In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-2679
B ARBARA J. G OOD ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U NIVERSITY OF C HICAGO M EDICAL C ENTER,
an Illinois not-for-profit corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:09-cv-04802—Ronald A. Guzman, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 19, 2012—D ECIDED M ARCH 12, 2012
Before K ANNE, S YKES, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Barbara Good
appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant University of Chicago
Medical Center in Good’s reverse race discrimination
case. Good was employed in UCMC’s Radiology De-
partment as a lead technologist in the Computerized
Tomography Department. She admits that there were
2 No. 11-2679
issues with her job performance, but she contends that
UCMC discriminated against her on account of her race
(white) when it terminated her employment rather than
demoting her as it had some employees of other races.
Good sued UCMC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
An employee alleging racial discrimination under
these statutes may elect to proceed via either the indirect
or the direct methods of proof, or a combination of the
two. See Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602
F.3d 845, 849-50 & n. 7 (7th Cir. 2010). Good invoked
both methods. The district court found that she
failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand
UCMC’s motion for summary judgment using either
method. Good has appealed, and we affirm.
I. Standard of Review and Factual Background
We review the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment de novo, construing all facts and drawing all rea-
sonable inferences in favor of Good, the non-moving
party. See Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 602 (7th
Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evi-
dence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In keeping
with these standards, the following facts are set forth in
a light most favorable to Good, as the non-moving
party. We do not vouch for their truth in any other sense.
The Radiology Department of UCMC is composed of
the Computerized Tomography, or “CT” Department,
No. 11-2679 3
where Good worked, as well as the Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Department, the Ultrasound Department, and
the Nuclear Medicine/Positron Emission Technology
Department. Each department employed staff tech-
nologists to perform imaging scans and who worked on
either the first, second, or third shift. Each shift of each
department had a designated lead technologist. Staff
technologists and lead technologists were bi-weekly
employees. Each department also had a manager, who
was a monthly employee.
Each year, the department managers evaluated their bi-
weekly lead and staff technologists and generated
annual performance reviews. Managers evaluated their
employees’ performance in several categories, each on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest. If an employee’s
overall annual performance review was less than 3,
UCMC would place the employee on a Performance
Improvement Plan or PIP. The PIP would specify areas
of improvement, measurable expectations, and conse-
quences of an employee’s failure to improve in the
targeted areas within a designated timeframe of either
30, 60, or 90 days.
UCMC maintained a four-step corrective Progressive
Action Policy that provided that an employee’s failure
to complete a PIP was grounds for termination. But
according to UCMC’s Policy and Procedure Manual,
“it is the policy of the University of Chicago Hospitals
to demote [an] individual[]” who “cannot perform . . .
her assigned job responsibilities” because “her skills are
not matched to the requirements of the job” or she
“lack[s] . . . motivation to perform up to standards.”
4 No. 11-2679
UCMC Radiology Department managers were to be
held to “a higher standard of performance, due to their
added responsibilities.” Managerial employees could
be terminated at any time, and the record adequately
demonstrates that, like bi-weekly employees, UCMC
subjected its managers to annual performance reviews
and dealt with some managers’ performance deficiencies
by demoting them in lieu of harsher corrective treat-
ment such as a PIP or a probationary period, or even
termination.
Good was hired as a lead technologist in the CT Depart-
ment in May 1994. She resigned in 1999 to take another
position, but UCMC rehired her three months later as a
staff technologist. In 2004, she was promoted back to
lead technologist, and she was assigned to the second
shift. In 2005, Cliff Sissel became CT Manager and
Good’s immediate supervisor. In April 2006, Monica
Geyer became the Assistant Director of Specialty
Imaging Services. Ed Smith was the Executive Director
of Radiology. Like plaintiff Good, both Sissel and Geyer
are white. Smith’s race is not disclosed by the record.
In July 2007, Sissel reviewed Good’s performance for
the year ending June 30, 2007 and gave her an overall
rating of 2.65. Good did not dispute Sissel’s evaluation.
Because her overall score was below 3, Sissel and Geyer
developed a 90-day PIP designed to improve Good’s
performance. Pursuant to the PIP, Good needed to
improve in three areas: (1) timely patient service;
(2) improvement in staff efficiency; and (3) minimizing
staff overtime in her department. When she received the
No. 11-2679 5
PIP, Good told Sissel and Geyer that she “would be . . .
happy to step down to a staff tech position.” Geyer re-
sponded, “That’s a possibility. We might think about that.”
