UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4662
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STANLEY ARNOLD GREENE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00949-RBH-1)
Submitted: February 13, 2012 Decided: February 29, 2012
Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lionel S. Lofton, LOFTON & LOFTON, P.C., Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stanley Arnold Greene appeals his conviction following
a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
On appeal, Greene contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the gun officers found in the
trunk of his vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion
to suppress, “[w]e review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
2010). When the district court has denied a suppression motion,
“we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” Id.
Greene first contends that the vehicle search was
invalid because it was not incident to a lawful arrest. While
Greene’s factual premise is accurate, his conclusion is not. 1
There is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement
for automobile searches. Under this exception, “[i]f a car is
1
Greene contends for the first time that the officers did
not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the open-
air canine sniff. (Appellants Reply Br. at 1-5, 4th Cir. ECF
No. 30). However, because Greene did not raise that issue in
his opening brief, he has abandoned that claim. See Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
2
readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search
the vehicle without more.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.
938, 940 (1996) (citation omitted). Further, “it is well
settled that a ‘positive alert’ from a drug detection dog, in
and of itself, provides probable cause to search a vehicle.”
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008).
Greene’s second argument — that the search of the
trunk was outside the scope of a warrantless search — is
likewise meritless. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 (“The scope
of a search pursuant to [the automobile] exception is as broad
as a magistrate could authorize. Thus, once police have
probable cause, they may search ‘every part of the vehicle and
its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’”)
(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)
(citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 2
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
2
Because we conclude that the officer had probable cause to
search Greene’s vehicle based on the canine’s positive
indication of narcotics, we find it unnecessary to address
Greene’s additional argument regarding the applicability of the
doctrine of inevitable discovery.
3
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4