Hasan v. Holder

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 10-1656

MOHAMMED SUZAUL HASAN, TANJILA HASAN, and TAMEEM HASAN,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Torruella, Boudin, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.

Salim Sheikh, on brief for petitioners.
Julia J. Tyler, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, and Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, on brief
for respondent.

March 12, 2012
 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. The petitioners in this case,

natives and citizens of Bangladesh, seek review of a final order of

removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). The BIA affirmed the denial by an

immigration judge ("IJ") of the petitioners' applications for

cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

pursuant to the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). After careful

consideration, we dismiss the petition for review regarding

cancellation of removal for lack of jurisdiction. The remainder of

the petition is denied, as we find that the BIA's decision was

supported by substantial evidence.

I. Background

A. Facts and Procedural History

Mohammed Suzaul Hasan ("Hasan"), the lead petitioner in

this case, entered the United States, on or about August 4, 1992,

with his wife, Tanjila, and son, Tameem. The three were admitted

to this country as non-immigrant visitors with authorization to

remain in the United States until February 3, 1993. Hasan and his

family overstayed their visas. In the interim, a daughter,

Tashfia, was born to the family on July 2, 1993 in Los Angeles,

California.1 Ten days later, on July 12, 1993, Hasan filed an

application seeking asylum and withholding of removal under

1
Having been born in the United States, Tashfia is a U.S.
citizen. See Mariko v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898)).

-2-
sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 & 1231(b)(3), as well as protection under

the CAT, as implemented by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18, listing his wife

and son as derivatives.

Over a decade later, on May 25, 2007, the government

filed Notices to Appear ("NTA") in immigration court, charging

Hasan, Tanjila, and Tameem (collectively, "Petitioners") with

removability pursuant to section 237(a)(1)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(B). The three were placed in removal proceedings and,

in pleadings submitted to the IJ on June 17, 2007, they admitted

the factual allegations in the NTA, conceding their removability as

charged.

On June 30, 2008, Petitioners filed individual

applications seeking cancellation of removal under section

240A(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Hearings on the

merits of Hasan's pending application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT protection, as well as Hasan and Tanjila's

applications for cancellation of removal,2 were held by an IJ on

October 15 and November 21, 2008. Hasan testified as to the events

giving rise to his request for relief and protection, and the

2
Although Tameem filed his own application for cancellation of
removal, he admittedly had no qualifying relative and thus could
not pursue this avenue of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)
(qualifying relatives limited to the alien's spouse, parent, or
child). However, Tameem continued to qualify for cancellation of
removal as a derivative under his father's asylum application
because he was under the age of twenty-one when it was filed. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(B).

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alleged exceptional and extremely unusual hardship that would

befall his daughter, Tashfia, a U.S. citizen, if he and the rest of

his family were removed to Bangladesh. Tashfia also testified in

support of her parents' application for cancellation of removal.

Hasan declared that he came to the United States because

of political persecution in Bangladesh by opposition parties.

Hasan began his political career in 1985 with the Youth Front of

the Jatiya Party,3 and was eventually elected to prominent

positions within the local party chapter. Prior to his departure

from Bangladesh in 1992, Hasan had been attacked and threatened on

numerous occasions by political opponents of the Jatiya Party,

including the Bangladesh National Party ("BNP"), the Awami League,

and a fundamentalist Islamic group called the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Specifically, Hasan described: (1) being beaten by members of the

Awami League on October 7, 1988 while on his way back from a

political meeting, for which he received medical treatment and

several stitches on his face; (2) being attacked on March 2, 1989

by BNP members who attempted to abduct him from a marketplace and

fired upon him as he fled on a motorcycle; (3) being robbed and

beaten severely by BNP members on August 25, 1989 while he was

collecting donations for the Jatiya Party at a marketplace;

(4) receiving death threats from a BNP leader on October 26, 1989

3
While Hasan referred to the "Jatio" Party in his 1993 asylum
application, both the IJ and the BIA used the term "Jatiya" in
their decisions, as that party is named in the U.S. State
Department Country Reports. We do the same here.

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for his work with the Jatiya Party; (5) being beaten with a hockey

stick and assaulted with a knife by Islamic fundamentalists of the

Jamaat-e-Islami on August 30, 1990 as he was leaving a rally; (6)

being beaten in front of his home on December 6, 1990 by members of

the BNP and Awami League after the Jatiya Party stepped down from

power, from which attack he was saved by his wife's successful

entreaty to the mob; and (7) being arrested and detained for three

days in February of 1992 without an explanation or formal charges,

after the BNP came into power, during which time he was beaten and

given inedible food. Hasan declared that he was released from the

last of these events only after his wife pleaded with the police

and offered them a cash bribe.

