Opinion by
Mr. Justice Mitchell,The defendant company was chartered under the Act of May 29, 1885, P. L. 29, to produce, transport, supply, etc., natural gas for heat, light or other purposes. It has been supplying the gas for both heat and light, and proposes to continue doing so, but upon terms making a difference in price according to the use to which the gas is put by the consumer. The question now before us is the reasonableness of this regulation.
In his opinion the learned judge below said, “ So far as concerns this ease the defendant company may be regarded as incorporated for the purpose of supplying natural gas to consumers for heat and light.” Not only did its charter powers cover both uses, but as already said its actual operation has included both, and it is not intended now to abandon either, *183even if that could be done. The corporate powers are' the measure of corporate duties.
The gas is brought by the company through the same pipes for both purposes and delivered to the customers at the same point, the curb. Thence it goes into pipes put in by the consumer and, after passing through a meter, is distributed by the customer through his premises according to his own convenience. The regulation in question seeks to differentiate the price according to the use for heating or for light. It is not claimed that there is any difference in the cost of the product to the company, the expense of supplying it at the point of delivery or its value to the company in the increase of business or other ways. Some effort was made to show increased risk to the company from the use of gas for lighting purposes, but the evidence of danger was so remote and shadowy that it cannot be considered as more than a mere makeweight. The real • argument seeks to justify the difference in price solely by the value of the gas to the consumer, as measured by what he would have to pay for a substitute for one purpose or the other if he could not get the gas. This is a wholly inadmissible basis of discrimination.
The implied condition of the grant of all corporate franchises of even quasi-public nature is that they shall be exercised without individual discrimination in behalf of all who desire. From the inception of the rules applied in early days to innkeepers and common carriers down to the present day of enormous growth of corporations for nearly every conceivable purpose, there has been no departure from this principle. And from all the legion of cases upon this subject the distinguished counsel for the appellee have not been able to cite a single one in which a discrimination based solely on the value of the service to the customer has been sustained. Hoover v. Penna. R. Co., 156 Pa. 220, was much relied on by the court below, but was decided on a very different principle. That was an action for damages for unlawful discrimination by a dealer in coal, because a manufacturing company had been allowed a rebate on coal carried to it. But it was held that as the rebate was allowed in consideration of a minimum of coal to be carried per day, and also in view of return freight on the product of the manufacturing company, it was not an unreasonable discrimi*184nation; in other words, that the company might look for its compensation not only to the actual money freights from present service, but also to increased business to grow out of the establishment of a new industry in that place. So also Phipps v. London & Northwestern Ry. Co., L. R. 1892, 2 Q. B. 229, cited for appellee, where the decision was put upon the right of the railroad to make special rates for freights from distant points which otherwise it could not get at all. Both cases belong to the numerous class of discrimination sustained on the basis of special advantages to the carrier, not the customer.
Decree reversed, injunction directed to be reinstated and made permanent. Costs to be paid by appellee.