Case: 10-20640 Document: 00511777886 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/05/2012
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 5, 2012
No. 10-20640 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
TECHNICAL AUTOMATION SERVICES CORP.,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
LIBERTY SURPLUS INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation appeals the summary judgment
awarded to its insured, Technical Automation Services Corporation, holding that
Liberty had a duty to defend Technical Automation in an underlying lawsuit.
The parties consented to trial and entry of judgment by a federal magistrate
judge. In granting summary judgment, the magistrate judge applied the “eight
corners” rule of contract interpretation to determine the duty to defend, looking
only to the complaint in the underlying lawsuit and the insurance policy. The
magistrate judge therefore did not consider Liberty’s defense of mutual mistake
because Liberty’s evidence created a factual dispute that was inappropriate to
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determine the duty to defend. Accordingly, the court granted summary
judgment for the insured, Technical Automation.
Furthermore, we have raised, sua sponte, a jurisdictional question relating
to whether, in the light of Stern v. Marshall, the magistrate judge had authority
under Article III of the Constitution to try and enter judgment in the state law
counterclaim in this case. We hold that, notwithstanding Stern, the magistrate
judge had jurisdictional authority.
With respect to the merits, we hold that the magistrate judge erred in not
resolving whether a mutual mistake existed as to coverage and whether the
policy should be reformed to expunge the disputed provision. We therefore
reverse and vacate the summary judgment in favor of Technical Automation and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I.
A.
From 2003 to 2004, Liberty was Technical Automation’s general
commercial liability insurer. The 2003 insurance policy provided a basic
coverage form that set forth the essential terms of the policy. It also included
various endorsements that amended or supplemented the basic coverage form.
Endorsement nineteen was identified as form number “ES 344 EG/RH” and
entitled “Exclusion-Professional Liability.” It provided that: “with respect to
any professional services shown in the schedule, this insurance does not apply
to ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage,’ ‘personal injury,’ or ‘advertising injury’ due
to the rendering of or failure to render any professional service.”
In late 2003, Technical Automation sought to renew its coverage with
Liberty for another year. After providing Technical Automation with a policy
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renewal quote and an insurance binder, Liberty issued commercial general
liability policy number “DGL-BO-199658-023” to Technical Automation, for the
period of February 21, 2004 to February 21, 2005. The basic policy stated that
Liberty was obligated to defend Technical Automation against any suit seeking
damages covered by the terms of the insurance policy because of “bodily injury”
or “property damage” that occurred during the policy period. The policy’s
schedule of forms and endorsements identified endorsement nineteen as form
number “ES 344” entitled “Exclusion-Professional Liability,” an exclusion that
would make the terms of the new policy identical to the 2003-2004 policy. In the
actual policy document, however, endorsement nineteen was not an exclusion,
but appeared as a “Miscellaneous Errors and Omissions Endorsement” (“E&O
endorsement”), which was identified as form number “CGL 1204 0103.” This
endorsement provides:
Subject to the conditions and exclusion in the Coverage Part, the
coverage afforded by this endorsement shall apply to those sums
which you shall become legally obligated to pay as damages as a
result of any negligent act, error or omission committed by you, that
results in “bodily injury” or “property damage” committed during
the policy period in the conduct or operations shown in the Schedule
above.
B.
We now turn to the incident that provoked this coverage dispute. In 2005,
Technical contracted with Oxy Vinyls (Oxy) to inspect and to remove a chlorine
flow transmitter and to install a new transmitter at Oxy’s Deer Park Caustic
Plant. Technical completed its work on February 17, 2005, during the policy’s
liability coverage. On February 24, 2005, three days after Technical
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Automation’s policy with Liberty expired, an Oxy employee, Juan Valdovinos,1
was injured by a chlorine leak at the Oxy plant. In 2007, Valdovinos brought a
personal injury suit against Technical Automation and Oxy alleging negligence
by both companies. Valdovinos specifically alleged that Technical failed to
calibrate the new transmitter properly and that Oxy did not provide adequate
safety measures in the event of a chlorine leak.
