In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-2648
E RNESTO D ELGADO,
Petitioner,
v.
E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A077-767-216
A RGUED F EBRUARY 15, 2012—D ECIDED M ARCH 22, 2012
Before P OSNER, F LAUM, and M ANION, Circuit Judges.
F LAUM, Circuit Judge. Ernesto Delgado entered the
United States illegally in 1989. Eleven years later, in
2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the
“INS”) commenced removal proceedings against
Delgado by sending him a Notice to Appear. Delgado
admitted the allegations in the Notice to Appear, but
2 No. 11-2648
sought leave to stay in the United States by filing an
application for Cancellation of Removal. After several
immigration hearings and two remands from the Board
of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA” or “Board”), an immi-
gration judge denied Delgado’s application for cancel-
lation, and the BIA affirmed that finding. Delgado
appeals the BIA’s decision, claiming that his cancella-
tion application was wrongly decided and that his right
to due process was violated. We deny Delgado’s peti-
tion for review.
I. Background
In 1989, Delgado left his home in Morelos, Mexico
and illegally entered the United States. He settled
in Chicago where he has maintained a continuous resi-
dence. In 1992, he married Analoet Roman, another
illegal alien, and together they have three children:
Guadalupe (18 years old), Daisy (13 years old) and Luis
(5 years old). All three of the Delgado’s children were
born in the United States and are U.S. citizens.
This case began in 2000 when the INS commenced
proceedings against Delgado with the filing of a Notice
to Appear. The Notice to Appear charged Delgado with
being a native of Mexico who is subject to removal
from the United States. In response, Delgado filed an ap-
plication for cancellation of removal pursuant to INA
§ 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)1. To qualify for cancel-
lation under § 1229b(b)(1), an alien must meet the fol-
lowing four criteria:
No. 11-2648 3
(A) has been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than 10 years
immediately preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during
such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under
section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title,
subject to paragraph (5); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence.
The merits hearing on Delgado’s cancellation of removal
claim took place on September 24, 2004. Though the
immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Delgado established
the requisite continuous physical presence and good
moral character for cancellation of removal, he deter-
mined that Delgado failed to meet his burden of
showing his removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to his children, who are
United States citizens. The IJ denied his application
for cancellation or removal, granted voluntary depar-
ture, and alternatively, ordered his removal to Mexico.
Delgado appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. In
2005, the BIA remanded Delgado’s case to the IJ for
further action and certification because the tape
recording of Delgado’s hearing was defective, which
prevented the BIA from analyzing Delgado’s claims on
4 No. 11-2648
appeal. The BIA instructed the IJ to take the steps neces-
sary and appropriate to enable the BIA to review a com-
plete record and to hold a new hearing if necessary. In
response, the IJ determined that a new hearing was
unnecessary, given that the only shortcoming of the
previous record was an inability to discern what was
said at Delgado’s hearing. The IJ therefore determined
that it was inappropriate to consider new documents or
evidence.
The BIA disagreed. In July 2008, the BIA ruled that
its 2005 order did not preclude the submission of new
evidence or the taking of additional testimony, and
because new evidence might have been relevant, it
ordered a new hearing and preparation of a new deci-
sion that included comprehensive findings of fact. On
June 18, 2010, the IJ held a second merits hearing on
Delgado’s application for relief.
During Delgado’s 2010 cancellation hearing—the
hearing we now review—Delgado offered supporting
evidence in the form of documentation and live testi-
mony. Delgado testified that his parents and at least two
brothers still reside in Morelos. Despite this fact, he
claimed that his family would be unable to stay with
his parents in Mexico because his parents do not have
the resources to support them. Delgado admits that he
has not looked into the possibility of living anywhere
other than Morelos, or living with anyone other than his
parents. Delgado also stated that if he were to move to
Mexico, his father, who owns a business in Morelos,
would be unable to offer him a job. Delgado admits that
No. 11-2648 5
he did not look into the possibility of working anywhere
besides his father’s business.
In addition to Delgado’s perception that there is
a lack of housing and employment opportunities in
Morelos, he explained that Morelos is not a safe place
to live, citing excessive violence and murder. Delgado
also lamented the possibility that his daughters may
need to enter the Mexican education system. He stated
that the schools are not as good as they are in the
United States, and that the children would have dif-
ficulty taking classes in Spanish.
Guadalupe also testified at the hearing. Her sister,
Daisy, did not testify, but Guadalupe offered testimony
as to her sister. Guadalupe is in honors classes, re-
ceives As and Bs in school, and aspires to work in
the medical field. Daisy also receives As and Bs. Both
daughters have been to Mexico on vacation, and both
prefer the United States to Mexico. Guadalupe can
speak, read and write in Spanish. Daisy can speak
Spanish enough to communicate with her father
(who does not speak English), but she cannot read or
write in Spanish. According to Guadalupe and Delgado,
a move to Mexico would be challenging for both
daughters, but would be much more difficult for
Daisy. Delgado and Guadalupe maintained that Daisy
would have an especially difficult time, since she is old
enough to have become acculturated by the United
States and she cannot read or write in Spanish. Guadalupe
also expressed concern regarding her college prospects
in Mexico—the nearest university to Morelos is an hour
6 No. 11-2648
and a half away. She also discussed the potentially prohibi-
tive costs of a college education in Mexico, and while
Delgado did not know whether Guadalupe would be
eligible for financial aid, Guadalupe believed that
she would not be able to receive any financial help
from the State.