Over the course of the next 90 days, Good failed to
improve sufficiently. Sissel discussed these issues with
Good in August and again in September 2007, but
on October 12, 2007, Geyer gave Good a Final Written
Warning, put her on a 30-day PIP, and transferred her
to the third shift, which was less busy than the second
shift. The warning stated that Good had not met “the
majority of the goals [of the 90-day PIP] impacting
patient care.” The warning also stated that “this is
UCMC’s final effort to work with [Good] to bring her
performance to an acceptable level. If [Good] fails to
meet these new goals on a less busy shift, further correc-
tive action may be taken up to and including termina-
tion of employment.” Good again asked to be demoted
to a staff technologist position, and Geyer told her,
“we’re thinking about it.”
Sissel and Geyer expected that Good would properly
handle inpatient scan orders, properly handle the timing
of emergency scans, and properly maintain the CT De-
partment work area. Good did not contest the 30-day
PIP or her need to improve in those areas. In spite of
these corrective efforts, however, Good’s performance
did not improve.
In late October or early November 2007, Good again
asked Sissel and Geyer to give her a demotion. Geyer told
her that UCMC had “changed [its] policies” and had
“decided not to do that anymore.” Contrary to Geyer’s
6 No. 11-2679
statement, UCMC had not amended the demotion
policy and it was still in force. On November 2, 2007,
Ed Smith (Director of Radiology and Geyer’s immedi-
ate supervisor) sent Geyer an e-mail, instructing: “No
more e-mails about [Good],” and “have her removed.”
Geyer understood Smith to be instructing her and
Sissel to terminate Good’s employment. Accordingly, on
November 16, 2007, Geyer sent an e-mail to Em-
ployee/Labor Relations at UCMC stating that Good had
failed to successfully complete her 30-day PIP and recom-
mending that UCMC terminate Good’s employment.
Sissel agreed with this decision. On November 27, 2007,
UCMC terminated Good’s employment. UCMC re-
placed Good with Kristin Runion, who is also white.
II. Direct Method of Proof
To withstand UCMC’s motion for summary judgment
under the direct method of proof, Good must present
“direct or circumstantial evidence that creates a con-
vincing mosaic of discrimination on the basis of race.”
Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d at 604 (quotation marks
omitted). Good has no direct evidence that race played
any role at all in UCMC’s treatment of her. She relies
on circumstantial evidence, which we have said
typically falls into one of three categories:
(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written
statements, or behavior toward or comments directed
at other employees in the protected group; (2) evi-
dence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that
similarly situated employees outside the protected
No. 11-2679 7
class received systematically better treatment; [or]
(3) evidence that the employee was qualified for the
job in question but was passed over in favor of a
person outside the protected class and the employer’s
reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Darchak v. City of Chicago Board of Educ., 580 F.3d 622,
631 (7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff may survive a motion
for summary judgment based only on circumstantial
evidence under the direct method, but only if the cir-
cumstantial evidence presented points “directly to a
discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Cerutti
v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting
Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Lim v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 297 F.3d
575, 580 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring “direct evidence” to
“prove the particular fact in question without reliance
upon inference or presumption”) (internal quotation
and emphasis omitted).
To satisfy this burden, Good points to three UCMC
employees of different races or ethnicities from hers
who were allowed to take demotions from their
positions rather than receive corrective discipline for
their deficient performance. She also argues that UCMC
provided inconsistent reasons for departing from its
demotion policy in her case. This, she argues, is suf-
ficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the direct
method of proof. We disagree. Simply stated, the circum-
stantial evidence on which Good relies is insufficient
because it does not point to a discriminatory reason for
UCMC’s decision to end her employment rather than
demoting her as she would have wished. From this evi-
8 No. 11-2679
dence, one might guess or speculate that perhaps Good’s
race might have made a difference in the decision, but
guesswork and speculation are not enough to avoid
summary judgment.
To determine whether a plaintiff’s co-worker was
similarly situated for purposes of this analysis, a court
must make a “flexible, common-sense” evaluation of the
relevant factors. Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir.
2007). “All things being equal, if an employer takes an
action against one employee in a protected class but not
another outside that class, one can infer discrimination.
