FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-10182
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v. 3:10-cr-00455-
MARCEL DARON KING, WHA-1
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
February 13, 2012—San Francisco, California
Filed March 13, 2012
Before: Susan P. Graber, Marsha S. Berzon, and
Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam Opinion;
Concurrence by Judge Graber;
Concurrence by Judge Tallman
2937
UNITED STATES v. KING 2939
COUNSEL
Daniel P. Blank, Assistant Federal Public Defender, San Fran-
cisco, California, for the defendant-appellant.
Suzanne B. Miles, Assistant United States Attorney, San
Francisco, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Marcel Daron King appeals his conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless
2940 UNITED STATES v. KING
probation search of his room.1 We review de novo a district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress. United States v. Mayer,
560 F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). Underlying findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error. Id. We affirm.
On May 10, 2010, San Francisco Police Department
(“SFPD”) officers reported to the scene of a homicide. The
victim, Shawnte Sparks, had been shot and killed early that
morning. While at the scene, SFPD Officer Joseph Engler
noticed an individual (“CW1”) watching the police activity.
Officer Engler approached CW1, whom he had never met and
who previously had not been an informant for the SFPD, and
introduced himself.
Initially, CW1 appeared upset and expressed hesitation
about speaking with the police. Nevertheless, CW1 spoke at
length with Officer Engler. CW1 did not witness the shooting.
Shortly after the shooting, however, CW1 began receiving
phone calls from various individuals informing him that the
victim had been shot and relaying news about how it had hap-
pened and who had done it. CW1 told Officer Engler what
other people had been saying about the shooting. In particular,
CW1 had spoken over the phone with an individual referred
to by the parties as “Moniker.” Moniker did not see the shoot-
ing (although he/she was present at the scene of the crime),
but had apparently spoken with an eyewitness, “CW2.” Offi-
cer Engler was familiar with Moniker and CW2, although nei-
ther had served as an informant for the SFPD.
CW1 told Officer Engler some of what Moniker had
relayed about what CW2 had said to Moniker about the iden-
tity of the shooter. More details emerged when Officer Engler
listened (unbeknownst to Moniker) to a phone call between
Moniker and CW1. While still standing near the scene of the
1
In his appeal, Defendant also argues that his confession was inadmissi-
ble and that his sentence was unreasonable. We resolve those issues by
memorandum disposition filed this date.
UNITED STATES v. KING 2941
crime with Officer Engler, CW1 used his/her cell phone to
call Moniker. CW1 put the phone in “speaker” mode so that
Officer Engler could hear the conversation, but did not tell
Moniker that a police officer was listening. During that con-
versation, Moniker said that CW2 had described the shooter
as a heavyset African-American man with dreadlocks and
referred to him as “Marcel” from the cover of the “Bread Me
Out Family” rap album.
After the phone call ended, CW1 explained that he/she was
familiar with Marcel from around the neighborhood. CW1
also told Officer Engler that Marcel had been involved in an
altercation with the victim some weeks earlier at Marcel’s
son’s school. The dispute was over whether the victim’s child
had accidentally taken Marcel’s son’s coat. It is unclear from
the record whether CW1 had witnessed the altercation or had
simply heard about it.
CW1 also told Officer Engler that, although he/she did not
know Marcel’s last name, he/she did know where Marcel
lived, but could not remember the exact address. So, CW1 got
into Officer Engler’s unmarked police car and directed him to
Marcel’s house, which turned out to be located at 1526 Hud-
son Street.
After noting the location that CW1 had shown him, Officer
Engler returned to the police station. Using Google, Officer
Engler searched online for “Bread Me Out” and retrieved an
album cover depicting African-American men. At this point,
Officer Engler called CW1 and asked him/her to go to the
same website that Officer Engler had pulled up on the screen.
CW1 did so. Officer Engler asked whether the person, Mar-
cel, who lived at 1526 Hudson Street, appeared on the album
cover. CW1 identified Marcel.
After CW1 identified Marcel from the album cover, Officer
Engler and his partner searched the police database for any-
thing associated with 1526 Hudson Street and the name “Mar-
2942 UNITED STATES v. KING
cel.” Their search produced the name “Marcel King.” They
then compared a mug shot of Marcel King with the “Bread
Me Out Family” album cover photograph of the individual
identified by CW1 as Marcel. The officers noted that the two
photographs appeared to depict the same individual. That
individual is the defendant in this case.
