[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10294 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 1, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-02628-JDW-TBM
EMMANUEL EBEH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ST. PAUL TRAVELERS,
CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
PAT REDMOND,
JOHN MIKOS,
Dr.,
LAKESIDE OCCUPATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, P.A.,
Defendants-Appellees,
METRO STORAGE, LLC,
Parent Company, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 1, 2012)
Before CARNES, PRYOR, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Emmanuel Ebeh, an African American male proceeding pro se, filed a
lawsuit against St. Paul Travelers, Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, and Pat
Redmond alleging breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.
§ 501.201 et seq., and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district
court dismissed Ebeh’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is
Ebeh’s appeal.
I.
Ebeh filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that the defendants
mishandled his request for workers’ compensation benefits by delaying payments
required by a “three party contract” and “intentionally depriv[ing]” him of
“entitled income.” As a result of that alleged breach of contract, Ebeh could not
pay his rent, was evicted from his home, and lost all of his personal possessions.
He asserts that the defendants’ conduct was “outrageous” and “utterly intolerable
in a civilized society.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. They argued that all of Ebeh’s claims derived from work-related
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injuries and noted that Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act, Fla. Stat. § 440.11,
provides the exclusive legal remedy for on-the-job injuries suffered by workers in
Florida. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. It reasoned that
Ebeh’s claims fell within the scope of the Act, which meant that Florida’s circuit
courts would lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ebeh’s claims. And where
Florida’s state courts lack jurisdiction over an employee’s work-related claims, a
federal district court also lacks jurisdiction over those claims and any other claims
for damages not available under Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme.
II.
“We review de novo a district court’s finding that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides the “exclusive” remedy for
an employee with a grievance against an employer or the employer’s workers’
compensation carrier. Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1), (4). Under that statute, “the
employee relinquishes certain common-law rights with regard to negligence in the
workplace and workplace injuries in exchange for strict liability and the rapid
recovery of benefits.” Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 90 (Fla. 2005);
see also Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1262 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that
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the Act “expressly preempts common law tort remedies for on-the-job injuries
suffered by workers in Florida”).
The only exception to the Act’s exclusivity is “intentional tortious conduct.”
Aguilera, 905 So. 2d at 90; see also id. at 91 (stating that Florida’s workers’
compensation “system does not declare an ‘open season’ with regard to intentional
torts against workers”). An employee with an intentional tort claim against an
employer or an employer’s workers’ compensation carrier may bring suit in
Florida circuit court to recover damages. See id. at 92. Otherwise, the circuit
court lacks jurisdiction over the employee’s claims. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v.
Whitworth, 442 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); see also Sanders v. City
of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2008) (noting that Florida state courts
have “uniformly held . . . that [Florida circuit] courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving workers’ compensation issues”).
We have held that where Florida’s circuit courts lack jurisdiction over an
employee’s work-related claims because of the Act, a federal district court also
lacks jurisdiction to consider those claims and any other claims “for additional
damages over and above the relief that can be obtained” in the state workers’
compensation proceedings. Connolly v. Md. Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 525, 528 (11th
Cir. 1988). Thus, if a plaintiff does not escape the exclusive force of Florida’s
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Workers’ Compensation Act by alleging a viable intentional tort claim, a federal
district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Id. at 528.
III.
We agree with the district court that Ebeh’s complaint does not sufficiently
allege an intentional tort, so the exclusivity of Florida’s workers’ compensation
scheme deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Although Ebeh’s
complaint uses the proper legal terminology to describe an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, the alleged facts underlying that claim establish nothing
more than breach of contract and unreasonably delayed payments. The gravamen
of his complaint is that he was a beneficiary of a “three party contract” and the
defendants “deprived him of a regular entitled income which caused [him] to be
unable to pay his bills and support his family.” Those facts do not support a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, regardless of the legal
terminology that Ebeh uses to couch his allegations. “[A] complaint requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); see also Connolly, 849 F.2d at 526 (“[A]
compensation claimant cannot avoid the exclusivity of [Florida’s Workers’
Compensation Act] and transform a delay in payments into an actionable tort
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cognizable in the Circuit Court simply by calling that delay outrageous,
fraudulent, deceitful, or an intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
Because Ebeh’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish a
facially plausible intentional tort action, his claims fall within the scope of
Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act. That statute provides his exclusive
remedy.1
AFFIRMED.
1
The district court also lacks jurisdiction over Ebeh’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim because
there is no legal basis for asserting that claim apart from the alleged violations of Florida’s
workers’ compensation laws, and the remedy for those violations “cannot rise above the
exclusive remedy provided by the Florida statutes.” Connolly, 849 F.2d at 528.
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