PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CARLA M. DULANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PACKAGING CORPORATION OF
AMERICA; BOBBY MILLS,
No. 10-2316
Defendants-Appellees.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James C. Turk, Senior District Judge.
(7:09-cv-00063-jct)
Argued: January 25, 2012
Decided: March 12, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Duncan
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Keenan
joined.
2 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Terry Neill Grimes, GRIMES & WILLIAMS,
P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Anne Noel Occhi-
alino, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Lawrence Philip Postol, SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, Washing-
ton, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kevin D. Holden,
JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee
Bobby Mills. P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Lorraine C.
Davis, Acting Associate General Counsel, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Wash-
ington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant.
OPINION
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises out of the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Packaging Corporation of America
("PCA") on appellant Carla Dulaney’s claims of sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII. Finding genuine ques-
tions of material fact in dispute, we vacate and remand.
I.
A.
In considering the grant of a motion for summary judg-
ment, we view facts and inferences drawn from them in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pueschel v.
Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). We therefore recite
the facts here as Dulaney alleges them and note areas of dis-
agreement only where essential to our analysis.1
1
For this reason, we assume that the relationship between Bobby Mills
and Dulaney was nonconsensual although Mills apparently contends oth-
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 3
PCA is a manufacturer of cardboard boxes headquartered
near Chicago. Dulaney worked as a "Class ‘B’ Glue Helper"
on the second shift at PCA’s Roanoke, Virginia facility. In
that capacity, she was one component of a production line that
depended on the efficiency of all to assemble boxes.
Approximately 50 hourly and 15 to 20 salaried employees,
most of them male, worked at the Roanoke plant. These
employees worked in multiple shifts. After the close of regu-
lar business hours, which occurred during the middle of
Dulaney’s shift, there was no employee on duty with the title
of "manager" or "supervisor." Instead, Bobby Mills was des-
ignated as a "lead production worker." Appellee’s Br. 6.
Although lacking a supervisory title, Mills nevertheless exer-
cised certain responsibilities with respect to other workers.
For instance, he had the authority to assign work, send
employees home early without pay, and assess them points
pursuant to PCA’s progressive discipline system—under
which any employee earning 12 points was subject to auto-
matic termination. Mills was also responsible for reporting
employee complaints and misconduct to management. He had
a key to the office area, which allowed him sole access to that
part of the plant after the close of business.
Dulaney began working for PCA as a temporary hourly
employee in June 2006. PCA’s customary practice was to
offer temporary employees permanent employment after they
had worked a certain number of hours. Dulaney, however,
was not offered permanent employment on this schedule.
Rather, she had discussions with Mills throughout the fall of
erwise. PCA spends much of its brief attempting to undermine Dulaney’s
credibility as to her allegations of harassment by discussing affidavits
from her former co-workers in which they claim that Dulaney told them
about "her formerly working as a stripper and escort." Appellee’s Br. 7.
In addition to being of questionable relevance to the underlying issue of
whether Mills sexually harassed Dulaney during her employment at PCA,
such references are, in the context of deciding a motion for summary judg-
ment, unhelpful.
4 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
2006 as to when she might be promoted. Mills, although nom-
inally only lead production worker, ultimately wrote a memo-
randum extending her an offer of permanent employment on
November 20, 2006.
Shortly thereafter, in December 2006, Mills approached
Dulaney about "taking care of him" by performing sexual
acts. J.A. 26. She initially refused, at which point, she claims,
Mills followed through on threats to make her life "hell" by
screaming at her, spreading rumors, and otherwise interfering
with her work if she continued to refuse. Appellant’s Br. 6.
She eventually acceded to his demands.
These encounters typically occurred in the men’s restroom
or the office area, where Mills knew he would not be dis-
turbed because he alone had the key. Mills often interrupted
Dulaney’s work by calling her away from her station to report
to the office for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations
with him. At other times, he would rub himself against her
while she was working at her machine to signal that he
wanted her to engage in sex. Dulaney claims that Mills would
often scream at her when she refused him.2 Mills also sent
Dulaney home early, with a corresponding loss of pay, on
more than one occasion.
