PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
KARLA GERNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-1218
COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, VIRGINIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District Judge.
(3:10-cv-00885-HEH)
Argued: January 25, 2012
Decided: March 16, 2012
Before MOTZ, Circuit Judge, Thomas D. SCHROEDER,
United States District Judge for the Middle District
of North Carolina, sitting by designation, and
J. Michelle CHILDS, United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Schroeder and Judge
Childs joined.
2 GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Mark Dennis Dix, BUCCI & DIX, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey Lee Mincks, COUNTY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE for the County of Chesterfield,
Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Clinton W.
Verity, BUCCI & DIX, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Stylian P. Parthemos, Julie A. C. Seyfarth, COUNTY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE for the County of Chesterfield,
Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Karla Gerner brought this action, alleging that her former
employer, Chesterfield County, Virginia ("County"), unlaw-
fully discriminated against her by offering her a less favorable
severance package than that offered male employees holding
similar positions. The district court dismissed Gerner’s com-
plaint, on the ground that she failed to allege a Title VII claim
because the County’s assertedly discriminatory denial of sev-
erance benefits did not constitute an adverse employment
action. See Gerner v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va., 765 F. Supp.
2d 770, 773-74 (E.D. Va. 2011). We reverse.
I.
Gerner alleged the following relevant facts in her com-
plaint.
She began working for the County in June 1983. By July
1997, she was the County’s Director of Human Resources
Management. Throughout Gerner’s career she always "re-
ceived positive performance evaluations."
GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 3
After more than twenty-five years of employment by the
County, including twelve as a department director, on Decem-
ber 15, 2009, County officials informed Gerner "that her posi-
tion was being eliminated due to a ‘re-organization.’" The
County officials asked Gerner to sign an agreement, which
offered her three months pay and health benefits in exchange
for her voluntary resignation and waiver of any cause of
action against the County. Gerner considered the offer for a
few days and ultimately declined. The County then terminated
her employment effective December 15, without any sever-
ance pay or benefits.
Upon receiving a notice of her right to sue from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Gerner
filed this action alleging disparate treatment on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 ("Title VII"). Gerner alleges
that the County did not offer her the same "sweetheart" sever-
ance package it "offered her similarly situated male counter-
parts when the County sought to terminate their employment."
She claims that "[p]rior male department directors, including
employees who were not meeting performance expectations,
were transferred to positions with less responsibility while
being allowed to continue with their salary and benefits, or
were kept on the payroll with benefits for up to 6 months or
more to enhance their retirement benefits." The complaint
cites four male comparators to whom the County assertedly
gave such favorable treatment.
The County moved to dismiss Gerner’s complaint. After
holding a hearing, the district court issued a written opinion
granting the County’s motion. In its opinion, the district court
noted that the County’s challenge to the complaint rested on
two arguments: (1) "the terms and conditions of the severance
package do not constitute an actionable adverse employment
action" under Title VII, Gerner, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 772, and
(2) "the Complaint fails to adequately describe the compara-
tors offered in support of the disparate treatment claim," id.
4 GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD
at 774. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice
on the first ground, concluding that it need not reach the sec-
ond ground. Id. Gerner noted this timely appeal.
"We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. In so doing, we must accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Bonds
v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
II.
Title VII prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plain-
tiff must show: "(1) membership in a protected class; (2) sat-
isfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action . . .
; and (4) that similarly-situated employees outside the pro-
tected class received more favorable treatment." White v. BFI
Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).
The district court dismissed Gerner’s complaint because it
believed that she failed to allege a "factual basis" for the third
element — that is, she failed to allege an "adverse employ-
ment action." See Gerner, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 774; id. at 772
(explaining that "[t]he viability of Plaintiff’s Complaint turns
on a narrow question of law—whether the County’s offer of
a less favorable severance package constitutes an adverse
employment action"). The court found that "the County’s
offer of a less favorable severance package" did not constitute
an adverse employment action for two reasons. First, the court
held that severance benefits must be a "contractual entitle-
ment" to provide the basis of an adverse employment action
under Title VII. Id. at 773. Second, the court held that because
"the offer of the severance package was made after [Gerner]
had been terminated," it could not constitute an adverse
GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 5
employment action. Id. at 773-74. We consider each of these
rationales in turn.
