Opinion,
Mr. Justice Clark:The defendant is the proprietor of a restaurant in the city of Pittsburgh; his business consists, in part, in furnishing meals to transient and regular patrons, who pay for the same daily or by the meal, according to the ordinary usage in that business. From the facts set forth in the case stated it appears that on January 31, 1889, William McRay and George Spence called at this restaurant and ordered meals, which were served to them in the usual manner. Among other food furnished by the defendant on this occasion was a small quantitj'- of what appeared to be butter, but which in fact was oleomargarine, an article of manufacture and sale which is prohibited by the act of May 21, 1885, P. L. 22, entitled “ An Act for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the sale thereof.” It is admitted that this oleomargarine was furnished for food, as an imitation of butter, and that it was designed to take the place of butter in the meals' thus served. McRay and Spence, having partaken of the food served to them, paid each fifty cents for their meals, “ including said small dish of oleomargarine,” which, however, for some reason they did not eat, but carried the same away, presumably for examination. This suit is brought to recover the penalty provided in the third section of the act, for the manufacture or sale of the prohibited article, and the single question for our determination is whether or not, under the facts stated, there was a sale of the oleomargarine, within the meaning of the act referred to.
The purpose of the act is expressed in the title. It is to prevent adulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the sale thereof, and to protect the public health. It is plain that the exact legislative intent was to prevent the sale, and thereby prevent the use of these adulterations and admixtures as articles of food. It was the use, as food, and the frauds perpetrated upon *123the public in the sale, which was the mischief to be remedied; and the statute, of course, must be construed with reference to the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. That the food furnished to McRay and Spence, or so much of it as they saw fit to appropriate, was sold to them, cannot be reasonably questioned ; when it was set before them, it was theirs to all intents and purposes, to eat all, or a part, as they chose, subject only to the restaurateur’s right to receive the price, which it is admitted was promptly paid. They might not eat all of the article set before them, but they had an undoubted right to do so; and, even assuming that the meal is the portion of food' taken, in the sense stated, the transaction must be regarded as a sale wholly within the purport and meaning of the statute. It is certain that.-the oleomargarine composed a part of the meal the price of which was paid, and was embraced in the transaction as an integral part thereof. If an unlicensed keeper of a restaurant may set before his guests a bottle of wine, or other intoxicating liquor, charging a regular price for the same, with other articles of food furnished, with liberty to take much or little of the liquor as the guest may choose, or, failing to drink it with his meal, permit him to take it away with him, then the liquor laws of the commonwealth are of no avail, and the license to sell liquor is wholly unnecessary. When the liquor is thus furnished and paid for, it is in legal effect a sale, for the very act has been done which it is the policy of the law to prevent, and which it characterizes as a crime, viz., furnishing intoxicating liquors at a price which is paid. So, in this case, the oleomargarine was furnished to the person named as food, and the price was paid. As the learned judge of the court below well said, it was not given away, and the fact that it was not sold separately, but with other articles, for a gross sum, would not make it less a sale. It therefore comes within the letter of the law, and it is also within its spirit. If the use of such articles is injurious, it would seem to be especially within the spirit of the act to prohibit public caterers from selling them to their guests as part of an ordinary meal. Penal statutes are to be strictly construed, but both the letter and the spirit of the act of 1885 cover this case, and we think the judgment was properly entered.
Judgment affirmed.