At some point, Mills began making sexually explicit com-
ments about Dulaney to her co-workers. For example, he
spread a rumor that Dulaney had a sexually transmitted infec-
2
The reports of other PCA employees about the relationship between
Mills and Dulaney are conflicting. An affidavit from former PCA
employee Floyd Joyce states: "Bobby Mills, a supervisor, harassed Carla
Dulaney 24/7. He stalked her a lot to the point she would start crying."
J.A. 201. On the other hand, current PCA employees Cedric Preston and
Jane Vars submitted affidavits stating that Dulaney bragged about having
a consensual affair with Mills. J.A. 163, 166.
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 5
tion. Dulaney contended that this and other rumors caused
other employees to treat her poorly.3
Dulaney complained about Mills’s derogatory remarks to
his direct supervisor, Mike Bourne. Bourne responded to this
complaint by reminding Dulaney that she was "replaceable."
J.A. 48. Dulaney complained to Bourne on one other occa-
sion. In early 2007, she had a dispute with Jane Vars, another
employee at the plant. Vars had called Dulaney a "nigger
lover" and spread rumors similar to the one just described.
J.A. 248. Bourne "laughed it off." J.A. 247. When Dulaney
and Vars expressed their intent to take their dispute to a more
senior supervisor, Donnie Woodward, Bourne threatened to
fire them if they went over his head.
Matters reached a crisis point on September 26, 2007. An
African American employee, Tim Divers, whose work
Dulaney assisted, complained to Woodward about Mills’s
treatment of Dulaney. Earlier that day, Mills had been
screaming at Dulaney, saying that she was a "whore" and "re-
placeable," and demanding to know whether she was "fucking
these niggers here." J.A. 250. Dulaney was one of the few
white employees at the plant. Divers complained that he was
unable to perform his work efficiently when Dulaney was
away from her station or crying, as was often the case. Fol-
lowing up, Dulaney went to Woodward’s office to report
Mills’s conduct. Because Woodward was unavailable,
Dulaney spoke to his secretary.
Woodward called Dulaney into his office to discuss Mills
on September 28, 2007. Dulaney, Woodward, and Mills dis-
agree about what happened next. Dulaney testified that
Woodward initially sent her to finish her shift with Mills and
that Bourne approached her and said "can’t you two just get
along." J.A. 269. According to Dulaney, Woodward sent her
3
Preston also testified that Mills told him that Dulaney "had a nasty dis-
ease" and that he did not want her socializing with other men. J.A. 443.
6 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
home with pay once he realized that she would have to finish
her shift alongside Mills. Woodward, on the other hand, testi-
fied that Dulaney was allowed to go home because she was
upset, that Bourne escorted her off the premises, and that he
planned to schedule her for the first shift so that she could
avoid Mills. Woodward further testified that Mills finished his
shift on September 28 but resigned on the next business day,
October 1.
Mills tells a still different version. He claims that he fin-
ished his shift on September 28, after Woodward told him that
Dulaney reported him, and came back to work on October 1.
Mills maintains that he took a vacation day on October 2,
returned to work for a meeting on October 3, and then contin-
ued to use his vacation time until PCA fired him on October
7.
Woodward contacted Greg Bright in PCA’s Human
Resources department on October 1, 2007 to arrange for
Dulaney to submit a written complaint. Bright interviewed
Dulaney on October 3 and sent her home early with pay after
she became upset.
Dulaney’s relationship with her co-workers and Bourne
deteriorated after this point. She had two further disputes with
Vars, the first of which involved Vars passing messages from
Mills to Dulaney, and the second of which involved Vars call-
ing Dulaney a "whore" and accusing her of being promiscu-
ous. Although Vars was reprimanded in connection with these
disputes, Dulaney testified that when she complained about
these disputes to Bourne, he and Vars laughed at her, saying
"[t]here goes Carla again." J.A. 51. PCA did not reprimand
Dulaney for these disputes.
Dulaney approached Bright on November 2, 2007 to dis-
cuss her desire to find a new job because her co-workers con-
tinued to ostracize her. She found it difficult to search for a
new job while working full-time for PCA. Bright proposed a
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 7
severance agreement and arranged for one to be prepared for
her to review. Critical to this appeal, an internal PCA memo-
randum about Dulaney explains "[w]hen the separation agree-
ment is prepared . . . payroll automatically stops the
employee’s pay as of the termination date stated in the agree-
ment . . . Payroll coding is as follows: Employment status is
‘terminated’ . . . Termination Reason should be completed as
Quit with Notice." J.A. 187. The agreement stated that
Dulaney’s "employment with [PCA] shall be terminated
effective November 2, 2007." J.A. 181. Consistent with the
internal memorandum and the severance agreement, we pre-
sume that PCA ceased paying Dulaney on November 2.