At that point, Officer Engler and his partner checked
Defendant’s criminal history. They discovered that Defendant
was on adult felony probation in the City and County of San
Francisco. They also found that Defendant’s probation
included a warrantless search condition, which stated: “De-
fendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to
defendant’s person, property, premises and vehicle, any time
of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any
peace, parole or probation officer.” The residence listed with
the probation office was 1526 Hudson Street.
Officer Engler and several other officers went to 1526 Hud-
son Street and searched that house. The house was occupied
by Defendant’s grandmother, Odessa Allen. She told the offi-
cers that Defendant actually stayed at his mother’s house,
which was located at 78 Edgar Place.
The officers then went to 78 Edgar Place. There, they met
Defendant’s mother, Veronica Bradford. The parties dispute
whether Ms. Bradford consented to the officers’ search of her
home and of Defendant’s room in particular. Regardless, the
officers did indeed search the home, including the room that
Ms. Bradford pointed out as belonging to Defendant. Under
the bed in Defendant’s room, the officers found an unloaded
shotgun. That shotgun formed the basis for Defendant’s con-
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Defendant argues that the shotgun should have been sup-
pressed because police lacked reasonable suspicion to search
his room.2 In particular, Defendant asserts that the only infor-
2
The parties do not dispute that police had probable cause to believe that
Defendant was residing at his mother’s home at 78 Edgar Place. See
UNITED STATES v. KING 2943
mation linking him to the homicide was obtained from
sources not shown to be reliable.
Reasonable suspicion “exists when an officer is aware of
specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objec-
tive and reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized
suspicion.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We have explained:
While the probable cause requirement for a war-
rant requires a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found, reasonable suspicion
is less demanding and can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show proba-
ble cause. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause,
is dependent upon both the content of information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability.
Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered
in the totality of the circumstances. Thus, if a tip has
a relatively low degree of reliability, more informa-
tion will be required to establish the requisite quan-
tum of suspicion than would be required if the tip
were more reliable.
United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted).
Information obtained from an informant can provide rea-
sonable suspicion for a search. Id. “When a court is consider-
ing whether an informant’s tip is sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the court
must employ a ‘totality-of-the-circumstances approach’ that
United States v. Franklin, 603 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that,
before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to a probation condition,
law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that the pro-
bationer is a resident of the house to be searched).
2944 UNITED STATES v. KING
takes into consideration the informant’s ‘veracity’ or ‘reliabil-
ity’ and his ‘basis of knowledge.’ ” Id. We look to a variety
of factors to assess the reliability of an informant’s tip, includ-
ing (1) whether the tip was anonymous; (2) whether the infor-
mant had a proven track record of reliability; (3) whether the
informant revealed his/her basis of knowledge; and (4)
whether the informant provided detailed, predictive informa-
tion that was later corroborated by police observation. Id. at
907-08.
Here, CW1 lacked most of the indicia of a reliable infor-
mant. CW1 and Officer Engler did meet face-to-face. See
United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th
Cir.) (noting that in-person tips are generally more reliable
because the informant can be held accountable for making a
false tip and police have the opportunity to observe the infor-
mant’s demeanor), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 339 (2010). But
CW1 had no track record of reliability, having never before
served as an informant for the SFPD. Furthermore, although
CW1 did reveal his/her basis of knowledge, that basis of
knowledge was double hearsay. Cf. United States v. Vil-
lasenor, 608 F.3d 467, 474 (9th Cir.) (finding the informant
reliable in part because he had “first-hand knowledge” of the
criminal activities of the defendant (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 547 (2010); Palos-
Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1277 (suggesting that what is important
is not just whether an informant reveals his/her basis of
knowledge, but also whether or not that basis of knowledge
is firsthand); United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494,
507 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that an informant’s “detailed,
first-hand observations satisfy the basis of knowledge compo-
nent” for finding probable cause upon which to issue a war-
rant); United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting that the basis of knowledge requirement was
met by an informant’s information, which “was not based on
hearsay, but came from first-hand knowledge”). Police may
rely on hearsay reported by informants, but such information
is reliable only if there is reason to believe that the hearsay is
UNITED STATES v. KING 2945
truthful. See United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394,
1397 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Hearsay reported by informants is no
bar to a finding of probable cause. When the circumstances
suggest veracity, such as an admission against penal interest,
a statement made to an informant may be considered reli-
able.”). Here, no such circumstances exist. Finally, CW1 also
provided no predictive information about Defendant’s future
activities.