The ‘similarly situated’ prong establishes whether all
things are in fact equal.” Filar v. Board of Educ. of City
of Chicago, 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal
citation omitted). The purpose is to eliminate other pos-
sible explanatory variables, “such as differing roles,
performance histories, or decision-making personnel,
which helps isolate the critical independent vari-
able”—discriminatory animus. Humphries v. CBOCS West,
Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442
(2008). Similarly situated employees “must be ‘directly
comparable’ to the plaintiff ‘in all material respects,’ ” but
they need not have identical employment files. Patterson
v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365-66 (7th
Cir. 2009), quoting Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d
600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006). So long as the distinctions
between the plaintiff and the proposed comparators are
not “so significant that they render the comparison ef-
fectively useless,” the similarly situated requirement is
satisfied. Humphries, 474 F.3d at 405. Which factors are
material is a case-specific inquiry that depends on the
No. 11-2679 9
specifics of the defendant’s decision and the stated reason
for it. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 847-52 (7th
Cir. 2012) (finding that co-workers were sufficiently
similarly situated for meaningful comparison in spite
of having different immediate supervisors, different job
titles, and different duties); Crawford v. Indiana Harbor
Belt Railroad Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006) (the
question is whether “members of the comparison group
are sufficiently comparable to [the plaintiff] to suggest
that [the plaintiff] was singled out for worse treatment”).
Of the three employees that Good put forward, the
district court found that only one, an African-American
named Balderos-Mason, could be considered similarly
situated to Good. Like Good, Balderos-Mason was a
lead technologist. The performance histories of Good
and Balderos-Mason suggest that they had similar de-
ficiencies in performance, and Geyer was involved in
their disciplinary actions. But, unlike Good, Balderos-
Mason was not terminated. Instead, approximately one
year before Good was terminated, Balderos-Mason was
demoted to a staff technologist position. Balderos-Mason
was not put on a PIP before she was demoted, but the
evidence suggests that Balderos-Mason chose to be de-
moted rather than be put on a PIP. We agree with
the district court’s analysis and consider Balderos-
Mason to be similarly situated to Good.
However, the district court determined that two other
non-white employees whom Good proposed as compara-
tors were not sufficiently similar to Good to offer mean-
ingful comparison. Here, our analysis departs from the
10 No. 11-2679
district court. UCMC does not contest that these em-
ployees’ performance deficiencies were sufficiently
similar to Good’s to be comparable, but instead attempts
to distinguish them on the basis of their status as
managers and the decision-makers involved in the re-
spective employment decisions. True, these two em-
ployees were monthly, managerial employees and not bi-
weekly supervisory employees, as Good had been.
UCMC’s policies provided that these managers could be
terminated at any time and were to be held “to a higher
standard of performance.” Neither manager was on a
PIP at the time of his demotion, and neither manager
reported to Good’s supervisors, Geyer or Sissel.
But there was a common decision-maker involved—Ed
Smith, Director of Radiology. Smith was involved in the
decisions to demote the two managers in light of their
undisputed performance issues, and he prompted
Good’s termination with his instruction to Geyer to “have
her removed.” In short, the two managers’ status as
managerial, monthly employees does not eliminate
them as comparators. Given their similar performance
deficiencies, the fact that they were held to a “higher
standard” than Good, and the fact that a common decision-
maker decided to demote them but decided to ter-
minate Good, the two managers offered meaningful
comparison, at least for purposes of summary judgment.
But we agree with the district court’s ultimate con-
clusion that UCMC’s demotions of these non-white
employees were insufficient circumstantial evidence
under the direct method of proof, which requires
No. 11-2679 11
evidence leading directly to the conclusion that an em-
ployer was illegally motivated, without reliance on specu-
lation. See Cerutti, 349 F.3d at 1061; Adams, 324 F.3d at 939;
Lim, 297 F.3d at 580; see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 863
(Wood, J., concurring) (“Like a group of Mesopotamian
scholars, [judges] work hard to see if a ‘convincing mo-
saic’ can be assembled that would point to the equivalent
of the blatantly discriminatory statement.”). It can
be a high threshold, particularly in a reverse discrimina-
tion case. Good’s evidence of similarly situated em-
ployees of different races, even expanded to accom-
modate three comparable non-white employees instead
of only one, does not rise to this level. This record
simply does not contain a hint of race-based animus. A
jury could not reasonably conclude that Good was
treated differently because of her race without relying
on speculation.
