[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-11204 MARCH 21, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-02458-SCB-TBM
CATHERINE A. RANIOLO,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 21, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and SMOAK,* District Judge.
*
Honorable Richard Smoak, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Catherine Raniolo, the former spouse of a deceased wage earner, appeals the
district court’s order affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for disabled widow’s
benefits.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to adjudicate Raniolo’s
claim ruled that, because Raniolo’s disability did not occur until two days after her
eligibility for benefits expired, she did not qualify to receive these benefits. The
ALJ’s decision was affirmed on administrative appeal, making it the final
determination of the Commissioner. Raniolo now appeals to this Court, arguing
that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute and regulations determining
eligibility for disabled widow’s benefits, which the ALJ applied in her case, is
unreasonable.
When an agency rule adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
which occurred in this case,1 interprets a statute that the agency is charged with
administering, we must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation if the
1
There is no question in this case that the Commissioner’s regulation, enacted pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(a), is endowed with the “force of law” necessary to receive the deference owed
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (recognizing that agency actions are entitled to
Chevron deference where Congress enabled the agency “to speak with the force of law”).
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statute is ambiguous. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-87
(2000) (discussing scope of deference). Because the statute at issue may be
deemed ambiguous, we must sustain the Commissioner’s interpretation so long as
it is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (requiring deference where the statute does not “directly
address[] the precise question at issue”). In this case, the Commissioner’s
interpretation is a plausible, and therefore acceptable, reading of the statute. See
Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (accepting agency
interpretation where it “comes within the range of reasonable choices” in
interpreting statutory text).
Having concluded that the regulation “is based on a permissible
construction of the statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, we next determine whether
the Commissioner’s interpretation of the regulation is entitled to deference. An
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless it is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not find the interpretation
of the regulation in this case either implausible or “inconsistent with the
regulation.” Id.
AFFIRMED.
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