[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-13291 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar FEB 15, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-20852-ASG
RICARDO R. RIVERO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DAVID GEORGE TAYLOR,
SHEILA LEAL,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
BARBARA INGRAM,
in her official capacity only,
FLORIDA DISBURSEMENT UNIT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 15, 2012)
Before HULL, WILSON, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ricardo R. Rivero, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for reconsideration. Rivero’s second amended complaint and his
arguments on appeal are largely incomprehensible, but it appears that he is
displeased with a state court’s final determination in a case involving his duty to
pay child support. He filed suit in federal court and named as defendants his
former wife and other individuals and agencies involved with the child support
case. Below, the district court dismissed the second amended complaint because it
found that Rivero had not alleged any factual allegations that would support a
claim for relief. The district court also dismissed the case because the complaint
did not contain a short and plain statement of his claim, and Rivero had been
warned about the pleading requirement of Rule 8 and was given three
opportunities to file a complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Fourteen days after his complaint was dismissed, Rivero filed a
motion that the court construed as a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b). Along with his motion, Rivero filed documents he
alleges were newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of Rivero’s
request, the district court denied the motion.
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We construe pleadings filed by pro se parties liberally. Alba v. Montford,
517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). This liberal construction, however, “does
not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.
of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for
reconsideration. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (holding that a denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is reviewed for abuse of
discretion). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The only grounds for granting a Rule
59(e) motion are the submission of newly-discovered evidence or the
demonstration of manifest error. Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343. A motion for
reconsideration cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael
Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, a judgment will not be amended or altered if to do so would serve no
useful purpose. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
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KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 2011).
Rivero’s motion should have been construed as a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) because it was filed within twenty-eight days of the entry
of judgment. Regardless, Rivero’s challenge is without merit. Rivero submitted
docket sheets and correspondence from various agencies, legislators, and
organizations. However, nothing in the correspondence would compel a different
outcome in the case. Many of the correspondence communicate the conclusion
that Rivero’s allegations do not rise to a federal crime. We do not see any
arguments or evidence in Rivero’s motion that provide the factual allegations that
would state a claim for relief. Moreover, none of the evidence attached to the
motion excuses Rivero’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivero’s motion for
reconsideration.
To the extent that Rivero also appeals the dismissal of his second amended
complaint, we see no argument that would convince us that he has stated a claim
for relief or that he should be afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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