[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
___________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 18, 2008
No. 07-12025 THOMAS K. KAHN
___________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 05-01497-CV-ORL-22-JGG
DANITA DAVIS,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
versus
SAILORMEN, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_____________________________
(June 18, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting by designation.
Danita Davis appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of Sailormen, Inc., in her action alleging disability discrimination
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et.
seq. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Davis was born with a right arm that is shorter and smaller than her left arm.
She also lacks a thumb on her right hand. Davis’s condition does not prevent her
from work that entails lifting and carrying objects. Sailormen, Inc., is a franchisee
of Popeyes restaurants and operates a Popeyes in Merritt Island, Florida.
On June 21, 2005, Davis interviewed for a cook job at the Merritt Island
Popeyes with manager Terrance Lakeman. During the interview, Davis alleges
that Lakeman told her that “he didn’t know if he could hire [her] because of [her]
arm.” He explained that he “didn’t think that [she] could handle the lifting and
anything else that came along with it.” Davis did not receive the job.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
Davis contends that Sailormen Inc., via Lakeman, regarded her as disabled.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). An individual is “regarded as” disabled if she (1) has an
impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity, but is treated by
an employer as though it does; (2) has an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity only because of others’ attitudes towards the impairment; or (3)
has no impairment whatsoever, but is treated by an employer as having a disability
recognized by the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). To prevail on a perception theory
of disability discrimination, Davis must show: “(1) that the perceived disability
involves a major life activity; and (2) that the perceived disability is substantially
limiting and significant.” Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Major life activities are “functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
We understand but reject Davis’s argument that Sailormen regarded her as
substantially limited in the major life activities of maneuvering, scrubbing, heavy
lifting, grasping, manipulating items, and “other major life activities.” Assuming,
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arguendo, that the foregoing all constitute major life activities, the record
indicates that Lakeman was referring to tasks associated with the cook job, and not
commenting on Davis’s ability to perform these tasks in daily life. The Supreme
Court has cautioned against recasting “an inability to perform a specific job . . . as
an inability to perform a ‘class’ of tasks associated with that specific job.” Toyota
Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002). We therefore
address whether Sailormen regarded Davis as substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.
To meet her burden, Davis must show that Sailormen considered her
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see also Collado v.
United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005). Nothing in the
record suggests that Sailormen regarded Davis as unable to perform a broad range
of jobs. While Davis contends that Lakeman regarded her as incapable of holding
any job at Popeyes, it is undisputed that Lakeman was only hiring for the cook job
at the time of Davis’s interview. Davis did not testify that Lakeman discussed any
jobs besides the cook position with her.
Lakeman’s comments do suggest that he perceived Davis as unable to work
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as a fast-food cook.1 However, “the inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”
Rossbach, 371 F.3d at 1359. Davis failed to show that Sailormen regarded her
impairment as substantially limiting her ability to work.
AFFIRMED.
1
Davis does not argue that a fast food cook is a ‘class of jobs’ within the meaning of the
ADA.
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