Technical Automation first tendered a request for defense and indemnity
for the Valdovinos suit to Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City), which
was Technical Automation’s liability insurer on the date that Valdovinos was
injured. Twin City denied coverage based on a limited pollution exclusion in
Technical Automation’s insurance policy. As a result of the denial of its claim
by Twin City, Technical Automation submitted defense and indemnity claims to
Liberty. In consequence, Oxy also tendered defense and indemnity claims to
Liberty. On October 15, 2008, a representative from Liberty International
Underwriters denied coverage for the Valdovinos lawsuit on behalf of Liberty,
claiming that Valdovinos’s injury did not occur until after the policy period had
expired.
On March 2, 2009, Technical Automation filed suit in the Harris County
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment stating that Liberty had the duty
to defend and indemnify Technical Automation in the Valdovinos suit; it also
sought damages for breach of contract. Oxy intervened in the state court action,
also asserting claims for a declaratory judgment and breach of contract as an
additionally insured party. On April 14, 2009, Liberty removed the case to the
1
We are adopting the spelling “Valdovinos,” because it is the way it is spelled by the
parties in their briefs and filings in the trial court. He is also occasionally referred to as
“Valdavinos,” including in the magistrate judge’s memorandum and final order.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, on the grounds
that the complaint alleged complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in
controversy was more than $75,000.
On November 18, 2009, Technical Automation moved for partial summary
judgment. It argued that Liberty was obligated to defend Technical in the
Valdovinos suit, because Valdovinos raised a claim for negligence that was
covered by the E&O endorsement in the liability policy. On February 19, 2010,
Liberty opposed Technical Automation’s motion and, in the same document,
Liberty moved for summary judgment on the basis that the inclusion of the E&O
endorsement was a mutual mistake and sought reformation of the contract. It
also argued that it had no duty to defend Technical Automation because
Valdovinos’s alleged injuries took place after the policy had expired.
C.
We now review the trial court proceedings. As we have said, the parties
consented, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act, to a United
States magistrate judge handling all further proceedings. The magistrate judge
was thus responsible for determining Technical Automation’s breach of contract,
duty to defend, and duty to indemnify claims; Oxy’s third party claims; and
Liberty’s reformation counterclaim. On May 17, 2010, the magistrate judge
issued a memorandum opinion and an order on the cross-motions for summary
judgment. The court addressed the “eight corners” rule of contract
interpretation, and it seems that, on the basis of the eight corners rule, the court
reasoned that, when determining the duty for an insurer to defend, it could not
consider any matter not reflected in the complaint in the underlying lawsuit or
the liability policy. Thus, because the magistrate judge concluded that “there
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is a genuine issue of material fact on whether an original agreement existed”
with respect to Liberty’s defense of mutual mistake and its reformation
counterclaim and that it could not look to extrinsic evidence to establish the
contents of the original agreement, the court denied Liberty’s motion for
summary judgment. The court then turned to interpret the E&O endorsement
in the light of the complaint in the Valdovinos lawsuit; and it determined that
the endorsement was ambiguous and construed the endorsement in favor of
Technical Automation, the insured. Accordingly, the court held that the E&O
endorsement extended the coverage of the liability policy to include “bodily
injury” occurring after the policy period, if the alleged negligent acts or omission
occurred during the policy period. The magistrate judge subsequently granted
summary judgment to Technical Automation, holding that Liberty had a duty
to defend. However, the court found that it was premature to rule on whether
Liberty owed Technical Automation indemnification. Lastly, the court granted
Liberty’s motion for summary judgment regarding Oxy’s claims, holding that
Oxy was not a named insured under the contract.
On June 8, 2010, the magistrate judge, acting under the authority of Rule
20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order severing certain
specific claims and a final judgment with respect to all other claims. The order
severed Technical Automation’s remaining indemnification claim from the
claims regarding Liberty’s duty to defend Technical Automation and Liberty’s
duty to defend and indemnify Oxy. With respect to all of the claims except for
Liberty’s indemnification claim, the court entered a final judgment in favor of
Technical Automation finding that Liberty had a duty to defend Technical
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against the claims asserted in Valdovinos’s lawsuit, and it entered final
judgment in favor of Liberty on all of Oxy’s third-party claims.
On July 6, 2010, Liberty moved to alter the court’s final judgment on the
severed claims, arguing that the trial court had not yet resolved whether it was
entitled to reformation. On August 17, 2010, the magistrate judge issued an
order that reiterated her holding that Technical Automation was entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of Liberty’s duty to defend, asserting that “no
evidence existed to show that the policy should be reformed to nullify the
disputed endorsement.” Liberty timely appealed the judgment that it had a duty
to defend Technical Automation, and the magistrate judge stayed any further
proceedings on the indemnification claim pending this appeal.
