UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2172
NATALIE HAYES, individually; as the next best friend of
R.D.; RICARDO DIXON,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CITY OF SEAT PLEASANT, MARYLAND; PFC BURNETT, Seat Pleasant
Police Department in both his official and individual
capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:08-cv-02548-DKC)
Argued: December 8, 2011 Decided: March 14, 2012
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Richard M. GERGEL,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Gergel joined.
ARGUED: Gregory L. Lattimer, LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY L. LATTIMER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Kevin Bock Karpinski,
KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael B. Rynd, KARPINSKI, COLARESI &
KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant-plaintiffs Ricardo Dixon and Natalie Hayes filed
an eight-count complaint asserting several civil rights and
state law claims against defendant-appellees City of Seat
Pleasant, Maryland, and officer Tracey Burnett stemming from
their arrest on September 27, 2006. Hayes also brought suit on
behalf of her minor daughter, R.D.
The district court granted the Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the Appellants’ lawsuit,
including the claim brought on behalf of the five-year-old
child. At issue on appeal is the dismissal of the Appellants’
constitutional claims for unlawful seizure and excessive force
and state law tort claims for false arrest, battery, and
malicious prosecution. For the reasons that follow, we vacate
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees as to these claims and remand for further proceedings.
I.
On September 27, 2006, Hayes, who was employed as a
lieutenant with Coastal International Security, * arrived home in
uniform at approximately 4:00 p.m. and began talking to a family
*
Coastal International Security provides security for
government buildings.
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friend, Antonio Sallis, who had been visiting Hayes, her husband
Dixon, and their two children. All were standing outside of the
Dixon-Hayes home. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Dixon prepared to
take Sallis back to his home. Dixon placed his son in a car
seat in the rear of the vehicle, and Sallis got into the front
passenger seat. As Dixon completed strapping his son into the
car seat, he noticed that a police cruiser, later identified as
Burnett’s, was parked directly across from his driveway. From
his driveway, Dixon asked Burnett if Burnett could move up so
that he could back out of his driveway. In response, Burnett
allegedly yelled in a loud voice, “What, you don’t have enough
room?” Dixon then got in his vehicle and waited for Burnett to
move. After a few minutes, Burnett moved up the street and made
a U-turn. Dixon proceeded to back out of the driveway, and as
he pulled up to the nearest stop sign, Burnett activated his
emergency lights and stopped Dixon’s vehicle. The stop sign was
at the corner of the Dixon-Hayes property.
Hayes, standing on the sidewalk near the passenger side of
the patrol car with her daughter, asked Burnett why he was
stopping her car and harassing her husband. Burnett allegedly
responded, “Get the hell out of my face.” Hayes again asked
Burnett why he was harassing her family, at which time Burnett
exited his car and came around the front of his vehicle and onto
the sidewalk where Hayes and her daughter were standing.
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Burnett approached Hayes on the sidewalk, pointed and shouted in
her face, “Shut the hell up, shut the hell up.” Hayes asked
Burnett to back away from her because her daughter was
hysterical at this time. As Hayes consoled her daughter, she
backed up so that she was now near the rear window of her car,
which was located on Seat Pleasant Drive. While Hayes was
attempting to calm her daughter, Burnett grabbed her arm and
pulled out his baton, which he fully extended. The parties
agree that Burnett was physically handling Hayes as he backed
her up. At that point, Dixon exited the car. Dixon asked
Burnett to take his hands off of Hayes, and requested that he
call a female officer. Burnett told Dixon to stay back, and
Dixon complied. Nevertheless, Burnett holstered his baton and
took out his pepper spray. Burnett sprayed Dixon and turned
around and sprayed Hayes in her face, eye, nose, and mouth as
Hayes held her daughter’s hand. Appellants and witnesses
testified that at the time Burnett sprayed Dixon, he was no
closer than seven feet away, had obeyed Burnett’s orders to stay
back, and had made no further comments. They also testified
that Hayes never left the sidewalk. Burnett testified that
Hayes interfered with his traffic stop by stepping in between
his and Dixon’s vehicles. He also testified that Dixon bumped
him when Dixon exited his vehicle.
