clear and convincing reasons to reject Coffman’s
testimony and are based on substantial evidence in the record. We are not
persuaded by Coffman’s attempts to explain away these inconsistences.
Coffman also contends that the ALJ did not fully and fairly consider the
medical evidence, by giving insufficient weight to the opinions of Dr. Diller
(Coffman’s treating physician), Ms. Lagdan (Coffman’s treating psychiatric nurse)
and several examining psychologists. The opinion of a treating physician can be
rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. Id. at 725. Testimony from “other
sources,” such as nurse practitioners, can be disregarded for germane reasons.
Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2010).
The ALJ rejected the opinion of treating physician Dr. Diller because he
“seems unaware of [Coffman’s] drug seeking behavior and does not address
[Coffman’s] disability conviction or lack of objective findings.” The ALJ also
found that “Ms. Lagdan is completely unaware of any history of substance abuse
and finds that [Coffman] had bipolar disorder when there is no evidence of mania.”
Coffman contends that these are not valid reasons to reject the opinions of Dr.
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Diller and Ms. Lagdan, but does little more than recount those opinions, quote the
applicable legal standards, and assert that the ALJ erred. We hold that the ALJ’s
reasons meet the applicable legal standards and are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Regarding Coffman’s examining psychologists, the ALJ found that Coffman
“has had a number of psychological evaluations but the diagnoses have varied
significantly because [Coffman’s] presentation and reported symptoms have
changed.” The ALJ weighed the medical evidence opinions and gave the most
weight to Dr. McCollom, who concluded that Coffman’s alcohol and drug abuse
was a major contributor to his mental impairments, and that these impairments
would likely cause him to have mild to moderate impairments handling work
related stress over a normal 40-hour work week. Dr. McCollom said that
Coffman’s prognosis for work was poor because of his substance abuse, but that
with treatment Coffman may be able to work.
The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the medical
testimony. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ “is entitled to draw inferences
logically flowing from the evidence” and “need not substitute the judgment of
expert witnesses for his own.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.
1982). The evidence suggests that Coffman reported drinking daily and abusing
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prescription drugs to some mental health professionals while denying past and
present substance abuse to others. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
inference that Coffman has had continuous problems with substance abuse, which
he periodically concealed from his medical providers. Substantial evidence also
supports the ALJ’s finding that Coffman’s symptoms have been inconsistent, and
the inference that Coffman has not been wholly honest with his treatment providers
about his symptoms follows logically from these inconsistencies and the ALJ’s
negative credibility finding. These are clear and convincing reasons to discount
the opinions of the examining psychologists.
Because the ALJ did not err in discounting Coffman’s credibility or
improperly weigh the medical evidence, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
assessment is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ properly relied on the
testimony of the vocational expert to conclude that Coffman could perform work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
AFFIRMED.
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