An important additional factor weighs against CW1’s reli-
ability as an informant. The police were aware that CW1 had
a motive to implicate Defendant falsely because of friction
between their families. Cf. Rowland, 464 F.3d at 908 (noting
that the fact that “the informant did not have any apparent
motive to fabricate the tip” suggested reliability). This fact
further undermines CW1’s credibility. Thus, considering the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that CW1 was an
unreliable informant.
Officer Engler also heard directly from Moniker by listen-
ing, unbeknownst to Moniker, to a telephone conversation
between Moniker and CW1. But, like CW1, Moniker had no
track record of reliability, lacked firsthand information, and
provided no predictive information about Defendant’s future
activities. Furthermore, Moniker and Officer Engler did not
meet face-to-face. See Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1275
(“Courts have indicated that the in-person nature of a tip gives
it substantial indicia of reliability for two reasons. First, . . .
an in-person informant risks losing anonymity and being held
accountable for a false tip. Second, when a tip is made in-
person, an officer can observe the informant’s demeanor and
determine whether the informant seems credible enough to
justify immediate police action without further questioning.”
(citations omitted)). Here, Officer Engler had no opportunity
to observe Moniker’s demeanor. Furthermore, Moniker did
not know that he/she was speaking to a police officer at the
same time as he/she was chatting with CW1. For that reason,
Moniker could not have felt pressure to tell the truth in order
2946 UNITED STATES v. KING
to avoid being held criminally accountable for providing a
false tip, because Moniker never knew that he/she was provid-
ing a tip in the first place. Thus, the information provided by
Moniker possessed no greater indicia of reliability than that
provided by CW1.
The information provided by CW1 and Moniker linking
Defendant to the homicide was therefore highly unreliable.
“[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more
information will be required to establish the requisite quantum
of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reli-
able.” Rowland, 464 F.3d at 907 (internal quotation marks
omitted). After speaking with CW1, Officer Engler did con-
duct a further investigation. But Officer Engler’s subsequent
investigation was devoted entirely to verifying the identity of
the “Marcel” that CW1 and Moniker had mentioned. In this
pursuit, Officer Engler was admirably thorough. But none of
the inquiries was relevant to the question whether Defendant
was involved in the homicide.
In fact, police made no effort to corroborate any of the
information purportedly linking Defendant to the homicide.
They did not track down CW2, the eyewitness, or question
him or her. They did not go to Defendant’s son’s school to
find out more about the argument that supposedly had
occurred between Defendant and the victim. Before searching
Defendant’s residence, the police conducted no further inves-
tigation whatsoever into his alleged involvement in the homi-
cide.3
[1] Thus, we face a situation in which the police conducted
a search of Defendant’s room solely because of a highly unre-
liable tip, without having investigated Defendant’s alleged
involvement in the homicide. The only information linking
Defendant to the homicide was CW1 and Moniker’s unsub-
stantiated double and triple hearsay. In these circumstances,
3
In fact, Defendant was never charged with the homicide.
UNITED STATES v. KING 2947
police lacked a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was
engaged in criminal activity.
[2] The conclusion that police lacked reasonable suspicion
to search Defendant’s room does not, however, end the
inquiry as to whether the district court properly denied Defen-
dant’s motion to suppress. In United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d
1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2011), we held that suspicionless
search conditions for probationers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment. In Baker, the defendant challenged a condition
of probation subjecting him to search “with or without proba-
ble cause, and with or without reasonable suspicion.” Id. at
1054 (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that
“a suspicionless search of a probationer does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1055-56.
[3] Here, Defendant was subject to warrantless search as a
condition of his probation: “Defendant is subject to a warrant-
less search condition, as to defendant’s person, property,
premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or
without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation
officer.” Defendant argues that his probation condition falls
outside the scope of Baker because it allows searches “with
or without probable cause,” instead of “with or without rea-
sonable suspicion.”
[4] We are unconvinced by Defendant’s argument. Simply
because a search may be conducted without probable cause
does not mean that it must be conducted with reasonable sus-
picion. It would be unreasonable to read Defendant’s proba-
tion condition as implicitly imposing a reasonable suspicion
requirement. To the contrary, the plain import of Defendant’s
probation condition, allowing warrantless searches at any
time, is that Defendant may be searched whether or not police
suspect him of wrongdoing.