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After deploying pepper spray on the Dixon-Hayes family,
Burnett then proceeded to arrest Hayes and Dixon. Hayes was
charged with obstructing and hindering, resisting arrest, and
disorderly conduct. Dixon was charged with second degree
assault, obstructing and hindering, interfering with an arrest,
and disorderly conduct. Following a jury trial on June 25,
2007, Dixon and Hayes were found not guilty of all charges.
Dixon and Hayes then filed their eight-count complaint asserting
the civil rights and state law claims against the Appellees.
The district court granted the Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment, finding there was probable cause for Burnett
to initiate an investigatory traffic stop and probable cause to
arrest Dixon and Hayes. The district court also found no
evidence that Burnett acted with malice and that the force he
deployed was objectively reasonable and did not amount to
excessive force.
“We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de
novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the
non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her
favor.” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
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II.
The actions filed against Burnett and the city depend, to
some extent, on the averment that Burnett had no probable cause
to believe that both Hayes and Dixon had committed the crime of
hindering. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Appellees was based on the court’s finding that
Burnett did have such probable cause. According to the district
court, Hayes hindered Burnett during the investigatory traffic
stop, and Dixon then hindered Burnett as Burnett attempted to
arrest Hayes. Appellants contend that the district court
incorrectly determined there was no factual dispute with respect
to probable cause to arrest Hayes and Dixon. The probable cause
question is therefore central to much of this appeal.
A. Unlawful Seizure
This Court has articulated the probable cause standard as
“facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge [which]
would warrant the belief of a prudent person that the arrestee
had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v.
Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984). Thus, to determine
whether Officer Burnett had probable cause to lawfully arrest
Appellants, a reviewing court necessarily must relate the events
leading up to the arrest to the elements of the offense that
Officer Burnett believed was being or had been committed.
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That analysis requires a proper understanding of the
elements of the alleged offense -- in this instance hindering.
The elements of the offense of obstructing or hindering a police
officer are
(1) A police officer engaged in the performance of a
duty;
(2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by the accused
which obstructs or hinders the officer in the
performance of that duty;
(3) Knowledge by the accused of facts comprising
element (1); and
(4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the officer by act or
omission constituting element (2).
Cover v. State, 466 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Md. 1983). Further, the
offense comprises three categories of conduct:
(1) positive direct obstruction, in which the officer
acts directly against the defendant or the defendant’s
property and is physically resisted; (2) passive
direct obstruction, where the officer seeks to make
the defendant act directly and the defendant refuses
or fails to act as required; and (3) positive indirect
obstruction, where the police are not acting directly
against the [defendant] but are acting indirectly
against other citizens who are, or may be, about to
commit offenses against the criminal law, and the
[defendant] does an act which obstructs them in their
general duty to prevent or detect crime, intending to
frustrate the police operation.
DiPino 729 A.2d at 361-62. (internal citation omitted).
Here, the district court found that the conduct at issue
fell into the third category, positive indirect obstruction.
With regard to Hayes, the district court indicated that “Officer
Burnett could have reasonably believed that Hayes was hindering
by verbally accosting him, even after he told her to move away
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from the scene.” With respect to Dixon, the district court
stated, “A number of facts evidence that Dixon was hindering,
such as Dixon’s behavior, his statements to Officer Burnett to
take his hands off his wife, and his movement away from the car
after the officer ordered him to stay back.”
