UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4408
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN CRISTOBAL HERNANDEZ-REYES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (4:10-cr-00044-BR-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2012 Decided: March 13, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey A. Phipps, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Cristobal Hernandez-Reyes (a native and citizen
of El Salvador) pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to
illegally reentering the United States subsequent to a
conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), (b) (2006). At sentencing, the district court
applied a 16-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2010), based on a
prior conviction for felony cocaine trafficking. After a three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Hernandez-
Reyes’ adjusted Guidelines level was 21. With a criminal
history category V, his Guidelines range was 70-87 months
imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence at the top of the
range, 87 months, followed by three years of supervised release.
Hernandez-Reyes timely appealed.
Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that, after a
thorough review of the record and relevant case law, she has
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Although informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Hernandez-Reyes
has not done so. We affirm.
Our review of the guilty plea hearing discloses that
the district court fully complied with the mandates of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Hernandez-Reyes’ guilty plea. The
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district court ensured that the plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily and was supported by an independent factual basis.
See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119–20 (4th
Cir. 1991). We therefore affirm Hernandez-Reyes’ conviction.
We review Hernandez-Reyes’ sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review
requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. We assess whether the
district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2010). If
there is no procedural error, we review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v.
Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the
sentence is within the Guidelines range, we apply a presumption
of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56
(2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for within-
guidelines sentence).
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We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Moreover, Hernandez-Reyes has failed to overcome
the presumption of reasonableness we accord his within-
Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Hernandez-Reyes’ conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Hernandez-Reyes, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Hernandez-Reyes requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Hernandez-Reyes.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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