UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4165
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DANIEL SCOTT HOPPER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00016-MR-1)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: March 2, 2012
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Angela Parrott, Acting Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Ann L. Hester, Rahwa
Gebre-Egziabher, Assistant Federal Defender, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Asssistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Scott Hopper pled guilty to one count of armed
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2006)
(Count One), and one count of possessing and brandishing a
firearm in furtherance of the bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (Count Two). The district
court sentenced Hopper to a total of 114 months in prison,
thirty months for Count One and a consecutive term of
eighty-four months for Count Two. The district court also
ordered Hopper to reimburse the United States for his
court-appointed attorneys’ fees. Hopper timely appealed.
On appeal, Hopper first contends that his sentence was
unreasonable. This court reviews sentences for reasonableness,
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Llamas, 599
F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). Our review of the record leads
us to conclude that, when selecting a sentence for Count One,
the district court properly considered both the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors and the fact that Hopper faced a
statutory minimum consecutive sentence for Count Two.
Therefore, we find the term of imprisonment imposed by the
district court to be both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
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Hopper also claims that the district court erred in
requiring him to reimburse the United States for his
court-appointed attorneys’ fees. We review the district court’s
legal analysis in a reimbursement order de novo, and its factual
findings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore, 666
F.3d 313, 2012 WL 208041, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012). In
Moore, we recently held that the district court “must base the
reimbursement order on a finding that there are specific funds,
assets, or asset streams (or the fixed right to those funds,
assets or asset streams) that are (1) identified by the court
and (2) available to the defendant for the repayment of the
court-appointed attorneys’ fees.” Id. at *6. Because the
district court made no such finding in Moore, we found that the
district court had erred, vacated the portion of Moore’s
sentence relating to the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, and
remanded for resentencing only on that issue. Id. at *9.
Similarly, in the case at hand, the district court made no
determination as to Hopper’s current ability to pay.
Accordingly we vacate Hopper’s sentence and remand for further
proceedings in light of Moore.
We affirm Hopper’s conviction which he does not
challenge on appeal. Furthermore, we affirm Hopper’s sentence
of imprisonment. In light of our decision in Moore, we vacate
only that portion of Hopper’s sentence ordering repayment of
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attorneys’ fees and remand to the district court for
resentencing on this portion of the judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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