In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A ARON D EL V ALLE AND A LFRED S ANCHEZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 07 CR 149—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 21, 2012—D ECIDED M ARCH 20, 2012
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, B AUER, Circuit
Judge, and S HADID, District Judge.
S HADID, District Judge. Following a jury trial, Alfred
Sanchez was convicted of one count of mail fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and his co-defendant
The Honorable James E. Shadid, United States District
Court, Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation
2 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
Aaron Del Valle was convicted of one count of perjury.
Sanchez appeals contending that the erroneous admis-
sion of certain evidence was not harmless error and
that city jobs are not “money or property” for purposes
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Del Valle appeals contending the
district court erred when it repeatedly denied his
motions for severance.
I. BACKGROUND
Alfred Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago
politics eventually becoming Commissioner of the De-
partment of Streets and Sanitation (“Department”).
Sanchez was also one of the founders and leaders of the
Hispanic Democratic Organization (“HDO”), a campaign
organization staffed largely by City employees and
those seeking employment with the City. Sanchez acted
in a dual role as a City official and political operative
and participated in a scheme to award City jobs to indi-
viduals who participated in campaign work. This was
in direct violation of a series of orders and consent
decrees entered into known as the Shakman decrees.
The Shakman decrees enjoined the City from patronage
hiring practices for most positions. To implement the
policy, the City instituted a multi-step hiring procedure.
In the first step, the City approved the expenditures of
money from its budget to fill vacant positions. In the
next step, the City issued public notices that it was ac-
cepting applications. The notices were posted in City
Hall and public libraries throughout the city identifying
the open positions, the minimum qualifications for the
job and the wage paid by the City for the position.
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 3
Applications were to be screened by City employees
to determine which of the applicants were eligible for
the jobs based on the required qualifications for each
posting. Once an applicant was deemed qualified, the
applicant was placed on a list to be interviewed. The
interview process was designed to evaluate candidates
based on specific criteria, without reference to their
respective political affiliation.
Candidates were evaluated and scored numerically on
a scale of 1 to 5 against specific criteria, e.g., quality of
previous experience, oral communication skills, etc.,
and the final score was derived from a process of multi-
plying scores in a particular category by the weight
assigned to that category. Accordingly, the candidates
with the highest scores received the jobs. The last
stage in the hiring process involved the “official hiring
authority” for each department to certify that political
considerations did not enter into the hiring decisions.
The Mayor’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
(“IGA”), served as the City’s lobbyist to the City Council
and other governments. Though it had no official role
in hiring or promotion of City jobs, the IGA received
lists of vacancies from personnel officers within the
City’s various departments and indicated preferred
candidates, who then received interviews and jobs.
The IGA also formed organizations of City employees
to perform campaign work, directed political organiza-
tions to support selected candidates, and used the organi-
zations to work precincts for candidates during elec-
tions. As compensation for their work, these organizations
4 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
competed amongst themselves for City jobs awarded
through IGA. The IGA selected the organizations
which were to receive the jobs and based their deci-
sions on recommendations from political coordinators.
In order to effectuate the deceit, City departments
falsified ratings for applicants selected by the IGA by
giving them the highest scores. They then conducted
sham interviews to give the appearance of integrity to
the process, though the decisions had already been
made. Lastly, the official hiring authorities falsely
certified that politics played no part in their decision.
Sanchez participated in every aspect of the scheme. He
ran campaign organizations for the IGA for more than
a decade, as a City employee he falsified ratings forms
and as head of the Department, he directed his
personnel officer to submit names of HDO participants
to the IGA for hiring.
While working as a city employee in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Sanchez was the leader of a political group
in the southeast side of Chicago. Sanchez was ap-
proached by the then Mayor’s campaign manager who
sought assistance from Sanchez’s group. In exchange
for that Sanchez sought assurances that his group
would not be forgotten. Around the same time, Sanchez’s
political group merged with other Hispanic political
organizations from the north and west sides of Chicago,
forming the HDO. Sanchez led a branch of the HDO and
the precinct workers under his leadership primarily
canvassed neighborhoods during elections and raised
funds. Because the workers were not paid, the HDO
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 5
sought to secure City jobs for its employees, which
helped the group grow in numbers and influence.
Sanchez’s branch of the HDO had a specific protocol for
its workers in which requests for City jobs were given
to the worker’s respective HDO coordinator who in
turn recommended their precinct workers to Sanchez
or Aaron Del Valle.
Sanchez served as the Deputy Director of the Mayor’s
Office of Inquiry and Information (“Office”) in the early
1990s and the personnel administrator for the Office
was Bob Medina. In 1993, Arturo Salinas was seeking
employment with the City and heard that working for
the HDO was an way to enhance his prospects. Salinas
began working for the HDO and eventually met with
Sanchez at City Hall, after which Sanchez directed
Medina to hire Salinas. Sanchez then falsified ratings
sheets and Shakman certifications and signed a docu-
ment stating that an interview of Salinas occurred, when
in fact it had not. All of this was done after the
hiring decision was made. Sanchez did the same for
another HDO worker who he never actually interviewed.
In 1999, Sanchez became the Commissioner of the
Department and though he no longer had to complete
personnel documents associated with hiring decisions,
all such decisions flowed through him. Jack Drumgould
was Sanchez’s personnel director and met with him
routinely to discuss hiring for vacancies. Drumgould
would give Sanchez a packet of personnel documents
every two weeks which listed various vacancies and
applicants for those jobs. Sanchez would then read the
6 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
list, highlight or check the selected applicants who
should be hired and returned the packet to Drumgould.
Sanchez never made reference to the interviews or
ratings sheets for the applicants he selected. However,
he occasionally would make reference to the HDO and
on one occasion, in 2003, Del Valle entered the room
while Drumgould and Sanchez were discussing an ap-
plicant list. Sanchez asked Del Valle whether a
particular person had worked for the HDO and when
he received an affirmative answer, he highlighted his
name for hiring. The IGA had the final say on hiring
decisions and often would send lists back and forth
with Sanchez before finalizing the hiring decisions. Fol-
lowing approval of the list by IGA, Drumgould and
another Department official would falsify the ratings
sheets and interview records to reflect positively on
the applicants selected.
In 2002, the Bureau of Electricity within the Streets
and Sanitation Department sought positions for Lamp
Maintenance Man who replaced lightbulbs, cleaned
light fixtures, alley lights, streetlights and traffic signals.
This was an entry level position, but was considered an
essential stepping stone to higher positions within the
Bureau. Over six hundred people applied for sixteen
positions and one hundred and eleven individuals were
interviewed. The ratings for the position were much
the same as those discussed supra. Prior to the interview
process, Sanchez reviewed a list of applicants for the
position and selected two individuals, Alejandro
Duran and Robert Aguirre, to submit to the IGA for
approval. Aguirre had previously worked with the
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 7
HDO and specifically with Del Valle. He did not have
the minimum requisite experience for the position, but
by virtue of Sanchez’s selection, he was interviewed
and ultimately hired. Another applicant for one of the
sixteen positions was Benita Mangrum, an electric
signal specialist for a railroad who had an associate’s
degree in mathematics and four years of experience
with the railroad. Mangrum unfortunately had never
contributed man-hours to political campaigns and
though she was interviewed she was not hired. She
received her rejection letter via United States mail.
Aaron Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by
Sanchez’s branch of the HDO and held the title of “co-
ordinator of coordinators”. During the investigation
into Sanchez, Del Valle testified before a grand jury.
This testimony concerned his conversations with other
HDO coordinators, the spreadsheets he maintained on
his computer that pertained to HDO coordinators and
City jobs and his personal role, if any, in the process
of getting HDO workers City jobs. Del Valle denied
having any role as to the hiring process and also
denied having any conversations with HDO co-
ordinators about rewarding campaign work with City
jobs. Del Valle also denied that the spreadsheets he main-
tained were connected to HDO workers seeking City
jobs. Del Valle stated that his role was limited in nature.
It amounted to checking “lottery lists” for HDO volun-
teers. These lottery lists were used by the Department
to generate random lists of applicants for interviews
for hand laborers and motor truck drivers. Del Valle
stated further that Gil Valdez, an HDO coordinator
asked him to check a lottery list.
8 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
Del Valle’s actual role in the hiring scheme was far
greater and he wielded significant influence. Being the
“coordinator of coordinators” practically speaking,
meant that all coordinators were to submit their list of
workers seeking City jobs to Del Valle. Del Valle
instructed HDO workers to submit their job requests
to their coordinator who would then submit it to Del
Valle. At trial, HDO coordinators and a precinct captain
testified as to their dealings with Del Valle. These wit-
nesses testified that on different occasions, they would
approach Del Valle with requests for City jobs for their
workers. The critical inquiry for the workers always
centered on their political campaign work. Del Valle
kept records of some coordinators and their re-
quests for hiring or promotion on his City computer.
One spreadsheet found on his computer contained a list
of individuals seeking City jobs, sorted by their HDO
coordinator and bore an electronic date of April 27, 2004.
A fax dated April 28, 2004 from the Department to
IGA listed the same individuals, in almost identical
order with the handwritten notation “Al’s Picks”, in-
dicating these were the individuals Sanchez picked for
the positions.
A grand jury charged Sanchez with nine counts (1-9)
of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and Del
Valle with one count (10) of perjury in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1623. Prior to trial in March 2009, the govern-
ment dismissed counts 3 & 6 and following trial, a jury
found Sanchez guilty of counts 1, 5, 7 & 9. Del Valle
was found guilty of one count of perjury. Following the
trial, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 9
and granted Defendants’ motion for a new trial. In July
2010, the government dismissed counts 1 & 5 against
Sanchez and proceeded to trial on counts 7 & 9 and the
one count of perjury against Del Valle. During the course
of the trial, the government dismissed count 7 against
Sanchez, and a jury found him guilty of one count of
mail fraud and Del Valle guilty of one count of perjury.
During the re-trial, the government cross-examined
Sanchez regarding certain claims he made under direct
examination. Specifically, the defense elicited testimony
concerning Sanchez’s tireless work ethic and his good
standing with every alderman in the City. The govern-
ment’s objections to this testimony were overruled.
Sanchez himself testified at the trial and made similar
statements and upon cross-examination by the govern-
ment, Sanchez adopted the statement that he worked
for the City of Chicago 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
and that he was available to the citizens of Chicago the
same. The government then sought to introduce two
instances of prior conduct of Sanchez that they claim
impeached this statement. The first involved a motor
vehicle accident in which Sanchez was allegedly driving
intoxicated in a City-owned car. Sanchez denied being
intoxicated. The second instance concerned a stop by
a Chicago police officer on the Skyway in which
Sanchez, who was passenger in the car, allegedly was
intoxicated and confronted the police officer stating that
he was exempt from traffic laws. The defense objected
to the government’s second question regarding the car
crash which was overruled and on re-direct, Sanchez
explained the situation on the Skyway. Following
10 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
Sanchez’s testimony, the jury recessed and the defendant
moved to strike the questions and answers regarding
the two incidents. The district court eventually found
that the questions were irrelevant and when the jury
returned to the courtroom, gave a limiting instruction
to disregard that portion of the testimony.
The limiting instruction stated in part “I want you
to disregard both the questions that were put to
Mr. Sanchez on cross-examination, his answers
to those questions, and the questions and answers on
redirect concerning the two incidents of alleged drunk
driving.”(emphasis added). The following day, Sanchez
brought to the district court’s attention the misstate-
ment contained in the limiting instruction noting that
there was only one instance of drunk driving and one
instance in which he was the passenger in a vehicle.
The district court proposed correcting the instruction
to the jury but the defense opted to not bring it back to
the jury’s attention. Sanchez was ultimately convicted
of the one count of mail fraud and on his motion for
new trial, argued that the two incidents were irrele-
vant and prejudicial, and that the error in the curative in-
struction did not cure the prejudice. The court denied
the motion after weighing the prejudicial effect of that
limited aspect of the trial compared to the adequacy of
the other evidence adduced. The court also found that
the jury was able to understand and follow the instruc-
tion and found any error in the instruction harmless.