[5] Defendant’s claim thus falls squarely within the pur-
view of Baker. Although the police did not have reasonable
2948 UNITED STATES v. KING
suspicion to search Defendant’s room, they needed no such
suspicion, because Defendant was subject to suspicionless
search as a condition of his probation. Under Baker, such
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly,
the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to sup-
press.
AFFIRMED.
GRABER, Circuit Judge, with whom BERZON, Circuit
Judge, joins, concurring:
I concur fully in the per curiam opinion. But, for the rea-
sons expressed in the concurrence in United States v. Baker,
658 F.3d 1050, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2011) (Graber, J., concur-
ring), I again urge the court to reconsider this issue en banc
so as to take account of developments in Supreme Court law.
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment that the district court properly
denied King’s motion to suppress. I write separately because
I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that Inspector
Engler lacked reasonable suspicion to connect King to the
homicide. Testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing suffi-
ciently corroborated his possible motive and opportunity, as
well as explained how the detectives confirmed a detailed
identification of King as the shooter provided by informants.
Because an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
is constitutionally sufficient to search the home of a proba-
tioner who is subject to a search condition, both United States
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001), and United States v.
Baker, 658 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011), authorize the officers’
UNITED STATES v. KING 2949
actions. The district court correctly held that Inspector Engler
had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). It is true
that no homicide charges were ever brought against King.
That could be due to a host of reasons the record does not
reveal: an inability to obtain sufficient admissible evidence to
meet the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt; witnesses unwilling to testify for fear of retalia-
tion; etc. But we must remember that this “process does not
deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities” and the evi-
dence “collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed
in the field of law enforcement.” Id. at 418; Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (“In dealing with probable
cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with prob-
abilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
The majority asks too much of the informant, CW1, and
inappropriately second-guesses the training, experience, and
good police work of a nineteen-year-veteran homicide detec-
tive. Inspector Engler followed leads that strongly suggested
that Marcel King might be the shooter who was still at large
in the early morning hours of May 10, 2010. CW1 was a citi-
zen informant who professed to know the victim of the mur-
der, Marcel’s first name, and the nearby home where King
had lived. See United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394,
1397 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that citizen informants require
less evidence to prove their reliability than criminal infor-
mants). As the majority concedes, CW1 met Inspector Engler
in person at the scene of the crime while the investigators
were processing the scene for evidence. See Adams, 407 U.S.
at 146-47 (suggesting that informants who meet personally
2950 UNITED STATES v. KING
with officers are more reliable). A thirty-minute conversation
revealed the basis of his/her knowledge, further enhancing
CW1’s reliability. See United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d
899, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an informant’s dis-
closure of the source of their information increases reliabil-
ity). CW1 was not suspected of having engaged in any
criminal activity, so a reasonable officer could assess and
evaluate the information supplied from this citizen informant
before acting upon it. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47.
There were additional reasons to trust the informant.
Although it is not clear exactly how much time transpired
between the shooting and CW1 and Inspector Engler’s on-
scene conversation, CW1 relayed the tip shortly afterwards
while officers were still investigating what had occurred
there. See United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272,
1277 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that contemporaneous tips are
more reliable). The description of the shooter—as an over-
weight, black male with dreadlocks who looked like the
“Marcel” appearing in the picture of a local rap group on its
“Bread Me Out Family” album cover—and of the shooting
itself, contained “sufficient detail to dispel concerns that the
tip was a hoax.” Rowland, 464 F.3d at 908. And it was of the
sort that prudent follow-up investigation could confirm or dis-
pel fairly quickly.
The tip met other common-sense “indicia of reliability.”
See Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1277. It was Inspector Engler
who approached CW1, not the other way around, and CW1
was not initially eager to divulge any information, expressing
a fear of retaliation since CW1 knew King’s family to have
a bad reputation on the street. It is true, as the majority notes,
that the friction between King’s and CW1’s families could
potentially tempt CW1 to implicate King. See Rowland, 464
F.3d at 908. But CW1 would have known this fact tended to
cast doubt on his/her credibility, yet he/she forthrightly admit-
ted it to the detective. In addition, CW1 was visibly distraught
at the death of a family member and presumably cared more
UNITED STATES v. KING 2951
about apprehending the real killer than satisfying some unre-
lated vendetta.