Our review of the record in the present case reveals two
conflicting versions of what transpired between Hayes, Dixon,
and Burnett. Further, contrary to the district court’s
contention, these disputed facts go to the heart of whether
probable cause existed to arrest Hayes and Dixon for hindering,
rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
With regard to Hayes’s arrest, the deposition testimony of
Hayes and other witnesses is at odds with the district court’s
finding that “Hayes interfered with that stop, such that officer
Burnett was unable to continue,” and that “given that Hayes
continued interfering even after Burnett ordered her to stop,
one can infer intent to impede the police.” It is unclear that
Hayes “verbally accosted” Burnett at all or “interfered with the
stop, such that officer Burnett was unable to continue,” much
less that she intended to do so, a requisite element of a
hindering offense. According to Hayes and witnesses, Hayes
never left the sidewalk and was holding the hand of her five-
year-old child during the entire exchange with Burnett. From
the sidewalk outside her home while dressed in her security
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officer’s uniform, she asked Burnett through an open passenger
window why he was stopping the vehicle -- a seemingly reasonable
inquiry based on the questionable circumstances of the traffic
stop -- to which Burnett replied, “Get the hell out of my face.”
When Hayes asked him again why he was harassing her family,
Burnett jumped out of his vehicle, came around to where Hayes
was standing on the sidewalk, and pointed and shouted in her
face, “Shut the hell up,” all while she held her five-year-old
daughter’s hand. Hayes immediately backed away, consoled her
hysterical daughter, and cut off communication with Burnett. It
is undisputed that Burnett then physically grabbed Hayes and
shortly thereafter deployed pepper spray in her face and placed
her under arrest. Construing the facts in the light most
favorable to Hayes, the evidence does not reveal that Burnett
had probable cause to arrest Hayes for the crime of hindering.
The same is true for Dixon. Dixon testified that he exited
the vehicle out of instinct when he saw “a big officer
manhandling [his] wife with a baton in his hand” while she was
holding their daughter’s hand. He remained at least seven feet
from Burnett, and when ordered to stay back, he obeyed. At no
time did he come into contact with the officer or approach any
closer. Apart from requesting a female officer as he watched
Burnett twist his wife’s arm while holding their hysterical
child’s hand, Dixon did not attempt to stop Burnett or interfere
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with the arrest. According to the witnesses on the scene, no
resisting of arrest occurred, and no one gave Burnett any reason
at all to be threatened.
What transpired between Burnett, Dixon, and Hayes is a
matter of disputed fact that goes directly to the heart of
whether Burnett was acting within the contours of his authority
when he arrested the Appellants. For the reasons given above,
the district court’s dismissal of the claims arising from the
alleged unlawful arrest is vacated.
B. Excessive Force
Appellants further contend that the district court erred in
concluding Burnett was entitled to summary judgment with respect
to their claim for excessive force. The Supreme Court has held
that excessive force claims against law enforcement officers
during the course of an arrest should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Reasonableness analysis requires “careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties
does not support the conclusion that the force used against
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Dixon and Hayes was objectively reasonable and did not amount to
excessive force.
This is especially evident in light of this Court’s
decision in Park v. Shiftlett, 250 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2001). In
Park, a husband and wife mistakenly entered a convenience store
that they believed was open, triggering the alarm. 250 F.3d at
848. After police arrived, various events led them to detain
the husband. Id. When the wife saw her husband being
handcuffed and pressed against a building, she responded by
running toward her husband. Id. Police officers grabbed her,
threw her against the building, handcuffed her, and sprayed her
twice in the eyes with pepper spray at close range. Id. This
Court determined that this “irresponsible use of pepper spray
twice from close range was indeed excessive. . . . It is
difficult to imagine the unarmed [wife] as a threat to the
officers or the public.” Id. at 852-53. The instant case is
strikingly similar to Park. At the very least, what transpired
between Burnett and the Appellants that resulted in the
Appellants being pepper sprayed involves disputed facts that go
to the heart of the Graham factors and should be decided by a
jury.