Dulaney did not meet with Bourne and Bright to receive a
copy of the severance agreement until November 5.
The letter accompanying the severance agreement that PCA
presented to Dulaney on November 5 explained that she had
21 days to sign the severance agreement and seven days after
signing to revoke it. The letter also informed her that she had
the right to consult with an attorney to review the document
prior to signing. The severance agreement itself proposed an
extensive waiver of rights in exchange for weekly payments
and benefits until December 31, 2007.
Dulaney testified that at the November 5 meeting, Bright
told her that she was required to sign the severance agreement
before she left the office that day or she would be fired. When
she refused to sign, Bourne escorted her out of the office and
told her to take her belongings and lock from her locker.
Bourne then took her key to the facility and asked her when
she would be able to return her uniform.
Dulaney returned her uniform on November 7, 2007 and
refused, on her lawyer’s advice, to speak to management.
That same day, Bright wrote Dulaney a letter explaining that
she still had not been fired and was welcome to return to
work. Nonetheless, in Dulaney’s unemployment hearing on
8 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
November 29, 2007, PCA described her status as "termi-
nated."
B.
On February 27, 2009, Dulaney sued PCA and Mills for
gender discrimination and sexual harassment, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
et seq., and for state law causes of action, in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia. She sought
to hold PCA and Mills jointly and severally liable for com-
pensatory and punitive damages. PCA filed for summary
judgment on July 13, 2010. The district court granted PCA’s
motion on November 15, 2010.
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the affir-
mative defense recognized by the Supreme Court in Faragher
v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Ordinarily, an employer would
be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if a vic-
tim’s supervisor created a hostile work environment or sexu-
ally harassed the victim himself. If the employer took no
tangible employment action against the victim, the Faragher-
Elleth doctrine provides a defense to the charge of supervi-
sory harassment if: (1) the employer "exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior," and (2) "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
The district court made somewhat contradictory factual
statements in analyzing the availability of the defense. At one
point, it noted that "[t]here is no allegation here that
Dulaney’s direct employer, PCA, sexually harassed her.
Instead, Dulaney alleges that a co-worker harassed her."
Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 7:09-cv-00063 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120687, at *8 (W. D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010).
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 9
The district court later notes, however, that it need not decide
whether Mills was a supervisor before assessing whether PCA
was entitled to assert the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Id. at *1
n.1, *6 n.4. Although we find this apparent confusion difficult
to parse, we believe that the district court was trying to give
Dulaney the benefit of the doubt by holding PCA to the rela-
tively strict standard imposed by respondeat superior. In other
words, the district court reasoned that if it assumed that Mills
was a supervisor, and if PCA was nonetheless entitled to the
Faragher-Ellerth defense, then Dulaney could not prevail on
any Title VII claim.
In considering whether PCA was entitled to the Faragher-
Ellerth defense as a matter of law, the district court first con-
sidered whether PCA had taken a "tangible employment
action" against Dulaney. It rejected her argument that (1)
being sent home with points for refusing sexual advances, (2)
being escorted off the premises on November 5, 2007, and (3)
being labeled as "terminated" on an internal PCA memoran-
dum were evidence of a "tangible employment action."
Instead, it relied solely on the terms of the severance agree-
ment—which explained that Dulaney had 21 days to consult
with an attorney before executing it—as proof that PCA had
not fired or taken any other tangible employment action
against Dulaney. It further noted that even if Dulaney reason-
ably interpreted the events that transpired during the Novem-
ber 5 meeting as her termination, PCA’s subsequent letter
explaining that she had not been fired, proved that "there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dulaney suf-
fered a ‘tangible employment action.’" Id. In a footnote the
district court commented: "While the ‘legalese’ of the sever-
ance agreement may not have been clear to Dulaney herself,
it would have been abundantly clear to an attorney, which
PCA advised she could have consulted before signing the
agreement." Id., at *12 n.3.