Hasan was once again attacked and attempts were made

against his life in April of 1992. Consequently, he left

Bangladesh with his wife and son on July 30, 1992, and made for

Belgium, from which country the family found its way to the United

States on a valid, non-immigration visa.

Hasan testified that, at the time of his hearing,

Bangladesh had a "caretaker government," that all political

activities were "suspended" and restricted, and that the Jatiya

Party was "not in power at all." The government, in contrast,

presented the U.S. State Department's 2007 Country Report on Human

Rights Practices for Bangladesh, which indicated that after the

2001 elections, which were supervised by a nonparty caretaker

government, the BNP had formed a four-party coalition government

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with the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Bangladesh Jatiya Party, and the

Islami Oikko Jote. The 2007 Country Report also recounted the

implementation of electoral and political reforms. In addition,

the government pointed to newspaper articles chronicling a historic

democratic election held on December 29, 2008, as well as

statements in the 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for

Bangladesh that the elections were "considered by international and

domestic observers as free and fair," blemished only by "isolated

irregularities" and "sporadic violence." Asked specifically what

harm might befall him if he returned to Bangladesh, Hasan stated

that he did not "know what will happen." He identified the BNP and

Jamaat-e-Islami as "the main threat" for him and averred that

members of these organizations would not like it "if [he] g[o]t

into politics again."

As to Tashfia, Hasan's daughter and a U.S. citizen,

declarations by herself and Petitioners reflected that she had

never traveled to Bangladesh, knew little about the country, and is

not comfortable speaking the native language, nor can she read or

write in Bengali. If the Petitioners were repatriated to

Bangladesh, Tashfia would accompany them as there is no one in the

United States that could care for her. Hasan expressed fears that

political rivals might kidnap Tashfia in order to hurt him, or that

she might be kidnaped simply for being perceived as a foreigner

from a rich country. Hasan also worried that food shortages,

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substandard health care, and the expense of education for English

speakers in Bangladesh might affect Tashfia negatively.

B. The IJ's Decision

On June 17, 2009, the IJ issued a written decision

denying Hasan's request for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

protection, denying Hasan and Tanjila's request for cancellation of

removal, but granting Petitioners voluntary departure.

The IJ determined that Petitioners were ineligible for

cancellation of removal because they failed to demonstrate that

their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship," 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), to their one qualifying

relative, Tashfia, that would be "substantially different from, or

beyond, that which would normally be expected" from repatriation,

Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (B.I.A. 2001) (citing

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 discussing intended reach of INA

section 240A(b)(1)(D)). The IJ held that Petitioners could not

establish that removal would cause Tashfia to be submitted to the

necessary level of economic hardship since the record reflected

that Hasan did not allege any adverse medical conditions; possessed

a high degree of education as a CPA and college graduate; and was

the co-owner of his family's house in Bangladesh. The IJ also

considered Petitioners' strong family ties in Bangladesh, including

Hasan's brothers, sisters, and father who all currently reside

there, and the fact that a number of these relatives held skilled

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positions.4 There was also meager evidence indicating that Tashfia

would face peril based on any political activities in which her

father may have engaged over seventeen years ago, or that her U.S.

citizenship would make her an appreciable target for kidnapping or

other criminal activity.

Regarding Petitioners' eligibility for asylum under the

INA's section 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, the IJ determined that,

assuming Petitioners had sustained their burden of establishing

past persecution, the government had nevertheless established by a

preponderance of the evidence that there had been a fundamental

change in circumstances in Bangladesh such that Petitioners no

longer had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a

statutorily cognizable ground. See id. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (in order

to establish eligibility for asylum under INA section 208, an alien

must be a refugee within the meaning of INA section 101(a)(42)(A),

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining

"refugee" as any person who is unwilling or unable to return to his

or her country of nationality due to "persecution or a well-founded

fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion");

see also Zarouite v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2005)

4
The record reflects that Hasan has three brothers and three
sisters who live and work in Bangladesh. Hasan testified that, of
his sisters, two were schoolteachers and one was a nurse; of his
brothers, one was an attorney. He also testified that his father
was retired but owned land that he employed for sharecropping.

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(well-founded fear can be shown on the basis of "past persecution,

which gives rise to a presumption of future persecution . . .

sufficient for the applicant's case unless rebutted by the Attorney

General (e.g., by showing changed conditions)" (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A))).