C. False Arrest and Battery
With regard to Appellants’ state law causes of action for
false arrest and battery, the district court determined that
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[b]ecause the court has concluded that Officer Burnett
possessed probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for
misdemeanors committed in his presence, the court will
enter summary judgment for Defendants on count five,
the false arrest and imprisonment claim . . . .
Because the court has already determined that Officer
Burnett did not use excessive force or unlawfully
arrest Plaintiffs, the court must conclude there is no
cause of action for battery either.
As discussed above, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to what transpired between Burnett and the Appellants
that goes directly to the question of whether probable cause
existed to arrest the Appellants for hindering and whether a
basis existed for the force that was used. For these same
reasons, the district court’s dismissal of these counts is
vacated.
D. Malicious Prosecution
The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment as to the malicious prosecution count, because
“Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that any wrongful or
improper motive drove Officer Burnett’s actions.” For the
reasons explained below, we hold that the district court erred
in reaching this conclusion.
To establish a malicious prosecution claim, Appellants must
show that (1) Burnett instituted criminal proceedings against
the Appellants; (2) the criminal proceeding was resolved in
Appellants’ favor; (3) Burnett did not have probable cause to
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institute the proceeding; and (4) Burnett acted with malice or a
primary purpose other than bringing appellants to justice. Okwa
v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 130 (Md. 2000).
Appellees do not contest that following Appellants’ arrest
by Burnett, Hayes was charged with obstructing and hindering,
resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct, and Dixon was charged
with second degree assault, obstructing and hindering,
interfering with an arrest, and disorderly conduct. It is also
uncontested that Appellants were found not guilty of these
charges. Thus, facts have been pled that, if proven, satisfy
the first and second elements of the tort. Further, as
discussed above, there is a triable issue as to whether Burnett
had probable cause to arrest Appellants, precluding summary
judgment for a failure to satisfy the third element. It is
therefore necessary for us to consider whether, on this record
and as a matter of law, Appellants lacked “malice, or a primary
purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of
bringing the offender to justice.” See Krashes v. White, 341
A.3d 798, 801 (Md. 1975).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has long held that “the
‘malice’ element of malicious prosecution may be inferred from a
lack of probable cause.” Okwa, 757 A.2d at 133 (internal
citations omitted). Moreover, the court has also held that
summary judgment on malicious prosecution claims is improper
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where, as here, genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether a defendant officer had probable cause to arrest a
plaintiff. See id. (vacating summary judgment on malicious
prosecution claim and explaining, “[b]ecause we have determined
Appellees may not have had probable cause to arrest Mr. Okwa,
further analysis of [the malice] element is unnecessary.”)
(emphasis added). Because disputed material facts exist in the
record as to whether Burnett had probable cause to arrest
Appellants, and inferences of malicious conduct may be drawn
from a lack of probable cause, Appellants’ malicious prosecution
claim is likewise not amenable to disposition via summary
judgment.
III.
As a final matter, the judgments entered by the district
court in favor of the Appellees were based on the court’s
finding that Burnett did not violate the Appellants’
constitutional rights. The court found it unnecessary to
consider and rule upon any of the immunity defenses raised by
the Appellees. Having determined there are factual matters in
dispute, rendering summary judgment inappropriate, there is no
legal issue on appeal on which we could base jurisdiction to
address these immunity defenses. See Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
225, 237 (4th Cir. 2008).
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IV.
The district court considered areas of factual disagreement
between the parties and rejected the contention that the
disputed facts were material to resolution of the issues. This
was in error. Appellants have alleged facts sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hayes
hindered Burnett during the investigatory traffic stop, whether
Dixon hindered Burnett as Burnett attempted to arrest Hayes, and
whether Burnett acted reasonably in pepper spraying Dixon and
Hayes in front of their children. Contrary to the district
court’s contention, these disputed facts go to the heart of the
Appellants’ constitutional and tort law claims for unlawful
seizure, excessive force, false arrest, battery, and malicious
prosecution. As such, we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in the Appellees’ favor on those claims. We
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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