Having determined that PCA took no tangible employment
action against Dulaney, the district court then concluded that
10 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
PCA had proven both prongs of the Faragher-Ellerth defense:
it found that PCA exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,4 and that
Dulaney unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-
tive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.5 Accordingly, the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of PCA on Dulaney’s
federal claims. Having dismissed all of Dulaney’s federal
claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her state law claims and dismissed them
without prejudice.
II.
Dulaney appeals the district court’s entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of PCA.6 She argues that the district court erred
4
The district court reached this conclusion by following our decision in
Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 2006), reasoning that "an
employer will be deemed to have exercised reasonable care to correct sex-
ually harassing behavior when an employer’s remedial response results in
the cessation of the complained conduct." Dulaney, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120687, at *14-15 (quotation marks omitted). The district court
dismissed the conflict in narratives of when Mills stopped working for
PCA and stated simply that "the day that Dulaney discussed the matter
with PCA management was the last day that Mills ever worked at the PCA
plant." Id. at *15.
5
The district court found that although Dulaney claimed to have
reported some of Mills’s harassment to Bourne, she had failed to seek
redress under PCA’s sexual harassment policy because that policy
required her to report any sexual harassment to the Facilities Manager or
Human Resources. Id. at *16-17. It found Bourne’s threat to fire Dulaney
if she went over his head to be a "generalized fear of retaliation" insuffi-
cient to excuse her failure to report the harassment according to PCA’s
policies. Id. at *18. We express no opinion about the appropriateness of
this analysis since we find that summary judgment is inappropriate in light
of other genuine questions of fact.
6
The EEOC has filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of Dulaney. It
joins her in arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether
Mills was a supervisor and by concluding that there was no genuine issue
of fact as to whether Dulaney had suffered a tangible employment action.
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 11
first by not determining whether Mills was her supervisor
before applying the Faragher-Ellerth defense, then by finding
that PCA took no tangible employment action against her, and
finally by improperly overlooking genuine issues of fact when
it applied the Faragher-Ellerth defense. PCA argues first that
it took no tangible employment action against Dulaney and
second, even if it did, that the Faragher-Ellerth defense
should nonetheless apply because the alleged harasser had no
hand in the tangible employment action.
Turning first to Dulaney’s arguments, because we find that
there are genuine issues of fact as to whether PCA took "tan-
gible employment action" against Dulaney, we reach neither
the question of whether the district court erred by not deter-
mining whether Mills was a supervisor nor the question of
whether the district court correctly applied the Faragher-
Ellerth defense itself. Turning then to PCA’s arguments, we
In particular, the EEOC urges us to analyze this appeal as a "submission
case," that is, one in which an employee submits to sexual abuse in order
to retain his or her job. The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance explains that
"[i]f a supervisor undertakes or recommends a tangible job action based
on a subordinate’s response to unwelcome sexual demands, the employer
is liable and cannot raise the [Faragher-Ellerth] defense. The result is the
same whether the employee rejects the demands and is subjected to an
adverse tangible employment action or submits to the demands and conse-
quently obtains a tangible job benefit. Such harassment previously would
have been characterized as ‘quid pro quo.’" Although not controlling, the
EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance does "constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The
Second and Ninth Circuits have found the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance
persuasive. Min Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2001);
Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1172. (9th Cir. 2003).
PCA argues that Dulaney has waived this argument because she did not
pursue this submission theory of liability in the district court. We need not
resolve this issue, however, because we find that summary judgment was
inappropriate because of the disputed issues of material fact surrounding
Dulaney’s termination.
12 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
explain why PCA’s contention that it is entitled to the
Faragher-Ellerth defense even if it fired Dulaney is meritless,
provided that there is some nexus between the harassment and
her eventual firing.
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the
district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pueschel,
577 F.3d at 563. Summary judgment is appropriate where
"there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine question of material fact
exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court
finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City
Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011); Evans v. Technolo-
gies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir.
1996).
A.