Delgado was unclear regarding where his children
would live if he were deported. If they did remain in
the United States, they would need to be supported by
the income of their mother and the $50,000 that Delgado
has in the bank. Guadalupe discussed the possibility
of working while in school to help support the family.
If Delgado does get deported, there is a possibility that
he would return to the United States in the future. One
of his brothers is a United States citizen, and in 1999,
Delgado’s brother applied for a visa for Delgado,
thus raising the chances that Delgado would not be
separated from his family permanently.
At the hearing, the IJ took a semi-active role in the
questioning (as he is permitted to do under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1), which allows the IJ to “interrogate, exa-
mine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”).
During the direct examination of Delgado, the IJ inter-
rupted the questioning three to four times to either
clarify what was being said, ask for an expanded answer,
or inquire as to why a certain line of testimony was rele-
vant. For example, the IJ interrupted a line of questioning
regarding the undesirability of Delgado’s parents’ home
as a potential residence for Delgado’s family. In inter-
jecting, the IJ questioned the relevance of the testimony
No. 11-2648 7
since Delgado could choose to live in any number of
other locations in Morelos, or even Mexico generally.
The IJ also conducted his own examination of Delgado
once both attorneys had completed their questioning.
Delgado’s attorney requested permission to ask follow-
up questions to the IJ’s examination of Delgado, but
her request was denied. She also asked that both of
Delgado’s daughters provide testimony in support of
Delgado’s cancellation request, but the IJ only allowed
one daughter to testify. Delgado’s attorney did not object.
Delgado faults the IJ’s general demeanor during
Delgado’s hearing. He suggests that the IJ was rude
and hostile throughout the hearing. As an example of
the IJ’s allegedly inappropriate demeanor, Delgado
quotes the following line of questioning conducted by
the IJ:
But that’s why you, a good family man who’s con-
cerned about your family, would go back there and
live there as opposed to any other place in Mexico,
isn’t it? You’d go to the place that is the most violent.
You’d choose to live in that place in Mexico. Isn’t
that right, according to your account?
At the conclusion of Delgado’s 2010 cancellation
hearing, the IJ determined that Delgado met three of the
four criteria to be eligible for cancellation of removal, but
held that Delgado fell short of proving that his removal
would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to his children. He also ruled that Delgado
should not be granted voluntary departure, since he
chose not to leave the country voluntarily on the two
8 No. 11-2648
prior occasions that the IJ denied Delgado’s cancellation
request—that is, the denials from which Delgado ap-
pealed. Just as with the IJ’s previous denials, Delgado
appealed the 2010 ruling to the BIA. Delgado claimed
that the IJ was incorrect in his assessment of the hard-
ship that Delgado’s children would face if Delgado
were deported. Delgado also argued that his due process
rights were violated, given the IJ’s apparent bias and
the IJ’s rejection of certain evidence, including the testi-
mony of one of Delgado’s daughters.
On June 20, 2011, the BIA affirmed in part and vacated
in part the decision of the IJ after de novo review. The
BIA concluded that the IJ did not err in his assessment
of the hardship that Delgado’s children would face, but
ruled that the IJ did err in denying Delgado’s ability to
leave the country voluntarily. More specifically, the
BIA found that the IJ had granted Delgado voluntary
departure in his two previous rulings, and that it was
an abuse of discretion to deny voluntary departure now
based solely on Delgado’s decision to pursue his right
to appeal any decision made by the IJ. Delgado has peti-
tioned this court to review the BIA’s determinations,
arguing that the IJ and BIA wrongly assessed the level
of hardship that Delgado’s children face and that
Delgado’s due process rights were violated by the IJ.
Delgado therefore requests that we reverse the BIA’s
decision and remand for further proceedings consistent
with that reversal.
No. 11-2648 9
II. Discussion
Delgado disputes the BIA’s decision for two indepen-
dent reasons. First, he argues that he has met the four
criteria necessary to be considered for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). More specifically,
he contends that his children will experience “exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship” if he is deported,
regardless of whether they go with him to Mexico or
remain in the United States. Second, Delgado argues
that the IJ did not provide him with the process that he
was due under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. Delgado claims that the IJ clearly
exhibited a bias against him during his cancellation
hearing, which was evident both in the tone of the IJ’s
questions and in the fact that the IJ rejected probative
evidence that would have advanced Delgado’s position.
The government contends that both of Delgado’s argu-
ments fall short. First, they maintain that we do not have
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the BIA’s decision on
the merits of Delgado’s request for cancellation of
removal, and thus it does not matter whether we
believe that Delgado’s children will suffer extreme hard-
ship upon Delgado’s removal from the United States.