Good attempts to bridge this gap by arguing that
UCMC deviated from its demotion policy and that it
gave “shifting” reasons for her termination. But she
offers nothing to dispute UCMC’s evidence that the
demotion policy did not give every employee an
absolute right to be demoted. Without some evidence
from which we could reasonably infer that UCMC exer-
cised its discretion to terminate Good rather than
demote her based on her race, the fact that it deviated from
a highly discretionary demotion policy, standing alone,
is not probative of improper motivation.
Good further argues that UCMC’s reasons for her
termination “shifted,” but here again we disagree that
12 No. 11-2679
the record supports that conclusion. Geyer told Good
that she could not be demoted because UCMC’s policy
had changed and it was no longer demoting employees.
Good has contradicted that point by offering evidence
that UCMC’s demotion policy had not changed. Perhaps
Geyer was misinformed, or perhaps she attempted to
mislead Good. In either case, though, Good fails to
explain how Geyer’s statement sheds any light on the
motives underlying Good’s termination—particularly on
this record, which shows that Smith, and not Geyer,
triggered Good’s termination and that Good was
replaced by another white supervisor.
Although UCMC has used different words at different
times to describe Good’s performance issues, we also
disagree with Good’s argument that UCMC’s semantics
could hide an improper motive. Good’s June 2007 perfor-
mance review stated:
Things that are holding [Good] back are the com-
munication she has with her shift, fair work distribu-
tion and controlling the schedule. . . . [She] also
needs to work on pre-scheduling transports and
coordinating exams with the nursing units to
minimize delays. This also means communicating in
advance to the staff about what is pending and when
it is expected to be in route to the department. Staying
positive and keeping staff informed will help her
improve in her role.
Good’s 30-day PIP reiterated these concerns. Finally, in
Geyer’s e-mail to Employee/Labor Relations in which
she carried out Smith’s instruction to have Good termi-
nated, Geyer wrote:
No. 11-2679 13
1. Staff want to be transferred off of [Good’s] shift.
2. [She] does not communicate well with the staff.
3. [She] gets short tempered with the staff when
they remind her of things that need to be done.
4. [She] does not provide direction and does not
assist the staff in ensuring smooth workflow.
5. [She] does not provide the staff with complete
sets of paperwork prior to patient arrival, which
delays patient care.
6. . . . . [She] demonstrates no sense of urgency
in getting the patients completed in a timely manner.
7. There is no sense of team between [her] and the
technologists.
8. [She] is not providing training to the new technolo-
gist on the shift.
So while [Good] has met some of the measurable
goals, the larger picture indicates that [Good ] does
not have the leadership skills needed to run an effi-
cient, productive, and happy shift.
It is our recommendation that we terminate [Good]
at this time, since she has not improved her leader-
ship skills despite concerted mentoring and coaching.
By comparison, in its brief before the district court,
UCMC justified its decision to terminate Good based on
its record of Good’s “poor attitude.” Good argues that
these are different reasons, but the phrase “poor attitude”
is not inappropriate or inconsistent shorthand for the
14 No. 11-2679
performance issues UCMC had throughly documented
before and at the time of Good’s termination. Although
UCMC did not use identical language to describe
Good’s deficiencies, a reasonable jury viewing this
record could not find that UCMC’s rationale for Good’s
termination shifted or changed over time in such a way
that could suggest that its decision was actually
motivated by her race.
In sum, Good has presented evidence that three
similarly situated, non-white co-workers received better
treatment when they were permitted to take demotions
from their managerial roles, yet Good, who is white, was
terminated from her position as a supervisor. Under the
direct method, however, we cannot conclude that Good’s
disparate treatment was racially motivated without
evidence pointing more directly to a discriminatory
motive without reliance on speculation. See Cerutti,
349 F.3d at 1061. Nothing in this record indicates that
UCMC was motivated to terminate Good because of her
race. Good has not presented evidence that anyone at
UCMC had an anti-white bias, nor has she presented
evidence that UCMC has a history of discrimination
against white people. She cannot, for example, point to
a formal or informal affirmative action policy in her
workplace that might have required or encouraged
UCMC to deviate from its demotion policy in her case
because of her race. She never heard any anti-white slurs
or jokes in the workplace, be they “stray remarks” or not.
