UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1044
CHRISTINA G. HOOD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SUFFOLK CITY SCHOOL BOARD; DERAN R. WHITNEY, Interim
Superintendent, Suffolk Public Schools,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:10-cv-00500-RAJ-TEM)
Submitted: December 21, 2011 Decided: March 13, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David S. Bailey, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GROUP, PLLC, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Wendell Myron Waller, SUFFOLK PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, Suffolk, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christina Hood, an elementary school teacher employed by
the School Board of the City of Suffolk, Virginia (the Board),
brought this action against the Board and Deran R. Whitney, an
administrator of the Suffolk public school system (collectively,
the defendants). In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Hood alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional
right to bodily integrity by deliberately exposing her to a
harmful workplace environment, which resulted from the presence
of excessive mold and bacteria in her classroom. The district
court dismissed Hood’s complaint, holding that she had not
stated a cognizable violation of a constitutional right. Upon
our review, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I.
During the 2007-2008 school year, Hood was employed by the
Board as a fourth grade teacher at Booker T. Washington
Elementary School (the School). When Hood began the school year
in August 2007, she immediately noticed an elevated level of
humidity inside the School. She observed that books and papers
that had been left in her classroom were “soggy” and warped as a
result of accumulated moisture. Hood also observed that
dehumidifiers were placed throughout the School.
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Several days later, Hood’s eyes became “itchy” and
irritated. By her second week of teaching, Hood began to
experience serious reactions similar to those caused by
allergies. By early September 2007, Hood also thought that she
may have contracted a cold or a sinus infection. Hood
additionally observed that several students suffered from
similar symptoms.
Based on these considerations, Hood requested a
dehumidifier from the assistant principal, Christopher Phillips.
Although Phillips stated that none immediately was available,
Hood was able to obtain one for use in her classroom. She used
the dehumidifier each day, and found that the dehumidifier
regularly collected a sufficient amount of water overnight to
activate the automatic “shut-off” feature of the machine.
By September 19, 2007, Hood’s symptoms had worsened, and
she developed a severe rash around her mouth that caused
swelling. Hood informed Phillips that she was ill, that she was
uncertain about the cause, and that she would need to leave work
to consult a physician. During their conversation, Phillips
stated, “[W]e know there is a mold problem and it comes up
through the ground in the summertime.”
Hood visited her primary care physician that day and
received a diagnosis of sinusitis, bronchitis, lip inflammation
3
and infection, and mold exposure. At that time, Hood received a
prescription for antibiotics.
The next day, Hood submitted to the School’s principal,
Patricia Montgomery, a note from her physician reflecting his
diagnosis of her condition. Before Hood gave Montgomery this
note, she had been informed by other teachers that school
administrators would order mold testing if provided with
documentation that mold in the School was causing illness.
However, although Montgomery made a copy of the physician’s
note, she took no other immediate action.
On September 26, 2007, a school administrator, Terry
Napier, visited Hood’s classroom to inquire about her medical
history and symptoms, and whether any of the students had
experienced similar problems. Hood explained her symptoms, and
related that some students also were sick and had allergy
problems. Additionally, Hood informed Napier that there was
excessive humidity in the classroom.
Napier obtained air samples from Hood’s classroom, although
he was not properly trained in mold sampling. At that time,
Hood was left with the impression that Napier thought that her
concerns about mold were unfounded.
When the rash on Hood’s face spread and caused her greater
discomfort in early October 2007, Hood scheduled two more
appointments with her primary care physician. Hood’s physician
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concluded that a fungus was the cause of Hood’s rash, and he
proscribed a strong antifungal cream.
After Hood made several inquiries about the mold test
results, Montgomery and Napier held a meeting on October 16,
2007, in which they shared the results with her. Referring to
the results, Napier told Hood that the classroom did not have a
mold problem, because the mold spore count was higher outside
than inside the classroom. Hood eventually obtained these
results, which revealed instead that levels of certain species
of mold actually were higher inside the classroom.
Starting on October 10, 2007, the maintenance staff began
cleaning Hood’s classroom on a daily basis, rather than on the
customary weekly schedule. After their meeting on October 16,
2007, Montgomery informed Hood that her classroom would be
thoroughly cleaned every night for two weeks, to see if Hood’s
condition would improve.