II.
This case was originally assigned to the argument calendar of Judges
Garwood, Smith, and Stewart. Shortly before the death of Judge Garwood, the
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Stern v. Marshall, which called into
question whether it is constitutional for a magistrate judge to render final
judgment over state-law counterclaims. For administrative reasons, the case was
subsequently reassigned to the calendar of this panel. The two questions
presented to us are: first, whether Article III of the Constitution permits a federal
magistrate judge, with the consent of the parties, to enter final judgment on a
party’s state law counterclaim and, second, whether the magistrate judge erred
by entering summary judgment in favor of Technical Automation before properly
considering Liberty’s mutual mistake and reformation claim.
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A.
First, we will resolve the jurisdictional issue and examine the impact of
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), on whether magistrate judges have the
constitutional authority to enter final judgment under the Federal Magistrates
Act in cases involving state-law counterclaims.
Here, a federal magistrate judge entered summary judgment on Liberty’s
reformation counterclaim based on her authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),
which provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, . . . [a]
United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury
or nonjury civil matter and order entry of judgment in the case.”2 A previous
panel of this court ruled that § 636(c) did not allow magistrate judges to
improperly “exercise powers reserved under the Constitution to Article III
judges.” Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984). The panel
explained that the Magistrates Act is “saved from any constitutional infirmity by
its requirement that all parties consent to such transfer and by the power of the
2
Stated in its entirety, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) provides:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge or
a part-time United States magistrate judge who serves as a full-time judicial
officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and
order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves. Upon the consent of
the parties, pursuant to their specific written request, any other part-time
magistrate judge may exercise such jurisdiction, if such magistrate judge meets
the bar membership requirements set forth in section 631(b)(1) and the chief
judge of the district court certifies that a full-time magistrate judge is not
reasonably available in accordance with guidelines established by the judicial
council of the circuit. When there is more than one judge of a district court,
designation under this paragraph shall be by the concurrence of a majority of
all the judges of such district court, and when there is no such concurrence, then
by the chief judge.
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district court to vacate the reference to the magistrate on its own motion.” Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),(6)). The panel also noted that “[e]ach circuit facing
this question has reached a similar conclusion.”3 Id.
Because a previous panel has resolved this question, we cannot overturn
its decision “absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory
amendment, or the Supreme Court or by our en banc court.” Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug
Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 420 n. 25 (5th Cir. 2005)). In particular, for a Supreme
Court decision to change our Circuit’s law, it “must be more than merely
illuminating with respect to the case before [the court]” and must “unequivocally”
overrule prior precedent. Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v.
Zuniga-Salinas, 945 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a panel of this
court can overrule a prior panel only if “such overruling is unequivocally directed
by controlling Supreme Court precedent”); see also United States v. Short, 181
F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999).
B.
In the light of our prior panel precedent and our observance of the rule of
orderliness, our inquiry turns to whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern
v. Marshall, unequivocally, sub silentio overruled Puryear. In Stern, the Supreme
3
See Bell & Beckwith v.United States, 766 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va. Dep’t
of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753
F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984);
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984); Collins
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984);
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Court held that although Article I bankruptcy courts are authorized by Congress
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)4 to issue a final judgment on a state law counterclaim
asserted by a debtor, bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to enter
final judgment when the counterclaim did not “stem[] from the bankruptcy itself
4
In full, § 157(b)(1)-(2) provides:
(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders
and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation
or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title
11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against
the estate;
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship,
except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter 15 of
title 11.
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or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Stern, 131 S.
Ct. at 2618. The Court’s decision hinged on the separation of powers mandated
by Article III of the Constitution, which requires that the judiciary be “truly
distinct from both the legislature and the executive.” Id. at 2608 (quoting The
Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). Accordingly, the
Court reaffirmed that Congress may not withdraw “from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty.” Id. at 2612 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856)). The Supreme Court emphasized that
even the slightest “chipping” away of Article III can lead to “illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices,” and accordingly held that the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts did not extend to most counterclaims based on common law.
Id. at 2620.
