FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 15 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CALVIN P. ROGERS, No. 09-16152
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-04658-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
KATHLEEN DICKINSON, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2012 **
Berkeley, California
Before: NOONAN, McKEOWN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Calvin P. Rogers appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for robbery. Rogers contends
that insufficient evidence supported his identity as the perpetrator in one of the two
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
charged robberies (“the Milpitas robbery”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a state prisoner’s petition for
habeas corpus. Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). Because
Rogers filed his petition after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs his action. Id. We review the last
reasoned state court decision, here the California Court of Appeal’s decision. Id.
Rogers argues that eyewitness testimony suggesting he was not the Milpitas
robber was so “extremely important and rare” that it “should establish a reasonable
doubt for any rational fact finder.” He further contends that the evidence of other
robberies, which the State used to establish Rogers’s identity as the Milpitas
robber, was not sufficiently probative to offset that eyewitness testimony. The
similarities between the robberies, he argues, were too general to support an
inference of identity.
Although Rogers comments that the prior crimes evidence should not have
been admitted, his challenge on appeal is to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its
admission. See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam)
(supporting the proposition that the “purpose of a Jackson analysis is to determine
whether the jury acted in a rational manner in returning a guilty verdict based on
2
the evidence before it, not whether improper evidence violated due process”). The
California Court of Appeal held that a reasonable factfinder could have determined
the witnesses were simply in error in not identifying Rogers. Given the recognized
fallibility of eyewitness identifications, this conclusion is not unreasonable. See
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012) (noting that “the reliability of
relevant testimony typically falls within the province of the jury to determine”).
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the eyewitness identifications of Rogers
as the perpetrator of related robberies supported an inference of identity, stating “it
would have required an astonishing, Ripley’s-Believe-It-Or-Not series of
coincidences for defendant not to have been the Milpitas robber.” We agree.
The relevant inquiry in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is whether
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A
reviewing court conducting a Jackson analysis “must respect the province of the
jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and
draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved
all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d
1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that a jury’s credibility determinations are entitled to “near-total
3
deference”). Inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, such as eyewitness
identifications of a person as the perpetrator of similar robberies, can sustain a
conviction, so long as those inferences are based on more than mere suspicion or
speculation. See Maass, 45 F.3d at 1358 (citation omitted). That principle is true
even if the evidence is “relatively weak.” Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 563 (9th
Cir. 2000).
The California Court of Appeal, considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, concluded that the trial court was not obligated to take
the eyewitnesses statements at face value, particularly when elements of the
testimony were implausible. The state court’s conclusion was not objectively
unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
4