By this point, Hood’s eyes were swollen and the rash on her
face had worsened. Her primary care physician instructed her
not to return to work until October 19, 2007. When Hood
informed Phillips about her physician’s instructions, Phillips
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directed Hood to file a worker’s compensation claim, because she
would not be compensated for this sick leave. *
After October 19, 2007, Hood was able to return to work
briefly. However, by November 2, 2007, Hood’s condition had
deteriorated again, and her primary care physician rendered a
diagnosis of facial fungal dermatitis. Hood’s physician also
instructed her that she should no longer work in the same
environment. When Hood gave Montgomery the physician’s note to
this effect, Montgomery responded: “What am I supposed to do
with this? . . . Where else are you going to work, you are a
teacher?”
In early November 2007, a mold inspection company, Marine
Chemist, took mold samples from Hood’s classroom as part of a
“limited indoor evaluation.” Hood contends that Napier and
other administrators at the School deliberately failed to inform
Marine Chemist about the recent “aggressive cleaning history” of
Hood’s classroom, which she alleged was a practice employed to
conceal the presence and severity of mold at the School.
According to Hood’s complaint, Napier also failed to provide
Marine Chemist with the relevant findings of an inspection
*
In November 2007, Hood began communicating with the
defendants’ workers’ compensation insurance company, attempting
to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits. In February
2008, the insurer denied her claim, and Hood filed a claim with
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission, which Hood states
has not yet been resolved.
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conducted in July 2003, which had found excessive levels of mold
in the School and concluded that its heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning system was unable to dehumidify the School
properly. Hood later obtained a copy of Marine Chemist’s report
regarding her classroom, which confirmed the presence of
multiple species of mold. Further, this report recommended to
Napier that a more thorough investigation be conducted in the
event that Napier received additional complaints.
At all times, the Board was aware of Hood’s increasing
health problems. Hood consulted an additional physician, and
she began taking steroids to control her symptoms. By late
November 2007, that physician informed Hood that her allergy
test results showed that she was very allergic to mold. The
physician further informed Hood that, if she did not stop
working in the School, she would continue to require many
medications and shots. According to allergy test results, Hood
had exhibited allergic responses to several species of mold that
had been identified in her classroom.
In December 2007, Hood requested that she be transferred to
another school. However, there were no vacant positions for
which Hood was qualified. The Board did not take any action at
that time to move Hood to another classroom.
For the remainder of the school year, the floors of Hood’s
classroom were washed more frequently than they had been
7
previously. Hood alleged that, although these repeated washings
initially may have removed some mold, the repeated washing
process ultimately caused increased indoor mold growth.
In June 2008, Hood obtained another mold inspection of her
classroom. Even though Hood’s classroom had been cleaned
repeatedly, the inspection revealed that mold growth was still
present, as well as excessive moisture.
Hood now takes several allergy medications, and expects
that she will have to take these allergy medications for an
unknown, extended period of time.
According to Hood, the presence of excessive mold and
moisture in her classroom was not an isolated incident.
Instead, she alleges that the School had a long history of water
leaks and inadequate attention to maintenance problems.
Further, Hood stated that the defendants were aware of the
condition of the School, and of the health risks that mold
exposure posed to its occupants.
Hood filed a complaint against the defendants in a Virginia
state court, which the defendants removed to the district court.
In an amended complaint, Hood contended that she had been
exposed to excessive levels of mold and bacteria in her
classroom at the School, which caused her severe and permanent
allergic reactions and respiratory difficulties. Hood also
alleged that the defendants engaged in deceitful practices to
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conceal evidence of mold growth at the School, and deliberately
caused Hood to be exposed to a harmful workplace while fully
cognizant of the risk to her safety from mold exposure.
In her amended complaint, Hood brought two causes of action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged that the defendants
violated her liberty interest in bodily integrity and deprived
her of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. In her first cause of action, Hood claimed
that the Board failed to train its employees properly regarding
mold inspection procedures and remediation, and had a practice
of concealing the harmful effects of excessive moisture and
mold. In her second cause of action, Hood claimed that the
defendants engaged in deliberate acts that created a dangerous
work environment, which violated her right to bodily integrity.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Hood’s amended
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II.