This holding can be translated to the many similarities of the statutory
powers of federal magistrate judges. Whereas Article III judges “hold their offices
during good behavior, without diminution of salary,” bankruptcy judges and
federal magistrate judges are Article I judges who lack tenure and salary
protection. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600-01 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
Moreover, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 157(b) (the statute addressed in Stern) and the
text of the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), allow Article I judges to enter final
judgments, allow for judges’ final judgment to be binding without further action
from an Article III judge, entitle the decisions to deference on appeal, and permit
the courts to exercise “substantive jurisdiction reaching any area of the corpus
juris.” Id. at 2615.
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Although the similarities between bankruptcy judges and magistrate
judges suggest that the Court’s analysis in Stern could be extended to this case,
the plain fact is that our precedent in Puryear is there, and the authority upon
which it was based has not been overruled. Moreover, we are unwilling to say
that Stern does that job sub silentio, especially when the Supreme Court
repeatedly emphasized that Stern had very limited application. Id. at 2620
(emphasizing the limited scope of the decision, saying that the issue addressed
was a “narrow one” that related only to “certain counterclaims in bankruptcy”)
(internal quotation omitted); see also id. (“Article III of the Constitution provides
that the judicial power of the United States may be vested only in courts whose
judges enjoy the protection set forth in that Article. We conclude today that
Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1984.”) (emphasis added). Article III jurisprudence is complex, requiring the
court to do an examination of every delegation of judicial authority. See generally,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986) (noting
that “precedents in this area do not admit of easy synthesis”); N. Pipeline Const.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(referring to prominent Article III cases as “but landmarks on a judicial ‘darkling
plain’ where ignorant armies have clashed by night”). Notwithstanding that this
constitutional question may be seen in a different light post Stern, we will follow
our precedent and continue to hold, until such time as the Supreme Court or our
court en banc overrules our precedent, that federal magistrate judges have the
constitutional authority to enter final judgments on state-law counterclaims.
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III.
A.
Now that we have settled that the magistrate judge had the necessary
authority to try and enter judgment in this case, we will consider the merits of
this appeal. On appeal, Liberty does not challenge the magistrate judge’s
interpretation of the E&O endorsement; instead, Liberty argues that the
magistrate judge erred by prematurely engaging in her interpretation of the
endorsement, before determining whether the endorsement was a result of
mutual mistake. According to Liberty, the E&O endorsement was included in the
policy by mutual mistake, and a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether it
was entitled to have the E&O endorsement expunged through reformation.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, which
means that we apply the same standard as the district court when deciding
whether summary judgment was properly granted. Makedwde Publ’g Co. v.
Johnson, 37 F.3d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co.,
940 F.2d 971, 975 (5th Cir.1991)). Summary judgment is appropriate only “when
the movant is able to demonstrate that the pleadings, affidavits, and other
evidence available to the court establish that there are no genuine issues of
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.” Hightower v. Tex. Hosp. Ass’n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also FED . R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the
burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact in
dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If a party can prove that a contract is the result of mutual mistake, it may
be entitled to the equitable remedy of reformation. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v.
Ind. Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1967) (utilizing
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Texas contract law). In the course of reformation, obligations to which the parties
have not assented in reaching the original agreement are expunged by the court.
“The underlying objective of reformation is to correct a mutual mistake made in
preparing a written instrument, so that the instrument truly reflects the original
agreement of the parties.” Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377,
379 (Tex. 1987) (internal citations omitted). Thus, reformation requires (1) an
original agreement and (2) a mutual mistake that occurred when reducing this
agreement to writing. Id.
B.
We now proceed to the magistrate judge’s analysis of Liberty’s reformation
claim.5 The magistrate judge found that the record demonstrated a “fact question
on whether there was an ‘original agreement’ to exclude the E&O coverage.”
Then, applying the “eight corners” rule of contract interpretation and declining
to consider parol evidence,6 the magistrate judge truncated her mutual mistake
analysis, denied Liberty’s motion for summary judgment, accepted, for purposes
of the duty to defend, the E&O endorsement as a valid part of the contract,
interpreted the endorsement in favor of Technical Automation, and granted
Technical Automation’s motion for summary judgment declaring that Liberty had
a duty to defend.
5
Our analysis is primarily focused on the rationale of the summary judgment order
itself and not any amended reasoning by way of the magistrate judge’s subsequent orders. But
see infra note 7.