The inspector had additional reason to suspect King’s
involvement in the shooting before the search of 78 Edgar
Place. Based on his experience working the streets in the
Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood and personal knowl-
edge of its occupants, Inspector Engler conducted further
investigation to see if the informant’s tip might be fruitful in
identifying and apprehending the killer. CW1 voluntarily
accompanied the detective to a house on Hudson Street and
pointed out where “Marcel” lived. The house was a short dis-
tance from the scene of the crime. The majority concedes that
CW1 supplied evidence of a possible motive when he/she
informed Inspector Engler of the recent verbal altercation
between the victim and King regarding the theft of a coat
belonging to King’s child from a school where the children of
both men attended—a story that King himself later corrobo-
rated. King’s grandmother told police that, at some point on
the night of the shooting, King had visited but not stayed at
the Hudson Street house. The police also knew that King had
a recent felony conviction, see United States v. Collins, 61
F.3d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that prior felony
convictions are relevant to probable cause), in this case for
another violent crime—felony assault on his domestic partner,
the mother of the child whose coat was missing. Cf. Rowland,
464 F.3d at 908 (holding that a suspect’s background of simi-
lar criminal activity is relevant to reasonable suspicion).
Three of the most important factors in assessing a tip for
reasonable suspicion are the informant’s “veracity, reliability,
and basis of knowledge.” See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 328-29 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
shown above, CW1 revealed the source of his/her knowledge
and gave Inspector Engler ample reason to believe him/her.
The only factor that arguably disfavors holding that there was
reasonable suspicion is CW1’s untested reliability. The infor-
mation provided by CW1—and Moniker during the phone
2952 UNITED STATES v. KING
call with CW1 overheard by Inspector Engler—surely was
hearsay. But see United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1029
(9th Cir. 1983) (“There is no requirement . . . that the
informer be a percipient witness to the reported facts.”). But
Inspector Engler also had reason to know of Moniker’s and
CW2’s credibility, having interacted with both of them in the
past (including a prior arrest by Inspector Engler of CW2’s
brother) and having actually interviewed Moniker on a previ-
ous occasion. Facts built upon facts pointed the arrow of rea-
sonable suspicion to King’s involvement in the murder.
“[T]he subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an
appropriate police response.” Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
The flaw in the per curiam opinion is that it treats the
assessment of these facts as if looking to establish probable
cause to tie King to the murder. But reasonable suspicion is
considerably laxer than probable cause. United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002). “Although the totality
of the circumstances in this case might not be enough to
establish probable cause, here we deal instead with the less
demanding reasonable suspicion standard.” Rowland, 464
F.3d at 908. Through dogged police work, Inspector Engler
quickly dug up sufficient corroborating evidence that identi-
fied Marcel King, his known abodes, his criminal history
involving other violent crimes, his current probationary status,
and a possible motive to kill the victim. Under the totality of
the circumstances, it was certainly proper to focus the next
step of the investigation into looking for King where he might
be living. At this point, King was surely the focus of the
police homicide investigation and the best suspect Inspector
Engler had.
The majority second-guesses Inspector Engler for not inter-
viewing Moniker and CW2 before conducting his search, but
the killer was at large and the detective already had credible,
incriminating evidence of a suspect’s motive, opportunity and
identity. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a police-
man who lacks the precise level of information necessary for
UNITED STATES v. KING 2953
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams, 407
U.S. at 145. Inspector Engler painstakingly identified Marcel
King as a suspect. He located a picture online of King’s
“Bread Me Out Family” album cover and had CW1 corrobo-
rate that it was the same Marcel that Moniker had described.
Inspector Engler and his partner then ran a search on a police
database recording prior law enforcement activity at 1526
Hudson Street—the location identified by CW1 as Marcel’s
home—with “Marcel” and the results linked the address to
Marcel King. They confirmed that King’s picture matched the
picture of Marcel on the album cover and that King was on
probation subject to a search condition. Pondering whether
the officers could have then strengthened their legal case by
interviewing Moniker and CW2 is beside the point; they had
a strong lead and knew with the search condition that they
needed only reasonable suspicion to proceed.
Once further investigation established probable cause to
conclude that King was using a bedroom at the home of his
mother on Edgar Place, a conclusion neither party disputes, I
would hold under the totality of the circumstances test that
Inspector Engler had reasonable suspicion to conduct a proba-
tion search of King’s residence for evidence of his involve-
ment in the murder and affirm under Knights. We thus need
not reach the open question identified in Baker as to whether
a search without reasonable suspicion would still satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. See Baker, 658 F.3d at 1058-60 (Graber,
J., concurring). And because I agree with my colleagues that
the district court properly denied King’s motion to suppress,
I concur in the judgment on these independent grounds.