We begin our analysis with Dulaney’s argument that the
district court overlooked genuine questions of fact when it
determined that PCA was entitled to the Faragher-Ellerth
defense as a matter of law.7 Before reaching the defense,
7
Dulaney and the EEOC argue that the district court erred by not deter-
mining as an initial matter whether Mills was her supervisor because dif-
ferent standards apply when the alleged harasser is a supervisor instead of
a co-worker. We have previously explained that when the harasser is a
supervisor, the employer is presumptively liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, unless the Faragher-Ellerth defense applies. Whitten
v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 2010). However, when the
harasser is not a supervisor, the employer is not liable unless "the
employer itself was negligent in failing to take effective action to stop
harassment about which it knew or should have known." Id. As discussed
above, we read the district court’s opinion as attempting to give Dulaney
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 13
courts must first determine whether the company took a tangi-
ble employment action against the employee. The defense is
unavailable if the employer has done so. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. We therefore begin with
the threshold question of whether Dulaney suffered a tangible
employment action.
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court defined a "tangible employ-
ment action" as "a significant change in employment status,
the benefit of the more stringent standard by assuming that Mills was her
supervisor. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the district court in fact
assumed that Mills was her supervisor in conducting its analysis. For
example, the district court twice says that it is not deciding whether Mills
was Dulaney’s supervisor. Dulaney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120687 at *3
n.1, *18 n.4. Then, when describing Dulaney’s federal claims, the district
court says that she "alleges that a co-worker harassed her." Id. at *8. This
is incorrect. Dulaney alleged that "Bobby Mills, [her] supervisor, told
[her] that she had to provide sexual favors to him to make things easy for
her at work and to keep her job." J.A. 11.
We are concerned that this apparent uncertainty about whether Mills
was a supervisor tainted the district court’s analysis of whether Dulaney
suffered a tangible employment action by making various events during
her tenure at PCA seem unduly innocuous. For example, if one co-worker
repeatedly tells another co-worker to clock out early, but lacks the author-
ity to enforce such instruction, it is, of course, difficult to argue that there
has been an "employment action" since no agent of the employer has
authorized this action. On the other hand, if a supervisor repeatedly tells
another employee to clock out early, thereby effectively cutting the
employee’s wages, our analysis might be different. See Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 762 ("A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct eco-
nomic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury.");
see also Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227,
1231 (11th Cir. 2006) ("A reduction in an employee’s hours, which
reduces the employee’s take-home pay, qualifies as a tangible employment
action."). Given Mills’s control over Dulaney’s day-to-day activi-
ties—such as his apparent authority to send her home early—we would
have difficulty believing that he was not her supervisor under the frame-
work we laid out in Whitten, 601 F.3d at 244-45. Accordingly, we think
it is for the jury to decide whether he was her supervisor and whether any
of his interactions with Dulaney constitute a tangible employment action.
14 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits." 524 U.S. at 761. We find that
there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Dulaney was
fired. The district court erred by giving dispositive weight to
the language of the severance agreement and Bright’s letter
without considering the contradictory evidence in the record.
We also conclude that the district court did not properly draw
inferences in favor of Dulaney as the non-moving party.
The district court reasoned that "[w]hile the ‘legalese’ of
the severance agreement may not have been clear to Dulaney
herself, it would have been abundantly clear to an attorney,
which PCA advised she could have consulted before signing
the agreement." Dulaney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120687 at
*12 n.3. Dulaney, of course, did consult an attorney, then
refused to sign the agreement, and instead filed this lawsuit.
Dulaney, through her attorney, indeed argues that the lan-
guage of the agreement specifies that she was terminated, and
further contends that the circumstances surrounding the
receipt of the agreement indicate that she had been termi-
nated. Appellant’s Br. 33. In other words, Dulaney and her
attorney read the agreement as an offer of severance benefits
in exchange for a waiver of certain rights, such as the right to
file suit in any jurisdiction except Illinois; the alternative to
this offer, as they read it, was termination. We do not find
such an interpretation so unreasonable that it warrants rejec-
tion as a matter of law.
The district court treated Bright’s letter, in which he
claimed that Dulaney was welcome to return to PCA, as dis-
positive evidence that Dulaney was not fired. The district
court explained that "[e]ven if it were reasonable for Dulaney
to get the impression on November 5 that she had been fired,
that impression was quelled by PCA’s letter explicitly stating
that Dulaney had not been fired and, in fact, still had her posi-
tion at PCA if she so desired." Dulaney, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120687 at *12. Bright’s letter, however, does not
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 15
stand in isolation. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 959 (explaining that
the question on summary judgment is whether any reasonable
jury "reviewing the record as a whole" could enter a verdict
for the non-moving party). According to Dulaney, whose tes-
timony we must credit on summary judgment, Bright
informed her that she would be fired if she did not sign the
severance agreement. After she refused to do so, Bourne
walked her to her locker, directed her to gather her lock and
other belongings, took her key to the facility, then escorted
her off the premises. Further, according to an internal memo-
randum, PCA stopped Dulaney’s payroll as of November 2,
three days before Dulaney first saw the severance agreement.