6
The magistrate judge did not explicitly tie the “eight corners” rule to her failure to
consider Liberty’s reformation claim; however, discussing the rule at length, she surely
implicitly did so as is evidenced by her exclusion of parol evidence, her refusal to resolve a
disputed issue of fact, and ultimately her severing the claim as irrelevant to the duty to
defend. In short, it is unclear how, without applying the “eight corners” rule, she could
conclude that there was an issue of fact remaining based on the evidence and not allow the
parties to move forward with resolving the claim.
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No one doubts that, generally, Texas subscribes to the “eight corners” rule
when deciding an insurer’s duty to defend under an insurance liability policy,
which means that courts are permitted to examine only the insurance contract
and the complaint against the insured in the underlying suit to determine
whether there is coverage for the insured. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd.
Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex. 2006). There is a relevant exception,
however.
When a mutual mistake is alleged, the first task of the court is not to apply,
perfunctorily, the “eight corners” rule and then directly proceed to interpret the
insurance policy. Instead, the first matter to address is whether the disputed
provision results from an agreement between the parties. Williams v. Glash, 789
S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. 1990) (“When mutual mistake is alleged, the task of the
court is not to interpret the language contained in the release, but to determine
whether or not the release itself is valid.”). Furthermore, the parol evidence rule
does not apply when a court is determining whether there was a mutual mistake,
even if the contract is unambiguous or fully integrated. Marcuz v. Marcuz, 857
S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex. App.– Hous. [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“The fact that the
written instrument is couched in unambiguous language, or that the parties
knew what words were used and were aware of their ordinary meaning, or that
they were negligent in failing to discover the mistake before signing the
instrument, will not preclude the admission of parol evidence or relief by
reformation.”). In fact, the claim of mutual mistake usually requires the
introduction of extrinsic evidence, because a substantive mistake and the original
agreement between the parties would rarely be readily apparent based on the
terms of the contract itself. See id. (“Here, Luciano offered the excluded evidence
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in an attempt to prove a mutual mistake occurred and to prove the true intent of
the parties. Under those circumstances, the parol evidence was admissible.”).
Thus, the magistrate judge erred by applying the “eight corners” rule to
Liberty’s reformation counterclaim. The introduction of conflicting evidence as
to whether the E&O endorsement was part of and included in the original
agreement between the parties should not have ended the court’s mutual mistake
inquiry; it should have begun it.7 See id. Because resolving the mutual mistake
could expunge the endorsement provision from the policy, the court should have
resolved the allegations of mutual mistake before interpreting the terms of the
contract.
In sum, the magistrate judge erroneously applied the “eight corners” rule
before considering Liberty’s reformation counterclaim and prematurely
interpreted the E&O endorsement. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact
remains as to whether the E&O endorsement was included in the insurance
policy by mutual mistake, which could entitle Liberty to reformation of the policy.
7
The magistrate judge’s order denying Liberty’s motion for reconsideration can be read
to contradict the rationale of her original summary judgment order. The first order clearly
held that there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether there was an original agreement.
In the second order, the magistrate judge, considering only the policy binder against the
testimony of John Burkland, Technical Automation’s president, states that Liberty had not
proved that there was an original agreement to “exclude the E&O endorsement.” Implicit in
restricting her comments to the policy binder is her rejection of the admission of Liberty’s
other evidence of mutual mistake. Morever, the magistrate judge seems to have resolved the
disputed issues of fact, crediting the testimony of Mr. Burkland. Still further, the magistrate
judge seems to misperceive Liberty’s claim of mutual mistake, referring to an original
agreement “to exclude the E&O endorsement;” Liberty’s claim is that the original agreement
simply had no E&O provision in its contents. In any event, under either rationale of the
magistrate judge’s first or second order, the magistrate judge erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Technical Automation on the duty to defend question.
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IV.
To review our decision, we hold that Stern v. Marshall has not overruled
prior precedent holding that it is within the jurisdictional authority of magistrate
judges to enter final judgment on state-law counterclaims, when the parties
consent thereto. Furthermore, we hold that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Liberty is entitled to reformation of the insurance policy on
the basis of mutual mistake. Summary judgment holding that Liberty had a duty
to defend was therefore not appropriate or, at least, certainly not at that time.
The trial court must first resolve whether the E&O endorsement provision was
the result of a mutual mistake and whether Liberty is entitled to reformation of
the policy to expunge said provision.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and VACATE the judgment of the magistrate
judge and REMAND for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED.
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