Specifically, the IJ noted that while Hasan had described

harassment, abuse, and physical harm at the hands of members of

various opposition political factions, every one of the cited

incidents took place between 1988 and 1992. The IJ found that,

since that time, the record revealed substantial changes in the

relationship between the different Bangladeshi political factions

and in the national political environment generally, as well as

electoral reforms that had produced more open, free, and

transparent voting processes in Bangladesh. Those changes served

to rebut the presumption that Petitioners possessed a well-founded

fear of persecution in Bangladesh, should they be removed to the

country almost seventeen years after their departure. The IJ made

note of the fact that the bulk of the Petitioners' documentary

submissions antedated the evidence submitted by the government.

The IJ also found that none of the Petitioners had

marshaled sufficient evidence to establish that, almost seventeen

years later, they held an independent, well-founded fear of future

persecution in Bangladesh, at least not one that the IJ considered

objectively reasonable. See Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 94

(1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that even if an applicant cannot

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establish past persecution, "[he or] she can [] establish

eligibility for asylum based on a 'well-founded fear of future

persecution' based on a protected ground" (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(2))); see also id. (an applicant must establish that

"[the] fear is both (1) subjectively genuine and (2) objectively

reasonable, meaning that a reasonable person in the applicant's

circumstances would fear persecution"). The IJ determined that the

fact that Hasan had not been politically active in Bangladesh,

whether for the Jatiya Party or any other entity, for over

seventeen years, significantly undercut the reasonableness of his

claimed fear. See Hasan v. Gonzales, 236 F. App'x 696, 697 (2d

Cir. 2007) (citing with approval IJ's finding that petitioner's

absence for ten years from relevant political activity suggests he

would not face persecution in Bangladesh). In addition, the IJ

noted that Petitioners have many family members who presently work

and live safely and peacefully in Bangladesh, a fact that worked

against their argument that Bangladesh would be unsafe for them or

their family upon repatriation. See Ali v. Gonzales, 190 F. App'x

13, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (denying review of denial of asylum claim,

noting fact that petitioner's parents, brother, and uncle currently

reside safely in Bangladesh negates claim of a well-founded fear).

Finally, the IJ denied Petitioners' claim for withholding

of removal because they had failed to sustain their eligibility for

asylum relief, and thus failed to meet the heightened standard for

withholding of removal pursuant to INA's section 241(b)(3),

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8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). See Rodríguez-Ramírez v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d

120, 123 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[A] claim for withholding of removal

places a more stringent burden of proof on an alien than does a

counterpart claim for asylum."). Similarly, their claim for relief

under the CAT failed because the IJ found that Petitioners

presented "little, if any," evidence indicating that it was more

likely than not that they would suffer torture at the hands of the

government, or with the consent or acquiescence of the government,

should they be repatriated to Bangladesh. See Romilus v. Ashcroft,

385 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (relating this as the standard for

relief under the CAT).

Petitioners appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA on

July 13, 2009. The IJ's decision was affirmed and the appeal

dismissed on April 27, 2010.5 This timely petition for judicial

review followed.

II. Discussion

Petitioners contend that the BIA applied an improper

legal standard in reviewing the IJ's hardship determination

regarding cancellation of removal and thus violated their due

5
We note that, despite having denied Petitioner's appeal, the BIA
remanded the case to the IJ mandating that a new period of
voluntary departure be provided that communicated the proper
advisals including, but not limited to, the consequences of failing
to timely post a voluntary departure bond. On July 12, 2010, the
government moved to dismiss the petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction because no final order had yet been entered in light
of the BIA's remand. This Court denied the motion on August 13,
2010.

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process rights. They also contend that the BIA erred in affirming

the IJ's determination regarding Petitioners' claims for asylum

relief, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. We

address their arguments in turn.

A. Cancellation of Removal

"Cancellation of removal is a form of discretionary

relief, the granting of which allows a non-resident alien,

otherwise removable, to remain in the United States." Ayeni v.

Holder, 617 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2010). The Attorney General may

cancel removal of an alien if he or she (1) has resided in the

United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years;

(2) has been a person of good moral character during that period;

(3) has not been convicted of certain enumerated crimes; and

(4) has established that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying family member (i.e.,

U.S.-citizen spouse, parent, or child). 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

It is the last of these requirements that is at issue here.

Generally, no court has jurisdiction to review agency-

level hardship determinations made in the cancellation of removal

context. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (stating that "no court shall have

jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of

relief" under the cancellation of removal provision); see Parvez v.