The district court characterized Hood’s claims as
substantive due process claims “based on her right not to be
harmed by the conditions of the School in which she works.”
Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd., 760 F. Supp. 2d 599, 601 (E.D.
Va. 2010). Because Hood sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the district correctly observed that Hood was required to allege
9
a violation of a cognizable constitutional right. Id. The
district court concluded that Hood failed to meet this
requirement. Id. at 602.
In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), a case in which a § 1983 claim was
brought on behalf of a city sanitation employee who had died
from asphyxia while trying to repair a sewer line. See Hood,
760 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02. There, the plaintiff alleged “a
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm
to his body . . . and a constitutional right to be protected
from the [city’s] custom and policy of deliberate indifference
toward the safety of its employees.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 117.
The complaint in Collins also alleged that the City violated
those constitutional rights “by following a custom and policy of
not training its employees about the dangers” of that workplace,
namely, the dangers posed by sewer lines and manholes. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that “[n]either the text nor
the history of the Due Process Clause supports [the] claim that
the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a
safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due
Process Clause.” Id. at 126. Therefore, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause “does not impose an
independent federal obligation upon municipalities to provide
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certain minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace.”
Id. at 130.
Considering the facts alleged in Hood’s complaint, the
district court concluded that her claim “falls within the
Collins precedent.” Hood, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 602. Although
Hood attempted to distinguish the holding in Collins by claiming
that her liberty interest in bodily integrity had been violated,
rather than a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
risk of bodily harm, see Collins, 503 U.S. at 117, the district
court did not consider this distinction to be persuasive. See
Hood, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02. The district court noted that
courts have recognized a liberty interest in bodily integrity
only in very limited circumstances, such as when minors are
molested by government employees. Id. (citing Wragg v. Vill. of
Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466-68 (7th Cir. 2010) (minor’s claim of
molestation against government official); Jones v. Wellham, 104
F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (woman’s claim of rape against
police officer); Doe v. Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
450-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (student’s claim of sexual
abuse against teacher); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 609 (4th
Cir. 1980) (child’s claim against teacher that paddling in
school violated the child’s substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause)). The district
court concluded that Hood had provided neither factual nor legal
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support for the extension of substantive due process to the
circumstances of her case, in which the harmful conditions of
Hood’s workplace allegedly caused her injury. Id. at 602.
The district court held that Hood’s substantive due process
claim that the defendants violated her liberty interest in
bodily integrity was not a cognizable violation of a
constitutional right. Id. Accordingly, the district court
concluded that Hood had failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted under § 1983, and granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss. Id. Hood appeals.
III.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253
(4th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain factual allegations that “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level and . . . state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In conducting this review, we “take the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but we “need not
accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Giarratano
12
v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record, the briefs, and the arguments
presented by the parties in this appeal. We conclude, like the
district court, that Hood asserted a substantive due process
claim asserting a right to be free from harm caused by the
dangerous condition of her workplace. As the district court
properly recognized, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Collins has plainly stated that this type of claim does not
allege a cognizable violation of a federal constitutional right.
See 503 U.S. at 117, 126, 130.
Hood attempts to distinguish the holding in Collins on the
ground that, in the present case, the defendants engaged in
deliberate acts that violated her right to bodily integrity, or
acted with deliberate indifference to that right. We find no
merit in this distinction and agree with the district court that
Collins is dispositive of Hood’s claim, because Hood’s injury,
as alleged, was caused by the dangerous condition of her
workplace due to mold growth and excessive humidity in her
classroom. See Hood, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
Our conclusion is unaffected by Hood’s characterization of
her substantive due process claim as being based on a liberty
interest in bodily integrity, rather than on a constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm to one’s body in
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the workplace. As we have stated, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Collins is dispositive of Hood’s described claim. We
therefore affirm the district court’s order dismissing Hood’s
amended complaint, based on the reasons well stated by the
district court.
AFFIRMED
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