A.
As to the first, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69
(1984), forecloses a holding that an employment benefit must
be a contractual right in order for its denial to provide the
basis for a Title VII claim. In Hishon, the Supreme Court held
that any "benefit that is part and parcel of the employment
relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion,
even if the employer would be free under the employment
contract simply not to provide the benefit at all." Id. at 75; see
also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 71
(1986). The Hishon Court clearly stated that "benefits that [an
employer] is under no obligation to furnish by any express or
implied contract . . . may qualify as a ‘privileg[e]’ of employ-
ment under Title VII" and so provide the basis for a Title VII
claim. 467 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). The viability of such
a claim turns not on any contractual entitlement but on
whether the benefit is "part and parcel of the employment
relationship." Id.
The district court cited and quoted Hishon, but ignored this
crucial teaching. Instead, the court relied on Britt v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985),
Jones v. Reliant Energy-ARKLA, 336 F.3d 689, 692 (8th Cir.
2003), and Cooney v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 258 F.3d
731, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2001). That reliance was misplaced.
Britt merely holds that conditioning an employee’s participa-
tion in a "wholly voluntary" reduction-in-force plan on a
deferral of that employee’s pension benefits does not provide
a basis for a discrimination claim. See 768 F.2d at 594-95
(emphasis added). Jones and Cooney hold that employees suf-
fered no adverse employment action because, although they
were not offered the severance benefits given to employees
who were terminated, the employees were permitted to retain
their jobs. Of course, Gerner, unlike Britt, did not volunteer
6 GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD
to participate in any reduction-in-force plan. Nor, unlike Jones
and Cooney, did Gerner retain her job in lieu of receiving
severance benefits.1
In contrast to the cases relied on by the district court, in sit-
uations like that at hand, in which an employee did not volun-
teer for a change in employment benefits or retain a job in lieu
of a new benefit, courts have consistently recognized that the
discriminatory denial of a non-contractual employment bene-
fit constitutes an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120-21
(1985); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 501 (2d Cir.
2009); Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 32
(D.C. Cir. 1997); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48
F.3d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 1995); Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No.
60, 917 F.2d 431, 442 (10th Cir. 1990); Judie v. Hamilton,
872 F.2d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1989).
The district court therefore erred in dismissing Gerner’s
complaint on the theory that the discriminatory denial of a
non-contractual employment benefit cannot constitute an
adverse employment action.
B.
The district court’s alternative rationale for dismissing
Gerner’s complaint—that she suffered no adverse employ-
ment action because the County fired her before it made its
1
EEOC v. SunDance Rehabilitation Corp., 466 F.3d 490 (6th Cir.
2006), on which the district court also relied, is similarly inapposite.
There, the Sixth Circuit held that a "mere offer" of a separation agreement
conditioning severance pay on a promise not to file charges with the
EEOC did not amount to retaliation because, until the employer acted, the
employees had "not been deprived of anything." Id. at 500-01. In doing so,
the court distinguished cases like this one, where "the employer actually
took an adverse action against the employee." Id. at 498 (distinguishing
EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.
1992)).
GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 7
allegedly discriminatory offer — also fails. This rationale suf-
fers from two defects.
First, it ignores the well-pleaded factual allegations in
Gerner’s complaint, which a court must accept as true at this
stage. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51 (2009).
Gerner alleges that at the December 15 meeting, County offi-
cials informed her "that her position was being eliminated,"
but offered to permit her to resign with "3 months severance
pay and health benefits." She further alleges that the County
permitted her to consider the offer until December 21, and
that she did so and then rejected the offer. According to
Gerner, only then, after she refused the County’s offer, did the
County terminate her employment, albeit making the termina-
tion retroactive to December 15. Thus, although Gerner ulti-
mately may not be able to prove it, she certainly has alleged
that she remained an employee at the time the County offered
the assertedly discriminatory severance package.