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 11
II. DISCUSSION
Sanchez’s first argument pertains to the district court’s
handling of the testimony regarding the incidents of
driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police
officer as a passenger. He also alleges that the indict-
ment did not adequately allege a deprivation of “money
or property” for purposes of mail fraud under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 and the district court’s instruction that City jobs
or promotions constitute “money or property” was in
error.
A. Prejudicial Testimony
The Court reviews an evidentiary ruling for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d 721, 727
(7th Cir. 2011). If an error is found, the verdict will not
be reversed if the error was harmless. United States v.
Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 1993). Sanchez con-
tends that the evidence the government introduced
through cross-examination was not admissible under
any circumstance, even as the government contends,
as impeachment to the claims that Sanchez was available
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The district court took
Sanchez’s side and overruled itself, noting that the evi-
dence was largely irrelevant to anything. Sanchez
argues that eliciting this evidence was improper by the
government and that it deprived him of a fair trial
and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. However,
the district court noted that it gave the defendant sig-
nificant leeway in establishing Sanchez’s “good faith”
in his employment, and therefore was apparently only
12 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
trying to balance the scope of the evidence. As the dis-
trict court noted, the evidence had little to do with the
scheme of fraudulent hiring and should not have
been admitted. The crux of the issue here is the
prejudicial effect the evidence had on the jury and
the ability of the erroneous curative instruction to
address that.
The test for determining whether an error was harm-
less is “whether, in the mind of the average juror, the
prosecution’s case would have been significantly less
persuasive had the evidence been excluded.” United
States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Sanchez
argues that drunk driving is an emotional crime to
which those impacted by it may be particularly sensitive.
Sanchez also argues that the prejudicial impact in this
case was compounded because it was the govern-
ment that made the accusations. Furthermore, because
Sanchez’s main argument was that he acted in good
faith in making recommendations to the IGA, his
defense was severely and unfairly undercut.
Driving under the influence is a serious matter and
certainly it has negatively impacted many people. How-
ever, it is not of such a unique nature that a mention of
an uncharged instance could be said to have significantly
bolstered the government’s case. In other words, the
mention of drunk driving was an error and was
prejudicial, but not so much so that its absence makes
the government’s case significantly less persuasive.
Also, the fact that the government made the accusation
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 13
does somewhat compound the prejudice. However, this
does not amount to making the prosecution’s case sig-
nificantly less persuasive had these accusations not
been made. Sanchez explained the incidents on re-direct
and therefore had the opportunity to address them in
front of the jury. Furthermore, there was a large amount
of evidence that suggested Sanchez was fully aware of
the scheme and was not acting in good faith.
B. Erroneous Curative Instruction
Sanchez next argues that the curative instruction
given by the district court actually exacerbated the prob-
lem. Generally, “jurors are presumed to follow the
limiting and curative instructions unless the matter
improperly before them is so powerfully incriminating
that they cannot reasonably be expected to put it out
of their minds.” United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 739
(7th Cir. 2002). Absent evidence of an “overwhelming
probability” that the jurors were unable to follow the
instructions, they are presumed to have done so. United
States v. James, 434 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2006)).
The argument of course is that an erroneous limiting
instruction is not sufficiently curative. The district court
admonished the jurors that they were to disregard the
line of questioning because the evidence was irrelevant
and had nothing to do with the case. The district
court noted that the jurors were outwardly showing
acknowledgment of its instruction in that they were
nodding their heads in agreement as he gave the instruc-
14 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
tion. The misstatement in the instruction does not
indicate that the jurors would assume there was a
third unexplained incident involving alleged drunk
driving as Sanchez argues. Furthermore, the curative
instruction came the same day as the testimony and
referred to a specific and small portion of cross-examina-
tion and re-direct examination. The cases relied upon by
Sanchez differ from the situation with which he was
confronted. The challenged questions in United States v.
Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1976) and Hill v.
Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411, 1419 (4th Cir. 1998) dealt with
post-Miranda silence, a well-established right from
which improper inferences easily arise. Here, the ques-
tioning had nothing to do with the case against
Sanchez, the district court recognized that and in-
structed the jury to disregard the testimony. Finally, given
the amount of evidence against Sanchez, it is unlikely
that a minor misstatement was enough to wrongly per-
suade the jury. In sum, there has not been a showing of
an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable
to follow the district court’s limiting instruction, albeit
misstated as it was.
Focusing on the erroneous curative instruction and
error in admitting the evidence of alleged bad acts by
Sanchez ignores the abundance of evidence which sug-
gested he was guilty. As such, any error was harmless.
C. Sufficiency of the Indictment
Sanchez argues that the indictment, which alleged
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, was insuf-
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 15
ficient because City jobs are not money or property.
Sanchez urges that this Court’s opinion in United States
v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) should be over-
ruled. The Court reviews de novo Sanchez’s contention
that the indictment insufficiently alleged a deprivation
of money or property. See United States v. Moore, 446
F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2006).
Sanchez argues that jobs are not money or property for
purposes of mail fraud and that the city suffered no
economic harm; therefore a charge of mail fraud in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §1341 cannot be sustained. These argu-
ments have been addressed by this Court and rejected.
See Sorich, 523 F.3d at 713 (“we hold that jobs are
property for purposes of mail fraud”). Furthermore,
whether or not jobs are “property”, the money paid for
the job (that is, the salary) is “money”. The City of
Chicago did not get the employees that it wanted to hire
and thus was cheated out of money. Sanchez’s conten-
tion that the workers he hired were just as good as those
the City wanted is irrelevant and misses the point. The
City, not Sanchez, gets to set the criteria for hiring.
Sanchez relies on United States v. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896
(2010), noting that the Supreme Court, in discussing
the history of the development of honest-services
fraud, distinguished between honest services fraud and
fraud involving loss of money or property. However,
Skilling dealt with honest-services fraud, not traditional
mail fraud as is the case here and therefore his reliance
on Skilling is misplaced.
As the law stands, the government need not establish
an economic loss or pecuniary harm in order to sustain
16 Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394
a charge of mail fraud and city jobs are money or
property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment
sufficiently alleges a deprivation of money or property.
D. Del Valle’s Severance
Sanchez’s co-defendant in this case is Aaron Del Valle,
a coordinator who worked for Sanchez in the HDO. Del
Valle argues that he was denied a fair trial by virtue
of being joined with Sanchez. The Court reviews a
district court’s denial of severance under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 14 for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 624 (7th Cir. 2011).
The standard for severance is that “when defendants
have been properly joined under Rule 8(b), a district
court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if
there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise
a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent
the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt
or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539
(1993). Here, Del Valle challenges only the district
court’s denial of his motions for severance thus
denying him the right to a fair trial. This falls well short
of establishing a serious risk as required to meet the
Supreme Court standard. D e l V alle argues that the
disparity in weight of evidence against Sanchez and
himself and the complex nature of the evidence denied
him the right to a fair trial. However, the existence of
a disparity in weight of evidence against a moving de-
fendant and co-defendants does not itself amount to
grounds for severance. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d
Nos. 11-1380 & 11-1394 17
690, 696 (7th Cir. 2003). This fear of “spill-over” can be
mitigated sufficiently when there is ample evidence to
convict the moving defendant and when jury is given
instructions to assess each defendant individually.
United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 2009).
The disparity in evidence here is apparent as a
majority of the evidence pertained to Sanchez. However,
it is clear from the record that there was ample evidence
to support Del Valle’s conviction for perjury based
on his answers to the grand jury. Additionally, the gov-
ernment was required to put Del Valle’s answers into
context in order to show how he perjured himself. This
required presentation of witnesses and evidence that
were used against both himself and Sanchez and the
jury was instructed to assess the evidence separately as
to each defendant. The district court properly con-
sidered each request for severance by Del Valle, and its
conclusion in denying them does not constitute an
abuse of discretion. Because we find that there was
no abuse of discretion by the district court, we need
not address whether Del Valle waived his severance
argument for failing to raise it at the close of evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the convictions
of the defendants.
3-20-12