Keisler, 506 F.3d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 2007) ("When the BIA denies

cancellation of removal based on the factual determination that an

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alien fails to demonstrate the requisite hardship, we lack

jurisdiction to review its decision."). The one exception to this

jurisdiction-stripping provision is that an appropriate court of

appeals may review petitions that raise claims premised on either

constitutional questions or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)

(2)(D) (establishing that no provision "which limits or eliminates

judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of

constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon petition for

review"). However, "[u]nder the terms of this limited

jurisdictional grant, discretionary or factual determinations

continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the courts of

appeals." Mehilli v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, only if the

petition fits within the exception do we have jurisdiction, and

"[t]he presence vel non of either a constitutional or legal

question is a matter of substance, not a function of labeling."

Ayeni, 617 F.3d at 70-71.

Petitioners attempt to bring themselves within this

exception by asserting that the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's

decision regarding extreme and unusual hardship violated their

Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Specifically, they argue the

BIA did not adequately address as a hardship factor the potential

harm that could befall Tashfia if she had to travel to Bangladesh.

In support of this, Petitioners contend that the IJ's decision

primarily mentioned facts relating to economic hardship, while the

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BIA made only "cursory" mention of Petitioners' fear for Tashfia's

safety. This, they contend, amounts to the application of an

incorrect legal standard and a violation of their due process

rights.

As the government correctly argues in opposition, this

claim comprises nothing more than a challenge to the correctness of

the BIA's factfinding. The very heart of Petitioners' claim, that

the BIA's analysis regarding their fears for their daughter's

safety was not "detailed" and failed to "adequately" address the

issue, is fundamentally an objection to a factual determination by

the BIA and the relative evidentiary weight the agency gave to

competing considerations. In fact, the BIA directly addressed

Petitioners' fears for Tashfia's safety and found that the IJ had

"properly considered the relevant factors in the aggregate,"

including consideration of Petitioners' "testimony that they

believed their daughter might be kidnapped in Bangladesh, as one of

the potential hardship factors."

We have repeatedly held that "[c]loaking [a factual

claim] in the garb of legal error does not alter its nature." Id.

at 73 (holding petitioner's claim was factual in nature, where he

alleged the BIA had failed to accord sufficient weight to the

seriousness of his son's asthma); see also Rashad v. Mukasey, 554

F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding allegation that the agency

failed to fully evaluate an aspect of petitioner's claim to be

"another way of saying that the agency got the facts wrong");

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Parvez, 506 F.3d at 97 (allegation that the BIA failed to consider

supporting evidence regarding familial changes in Bangladesh held

to be factual in nature). Petitioner's claim is simply "a

disguised challenge to fact finding," id., with no legal or

constitutional grounding. As such, it cannot support this Court's

exercise of jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of Petitioners'

appeal regarding their failed application for cancellation of

removal.

B. Denial of Asylum and Withholding of Removal

We give deferential review to the BIA's findings of fact

and credibility under the "substantial evidence" standard. Bonilla

v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2008). Under this approach,

"Board determinations of statutory eligibility for relief from

deportation, whether via asylum or withholding of removal, are

conclusive if 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.'" Guzmán v. I.N.S.,

327 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting I.N.S. v. Elías-Zacarías,

502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). This means that "we will not reverse

unless 'the record evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to

make a contrary determination.'" Id. (quoting Aguilar-Solís v.

I.N.S., 168 F.3d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1999)). Ordinarily, "[w]e

review the decision of the BIA and not that of the IJ, but to the

extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning, we

review those portions of the IJ's decision as part of the final

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decision of the BIA." Bonilla, 539 F.3d at 76 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

As noted previously, "[t]o establish eligibility for

asylum, an alien must prove either past persecution, which gives

rise to an inference of future persecution, or establish a well

founded fear of future persecution on account of [his or] her race,

religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political

opinion." Sugiarto, 586 F.3d at 94 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A),

1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)). "If an applicant can

prove past persecution, a regulatory presumption that the applicant

has a well-founded fear of future persecution is triggered."

Guzmán, 327 F.3d at 15 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)).

The BIA in this case determined that the IJ had correctly

denied asylum based on a finding that, even assuming Hasan had

suffered past persecution, the government successfully rebutted the

presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA

pointed to particular facts on the record that supported the IJ's

conclusion. It also held that the IJ had properly found no well-

founded fear of future persecution where Hasan conceded having been

away from Bangladesh and the Jatiya Party for seventeen years and

that the rest of his family remained in Bangladesh, unharmed.6

6
The BIA also noted that, to the extent Petitioners feared
kidnapping and extortion purely on account of their being viewed as
wealthy persons, "such does not establish the required nexus to a
ground protected under the [INA]." This conclusion was not

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 Petitioners challenge the BIA's determination by merely

arguing that the agency's decision to affirm the IJ "was not

supported by substantial evidence." Petitioners provide no

argumentation to support this assertion, however, and our own

review of the administrative record leads us to conclude otherwise.

The IJ had before him reports and news articles substantiating the

government's claim of changed country conditions, including country

reports prepared by the U.S. State Department. See Banturino v.

Holder, 576 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The [BIA] is entitled to

rely on the State Department's country reports as proof of country

conditions and may give them considerable weight, as long as any

evidence adduced to contradict them is considered."). The IJ also

took into account all of the testimonial and documentary evidence

presented by Petitioners in support of their independent claim of

fear of future persecution, and found it unpersuasive. As

previously stated, ours is a deferential review and "we must uphold

the BIA's determination unless the record points unerringly in the

opposite direction." Sugiarto, 586 F.3d at 94 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see Banturino, 576 F.3d at 15 ("Where

directly challenged on appeal, and we find support for the same in
our case law. See, e.g., Díaz v. Holder, No. 11-1125, 2012 WL
372664, at *2 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (noting cases where "we have
[] rejected attempts to recognize a particular social group
comprised of individuals perceived to be wealthy, who are returning
to Guatemala after living in the United States," where "nothing
indicates that in Guatemala individuals perceived to be wealthy are
persecuted because they belong to a social class or group" (quoting
Sicaju–Díaz v. Holder, 663 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011))).

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the agency's interpretation of the evidence as a whole is

reasonable, we do not disturb it."). The IJ in this case had

before it ample evidence from which to draw its conclusions, and we

will not disturb the BIA's decision on such bare assertions of

factual error.7

This conclusion also disposes of Petitioners'

withholding of removal claim. As noted earlier, "[w]ithholding of

removal, which provides mandatory relief, imposes a higher standard

than asylum." Romilus, 385 F.3d at 8. "While eligibility for

asylum requires a well-founded fear of future persecution,

withholding of removal requires that the alien show a clear

probability of future persecution." Chreng v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d

14, 23 (1st Cir. 2006). Therefore, because Petitioners' claim for

asylum fails, so too does their counterpart claim for withholding

of removal.

7
Petitioners additionally argue that in some cases involving past
persecution, even if there is little likelihood of future
persecution, asylum may be granted as a matter of discretion for
humanitarian reasons if the alien has suffered an atrocious form of
persecution. See Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989).
However, the BIA in this case rejected this precise argument and
determined that the respondents "have not shown compelling reasons
for being unwilling to return to Bangladesh based on the severity
of the past persecution, or that there is a reasonable possibility
of other serious harm if removed there." A review of the
administrative record does not compel the conclusion that the BIA
erred in its analysis on this ground. Guzmán, 327 F.3d at 15
(BIA's findings of fact will not be reversed "unless the record
evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary
determination").

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C. Relief Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture

Both the IJ and BIA found that Petitioners had failed to

meet their burden for relief under the CAT, since they had not

established that it is more likely than not that they would be

subject to torture by or with the "acquiescence" of a member of the

government of Bangladesh upon their return. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16

(c)(2) (indicating burden of proof) & 208.18(a)(1) (defining

"torture").8 In their challenge to this finding, Petitioners

indicate only that they should be granted relief "since there is a

clear probability that they will suffer torture if returned to

Bangladesh." However, it is a petitioner's burden to prove

entitlement to relief under the CAT, see Sulaiman v. Gonzales, 429

F.3d 347, 351 (1st Cir. 2005) (petitioner's burden of proof for

relief under the CAT is as high as in withholding of removal

context, "the petitioner has to show that it is more likely than

not that he will be [] tortured in his country of origin"), and the

IJ found that respondents presented "little, if any, evidence" to

substantiate their claim. See also Romilus, 385 F.3d at 8

(indicating there is no subjective component to a claim for relief

under the CAT and that "[t]o establish a prima facie claim under

the CAT, an applicant must offer specific objective evidence

8
This section of the INS implementing regulations defines
"torture" as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . .
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity."

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showing that he will be subject to [torture]" in proposed country

of removal). Under our deferential standard of review, Petitioners

have offered us no reason to disturb the IJ and BIA's substantially

supported findings on this ground. See id. at 5. We must

therefore deny the petition for review of the Petitioners' claim

for relief under the CAT.

III. Conclusion

The petition for review of the BIA's determination

regarding cancellation of removal is dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, and the remainder of the petition is denied because

we hold the BIA's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

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