The second problem with this rationale is that Title VII pro-
tects both current and former employees from discriminatory
adverse employment actions. Title VII makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against
any individual" on the basis of membership in a protected
class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Courts
have consistently interpreted this intentionally broad language
to apply to potential, current, and past employees.
As the Second Circuit recently explained, "[a] natural read-
ing of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) suggests that the ‘individual’
it references is a potential, current, or past employee of the
employer." Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361,
374 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted); see also EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d
1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Title VII applies equally to
those with an existing employment relationship (on-the-job
discrimination), those with a past employment relationship
(laying-off and refusing to rehire pursuant to a rehiring plan)
8 GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD
and those with no employment relationship at all (refusal to
hire a new employee or a laid off employee with no right or
expectation of being rehired)."); Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wil-
son, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasoning that
Title VII covers at least "former employees and applicants for
employment, in addition to present employees").
Indeed, in Hishon itself the Supreme Court rejected the idea
that denial of an employment benefit could not constitute an
adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII claim
because it only affected a former employee. See 467 U.S. at
77 ("A benefit need not accrue before a person’s employment
is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of that
employment relationship.").2 To limit actionable adverse
employment actions to those taken while an individual is cur-
rently employed would be inconsistent with the statutory text
and Title VII’s "principal goal" of "eliminat[ing] discrimina-
tion in employment." EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles
Co., 515 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 n.6 (1977)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the district court also erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground that Gerner failed to allege an
adverse employment action because she did not allege that the
2
This conclusion finds further support in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337 (1997). There, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a)—prohibiting employers from retaliating against "employees" for
exercising their Title VII rights—protects "former employees" from dis-
criminatory "postemployment actions." Id. at 339. Gerner’s complaint
relies on § 2000e-2(a)(1) — prohibiting employers from discriminating
against "any individual" because of membership in a protected class.
Surely if the term "employee" in § 2000e-3(a) includes former employees,
the more capacious term "any individual" in § 2000e-2(a)(1) must also
include former employees. This is particularly so given that in Robinson
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that "‘individual’ is a broader
term than ‘employee’ and would facially seem to cover a former
employee." Id. at 345.
GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 9
County made its assertedly discriminatory severance offer
before it terminated her employment.
III.
Perhaps recognizing the errors in the district court’s reason-
ing, the County presses two additional arguments before us.
First, the County maintains that "Gerner has made no factual
allegations that would allow this Court to conclude that . . .
severance benefits [were] ‘part and parcel’ of her employment
relationship," as required by Hishon. Appellee’s Br. at 27.
Second, the County contends that Gerner has failed "to allege
sufficient facts to allow the district court to examine the tim-
ing and nature of the employment actions taken with respect
to the ‘four male comparators.’" Id. at 22.
While these contentions may have some merit, the district
court did not address them. We leave it to that court to con-
sider these questions in the first instance. See Shomo v. City
of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2009); Feikema
v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1418 (4th Cir. 1994).3
3
When the district court indicated at the conclusion of the hearing that
it intended to grant the County’s motion to dismiss, Gerner’s counsel
requested leave to amend the complaint. Relying on its legal conclusion
that the complaint did not state an adverse employment action, the court
denied that motion stating "[t]here’s nothing to amend." The district court,
however, dismissed the complaint "without prejudice" so that Gerner
could refile if she "wish[ed] to." Given this and our conclusion that the
district court erred by dismissing Gerner’s complaint on the stated legal
grounds, we are confident that on remand the experienced district judge
will permit any amendment that might remedy other asserted defects in the
complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (providing that "[t]he court should
freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires"). Of
course, even if Gerner can amend the complaint sufficiently to avoid dis-
missal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), she must ulti-
mately prove the truth of her allegations to prevail.
10 GERNER v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD
IV.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED