[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 17, 2012
No. 11-12809
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00034-TWT-ECS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JUAN CARLOS CAMACHO-ALCANTAR,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lDefendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(February 17, 2012)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Carlos Camacho-Alcantar appeals his twenty-seven month sentence,
imposed at the low end of the guideline range, after pleading guilty to a single
count of reentry of a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On
appeal, Camacho-Alcantar contends that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and because the overall circumstances of the case, viewed in
light of the § 3553(a) factors, warranted significantly less punishment. Camacho-
Alcantar argues that the conduct for which his punishment was imposed was
benign and mitigated by the reason for his illegal reentry into the United
States—to care for his sick children. Camacho-Alcantar further urges that the
district court failed to consider his character as reflected in the fact that he quickly
admitted his guilt and expressed remorse for his crime. Despite this being his
third illegal reentry into the United States, Camacho-Alcantar suggests that the
district court did not properly consider his promise to never return to this country.
After reviewing the briefs and record, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors
that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
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irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011). “We may set
aside a sentence only if we determine, after giving a full measure of deference to
the sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” Id. at
1191.
The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),
which includes the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and
protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. In addition, the
sentencing court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the
applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the sentencing
commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
Although we do not presume a sentence is reasonable because it falls within
the guideline range, we ordinarily expect it to be so. United States v. Hunt, 526
F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Imposition of a sentence well below the statutory
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maximum penalty is another indication of reasonableness. See United States v.
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Camacho-Alcantar’s sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the
factual record and the § 3553(a) factors. The district court’s sentence of twenty-
seven months represents the lowest end of the applicable guideline range and was
well below the statutory maximum penalty of twenty years. In general, the weight
to be accorded to any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011). The record reflects that the
district court considered Camacho-Alcantar’s arguments in favor of a departure or
variance from the guideline range, but found that they were outweighed by other
factors. Camacho-Alcantar has not met his burden to show an abuse of discretion,
as the sentence he received reflects a proper balancing of the § 3553(a) factors.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence as reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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