NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3745
___________
ALVIN CHRISTOPHER MARTIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A031-362-217)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 19, 2012)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM.
Alvin Christopher Martin petitions for review of the order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen. The Government has
filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that we lack jurisdiction because the
petition is untimely. We agree and will grant the Government’s motion.
The BIA denied Martin’s motion to reopen on August 25, 2011. Martin’s
petition for review was due to be filed by September 26, 2011 (September 24 being
a Saturday). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). That deadline is jurisdictional. See Stone
v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995); Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 143, 146 (3d
Cir. 2008). Martin dated his petition for review September 12, 2011, but it is
postmarked October 4 and was received by this Court on October 6.
The Government argues that Martin’s petition is untimely because it was
“filed” on October 6, the date we received it. Martin filed his petition while in
prison, however, and thus potentially benefits from the prison mailbox rule. Under
that rule, a prisoner’s petition for review is deemed to be filed on the date that the
prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487
U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(C); see also Arango-Aradondo v.
INS, 13 F.3d 610, 612 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Rule 25(a)(2)(C) to immigration
petition for review). Cognizant of Martin’s pro se status, we have liberally
construed his filings in order to determine whether there is any basis for deeming
his petition timely under this rule. We cannot say that there is.
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Although Martin dated his petition for review September 12, his certificate
of service does not state that he mailed it to the Court or gave it to prison
authorities for mailing to the Court on that date. To the contrary, the certificate
states that he mailed the petition to his mother on that date and was waiting (for
unspecified reasons) for his mother to return it to him so that it could then be
“mailed to the Court.” The post mark on the envelope shows that Martin’s petition
was not actually mailed to the Court until October 4. Thus, this is not a situation in
which we can presume that Martin gave his petition to prison authorities for
mailing on the date he executed it. Cf. Baker v. United States, — F.3d —, Nos.
08-2288 & 08-2365, 2012 WL 433960, at *2 n.2 (3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (“We
presume here that Baker filed all of his motions on the date that he executed
them.”) (emphasis added). And Martin himself has made no representation
regarding the date he mailed his petition to the Court or gave it to prison authorities
for mailing. Nor has he certified the date of delivery by declaration or notarized
statement as provided by Rule 25(a)(2)(C).
“[A]n appellant must prove that necessary preconditions to the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction—including the timely filing of a notice of appeal—have been
fulfilled.” Porchia v. Norris, 251 F.3d 1196, 1198 (8th Cir. 2001). The
Government raised the issue of timeliness in its motion to dismiss and reiterated its
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argument in its appellate brief. Martin, however, has neither responded to the
Government’s motion nor raised any argument in his own brief that his petition is
timely. He also has not asserted any circumstances that might allow us to conclude
that it is. Martin alleges various instances of prison mailroom interference, but
those relate to his attempts to overturn a criminal conviction and to contest
removability during his initial proceeding before the Immigration Judge. He
makes no allegations regarding the mailing of his petition for review.
Accordingly, we will dismiss it as untimely.
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