[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-12852 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 12, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00165-MEF-TFM
C. H. KINSEY,
JANIE L. KINSEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
WILLIAM KEITH WATKINS,
Hon.,
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT MONTGOMERY, AL,
U.S. MARSHALS,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 12, 2012)
Before BARKETT, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se, C.H. Kinsey and Janie L. Kinsey (“the Kinseys”) sued
(1) U.S. District Judge William Keith Watkins, (2) Debra B. Hackett, the Clerk of
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, and (3) the “U.S.
Marshals.” The complaint alleged that Judge Watkins “fail[ed] to carry out his
duties” and that, when the Kinseys visited the courthouse to confront Judge
Watkins, the Clerk failed to meet with the Kinseys and the U.S. Marshals escorted
the Kinseys out of the courthouse. The Kinseys apparently seek $83 million in
damages for “tr[e]spass, op[p]ression, malice, negligence, wanton negligence,
wanton injuries, wanton act, discrimination, property loss, fraud . . ., actual fraud,
deceit, [and] omission.”
In a March 22, 2011 order, the magistrate judge determined that the
complaint was deficient and directed the Kinseys to file either an amended
complaint or a notice that they desired to withdraw their complaint. The Kinseys
filed neither and instead submitted a “Jury Trial Demand” stating that they “are
willing to present the facts to the judge and the jury.” Additionally, the Kinseys
filed another complaint, docketed as a separate action, containing identical factual
allegations as the first complaint. Each complaint contains only one paragraph of
factual allegations, which are identical in both complaints. The second complaint,
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filed after the magistrate judge’s March 22, 2011 order, also includes a “motion
for a trial” and a “letter form” demanding a jury trial and threatening an appeal if
no jury trial is granted.
After consolidating the two complaints for all purposes pursuant to Rule
42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the
complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On appeal, the Kinseys argue that
the district court erred by dismissing their claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and that the district court’s order was
unreasoned and not based on the law.1
A federal judge enjoys absolute immunity from a suit seeking damages
arising from the judge’s actions in his judicial capacity. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). Because the complaint seeks damages arising from
Judge Watkins’s actions in his judicial capacity, the district court properly
concluded that he enjoyed absolute immunity from suit.
We also conclude that the Kinseys’ complaints failed to allege facts
1
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a claim. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We liberally
construe pro se pleadings. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). We may
affirm “on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon or
even considered by the court below.” Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 797–98 (11th
Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
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sufficient to state a claim against either the Clerk or the “U.S. Marshals.” Under
the FTCA, the United States waives sovereign immunity and is therefore liable for
state-law tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus, to state an FTCA
claim, the Kinseys must allege facts sufficient to state a claim under the tort law of
the state where the conduct occurred, in this case Alabama. See Howell v. United
States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that the defendant’s liability
under the FTCA depended on whether a similarly situated private defendant would
be liable for the conduct under the law of Georgia, the place where the allegedly
negligent act or omission occurred).
Although the complaint concludes that the defendants are liable for trespass,
fraud, negligence, and other state-law tort claims, the only facts alleged in the
complaint are that the Kinseys (1) visited the courthouse on September 13, 2010,
(2) asked a Clerk’s employee to speak with Judge Watkins, and (3) were escorted
out of the courthouse by the “U.S. Marshals.” These bare allegations fail to
comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim.” Indeed, these bare facts fail even to
allege the principal elements of any of the ostensible state-law tort claims listed in
the complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 127 S. Ct.
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1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
(quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Despite the magistrate judge’s March 22, 2011 order warning them that the
complaint was deficient, the Kinseys refused to amend their factual allegations or
otherwise seek clarification from the district court. Accordingly, the district court
properly dismissed the complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
AFFIRMED.
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