UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7499
TRAVIS LEON DAVIDSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT RATLIFF; NICOLE MACE; WESLEY ROBINSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:11-cv-01072-RBH)
Submitted: February 27, 2012 Decided: March 1, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Travis Leon Davidson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Leon Davidson seeks to appeal the district
court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)
complaint. The district court’s final order was entered on
July 22, 2011. We construe Davidson’s notice of appeal as
having been filed, at the earliest, on November 4, 2011, the
date on his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1);
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 277 (1988). In his notice of
appeal, Davidson stated that he did not receive notice of the
district court’s order in time to file a timely notice of
appeal.
Parties are accorded thirty days after entry of the
district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period
is mandatory and jurisdictional. See Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“Today we make clear that the timely
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.”).
Davidson’s notice of appeal is clearly untimely.
However, under Rule 4(a)(6), the district court may reopen the
time to file an appeal if (1) the moving party did not receive
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notice of entry of judgment within twenty-one days after entry,
(2) the motion is filed within 180 days of entry of judgment or
within fourteen days of receiving notice from the court,
whichever is earlier, and (3) no party would be prejudiced. We
accordingly remand for the limited purpose of permitting the
district court to determine whether Davidson is entitled to the
benefit of Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen the time to file an appeal.
The record, as supplemented, will then be returned to this court
for further consideration.
REMANDED
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