It would not be unreasonable for a jury to conclude, based
upon this fact, that Dulaney had been terminated regardless of
whether or not she signed the agreement. By providing dispo-
sitive weight to individual documents without considering cir-
cumstances, such as those described above, the district court
effectively drew inferences in favor of the wrong party.
We emphasize that on summary judgment, we consider "all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party." Pueschel, 577 F.3d at 563. Drawing
reasonable inferences in Dulaney’s favor, we cannot say that
no reasonable jury, looking at the totality of the events that
form this dispute, would find that she had been terminated.
Accordingly, we hold that summary judgment is inappropriate
for this case because there is a genuine issue of fact as to
whether PCA took a tangible employment action against
Dulaney.
B.
PCA argues that, even if it took a tangible employment
action against Dulaney by firing her, it is entitled to the
Faragher-Ellerth defense "[b]ecause Dulaney’s employment
did not end at the hands of Mills, the alleged harasser."
Appellee’s Br. 28. In support of this argument, PCA directs
us to our decision in Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir.
16 DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA
1999), in which we allowed an employer to assert the
Faragher-Ellerth defense where the record demonstrated
"that Brown suffered no tangible employment action at [the
harasser’s] hands" and the alleged harasser "took no part in
any decision to hire, fire, discharge, transfer, or reassign
Brown, or in any way to alter her employment benefits.
Indeed, the only tangible employment action taken with
regard to Brown during the relevant period was her promo-
tion." Id. at 395.
PCA overreads Brown. Brown did not depart from the rele-
vant inquiry in this circuit, which requires us to look at the
entire course of conduct between the harassment and the tan-
gible employment action. For example, in James v. Booz-
Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2004), we
explained that a poor performance evaluation "merely causing
a loss of prestige or status is not actionable." Id. at 377. How-
ever, if the employer later used that evaluation as a basis for
demotion, firing, or other tangible employment action, the
discriminatory evaluation would become actionable. Id. This
analysis recognizes that the harasser may use his or her dis-
criminatory intent to set in motion a tangible employment
action taken by someone else. That someone other than the
harasser takes the tangible employment action does not
change its but-for cause: discrimination in violation of Title
VII. See id.
We read Brown as requiring some nexus between the
harassment and the tangible employment action for the latter
to be actionable. Cf. Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., 159 F. 3d
177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Tangible employment actions, if
not taken for discriminatory reasons, do not vitiate the affir-
mative defense."). In Brown, the victim was promoted for rea-
sons unrelated to the harassment, 184 F.3d at 395, and
therefore there was no nexus between the harassment and the
tangible employment action for Title VII purposes. Viewing
the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Dulaney,
we cannot say the same is true here. Inconsistencies between
DULANEY v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA 17
stories about how PCA reacted to Dulaney’s allegations began
the day she reported the harassment. Furthermore, there is tes-
timony that Bourne, the supervisor who escorted her from the
premises on November 5, criticized and laughed at Dulaney
first when she reported that Mills was making inappropriate
sexual comments about her to her co-workers, again when she
reported Mills’s physical harassment, and again when she
reported that some co-workers continued to tease her about
the sex-themed rumors initiated by Mills. Bourne’s treatment
of Dulaney as she sought to report Mills’s sexual harassment
and his subsequent involvement in her termination suggest a
nexus between Mills’s harassment and her termination. Such
questions are for the jury to decide. Simply put, we find suffi-
cient uncertainty in the facts about what transpired between
September 26 and November 7—uncertainty about whether
there is a nexus between the harassment and Dulaney’s
alleged termination—to find summary judgment inappropriate.8
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
VACATED AND REMANDED.
8
Because we find that there is a genuine question of fact as to whether
Dulaney was terminated, we express no opinion about whether she experi-
enced a tangible employment action when she was sent home without pay
or awarded points under PCA’s progressive discipline system.