In addition, the undisputed facts show that Good’s posi-
tion was filled by another white person. In this reverse
race discrimination case, the requisite “mosaic” from
No. 11-2679 15
which a reasonable jury might conclude that UCMC
was motivated to terminate Good based on her race is
simply not in the evidence.
III. Indirect Method of Proof
We turn now to Good’s argument that she presented
a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect,
burden-shifting method initially set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the
indirect method, to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in a reverse discrimination suit
involving disparate discipline such as this one, the plain-
tiff bears the burden of establishing: (1) “ ‘background
circumstances’ that demonstrate that a particular
employer has ‘reason or inclination to discriminate in-
vidiously against whites’ or evidence that ‘there is some-
thing “fishy” about the facts at hand’ ”; (2) that she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that
she was treated less favorably than similarly situated
individuals who are not members of the protected class.
Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2003)
(altering first prong of the indirect case to account for
reverse nature of race discrimination claim), quoting
Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455 (7th
Cir. 1999); Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329
(7th Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff produces evidence
sufficient to raise an inference that an employer
applied its legitimate expectations in a disparate man-
ner . . . the second and fourth prongs of McDonnell Douglas
merge — allowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
16 No. 11-2679
case, stave off summary judgment for the time being, and
proceed to the pretext inquiry.”). Summary judgment
in the defendant’s favor is proper if a plaintiff fails to
set forth a prima facie case. See Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t
of Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006). Other-
wise, if the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. If the de-
fendant does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant’s explanation was pretextual. Id.
We find, like the district court before us, that Good
has failed to present sufficient evidence of the first prong
for this reverse race discrimination case: evidence of
“background circumstances” demonstrating that UCMC
has “reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously
against whites,” or evidence that there is something
“fishy” about her termination. See Phelan, 347 F.3d at 684-
85. In Phelan, the plaintiff was a white man who
argued that he had been unfairly treated because of his
race. His reverse discrimination case failed because he
was unable to present any facts from which a jury
could infer that his white superiors were inclined to
discriminate against their fellow whites; indeed, the
plaintiff had been replaced by a white person. Id. Good,
too, is white and was replaced by another white person.
Also like the plaintiff in Phelan, Good has offered no
facts in the summary judgment record that could
suggest to a reasonable jury that UCMC had any reason
or inclination to discriminate against white persons. See,
e.g., Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822-23
(7th Cir. 2006) (five white plaintiffs satisfied the “back-
No. 11-2679 17
ground circumstances” prong by presenting evidence
that after their African-American boss fired them, they
were replaced by three African-American employees, an
African-American employee was assigned duties of the
fourth, and the fifth was not replaced); Ballance v. City
of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (back-
ground circumstances shown by law firm’s report con-
firming that police chief took minority race and female
gender into account when hiring, assigning, promoting,
and disciplining officers).
Good argues that this prong is satisfied by her evidence
that UCMC departed from its demotion policy in an
“unprecedented fashion.” Good Br. 28. She relies on
Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir.
1999). In that case, we found that Mills, a male, made a
sufficient showing of suspicious “background circum-
stances” by showing that over a seven-year span, nearly
all promotions in his office went to women instead of
men and that women dominated the supervisory posi-
tions in the relevant office. See id. at 457. As explained
above, Good’s evidence does not rise to this level.
Good has evidence that in three instances, UCMC gave
a minority employee with deficient performance the
opportunity to take a demotion rather than suffer more
onerous discipline. But again, nothing in the record
demonstrates that UCMC has an anti-white bias or a
history of discrimination against white people. Good
has no evidence that a formal or informal “affirmative
action” policy was in force in her workplace. After Good’s
termination, her position was filled by another white
person. We agree with the district court that Good has
18 No. 11-2679
not offered evidence of any fishy “background circum-
stances” from which a reasonable finder of fact
could conclude that UCMC was motivated by
improper, racially-based motives when it terminated her
employment rather than demoting her. Accordingly,
we find that Good has failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the indirect method.
Finally, we recognize that the direct and indirect meth-
ods for proving and analyzing employment discrimina-
tion cases are subject to criticism. They have become
too complex, too rigid, and too far removed from the
statutory question of discriminatory causation. See
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 862-63 (Wood, J., concurring). If
we look away from the intricacies of the direct and
indirect methods here and focus on the summary
judgment evidence as a whole, we still do not see
evidence that would allow a reasonable finding of
reverse race discrimination in favor of Good.
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRMED.
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