Next, the government argues that Delgado was given a
full and fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to
present his claims, and thus his due process rights were
not violated.
A. Jurisdiction
We review questions concerning our jurisdiction de
novo. Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir.
10 No. 11-2648
2001). Applications for cancellation of removal orders
are permitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, a provision of the
INA. Another INA provision—8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)—
clearly establishes that “no court shall have jurisdiction
to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of
relief under section . . . 1229b . . . of this title.” See also
Mireles v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Deci-
sions under § 1229b are not reviewable by the federal
judiciary.”). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review
Delgado’s claim that the IJ and BIA incorrectly held
that his children would experience exceptional and un-
usual hardship if Delgado were to move to Mexico.
The door-closing provision found in § 1252(a)(2)(B)
is, however, subject to an exception found in
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), which states, “Nothing in subparagraph (B)
or (C) . . . shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law . . . .” Thus,
we have jurisdiction to hear any constitutional or legal
challenge Delgado brings against the BIA’s decision.
As noted above, Delgado has brought a due process
challenge against the IJ and BIA’s determinations. We
turn now to those arguments.
B. Due Process/Statutory Process Claims
1. Propriety of Due Process Challenge in Cancella-
tion of Removal Proceedings
Delgado claims that the Fifth Amendment provides
him with certain due process rights in relation to his
application for cancellation of removal. In support, he
No. 11-2648 11
relies on Reno v. Flores, a Supreme Court case clearly
stating “that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to
due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 507 U.S.
292, 306 (1993). While this point is undoubtedly true, an
alien eligible for discretionary relief does not have a
substantive entitlement, and therefore, there is no liberty
interest at stake in a proceeding where an alien seeks
discretionary relief. Kahn v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 513, 518
(7th Cir. 2008). Thus, aliens, do not have a right to due
process in hearings for discretionary relief, such as
those conducted in response to a § 1229b application
for cancellation of removal. See id.; see also Town of Castle
Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (“Our
cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitle-
ment if government officials may grant or deny it in
their discretion.”); Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d
815, 817 (7th Cir. 2011) (“To have a liberty or property
interest in some benefit, a person must have a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement, which means an entitlement
established by rule; hope for a favorable exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion does not qualify.”).
This is not the end of the matter. In situations
where petitioners have made “flabby constitutional
arguments” of the sort found here, we have construed
such claims as arguments “that the IJ’s hearing violated
[the] statutory and regulatory provisions” applicable to
the hearing in question. See, e.g., Apouviepseakoda v. Gonza-
les, 475 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2007). At first glance,
this may appear to put our jurisdiction in question con-
sidering our analysis above, which indicated that our
jurisdiction was based on the fact that Delgado has pre-
12 No. 11-2648
sented a constitutional question. But “[t]he procedural
sufficiency of an immigration hearing is a legal question,”
Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 2006),
and since 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) allows us to retain
jurisdiction over any “constitutional claims or questions
of law,” Delgado’s challenge to the sufficiency of his
cancellation proceedings is safely within our purview.
We review questions of law de novo. Id.
2. Sufficiency of Delgado’s Cancellation Proceed-
ings
An alien applying for cancellation of removal has
the same statutory process protections as an alien
involved in removal proceedings, which are laid out
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; cf. Portillo-Rendon, 662 F.3d at
817 (stating that procedural entitlements found in § 1229a
apply to alien that applied for cancellation of removal).
Under § 1229a(b)(4), an alien subject to a cancellation
proceeding “shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present
evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government.” See
also Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885. “In order to succeed
in challenging the legality of such a hearing, the alien
must show not only that her ‘reasonable opportunity’
was denied, but also that she was prejudiced.” Id. In
the end, the question we must answer is whether, con-
sidering the totality of the circumstances, the alien re-
ceived a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Id. at 886.
No. 11-2648 13
Delgado offers two arguments for why his cancella-
tion proceedings fell short of the standard set by § 1229a.
First, he argues that the IJ’s aggressive questioning and
interruptions, along with IJ’s clear hostility toward
Delgado, belied any claims to neutrality and demon-
strated a bias that prevented Delgado’s hearing from
being a fair one. Second, Delgado protests the IJ’s
decision to exclude certain probative evidence in direct
violation of § 1229a’s warning—that an alien should be
able to “present evidence on [his] own behalf.”
a. Bias
An IJ’s decision to question an alien in a removal or
cancellation proceeding is not dispositive evidence of
bias. Indeed, under § 1229a, an immigration judge is
permitted to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine
the alien and any witnesses.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
Moreover, an immigration judge has “broad discretion
to control the manner of interrogation in order to
ascertain the truth.” Iliev v. I.N.S., 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th
Cir. 1997). Limiting an IJ’s discretion is the applicant’s
right to a full and fair opportunity to be heard. See
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885.
As to the manner in which an IJ questions an applicant,
we have routinely held that we would prefer IJs to
exhibit appropriate decorum during removal or cancel-
lation proceedings, but impatience, inappropriateness,
and even hostility toward applicants do not generally
rise to such a level as to prevent an applicant from re-
ceiving a full and fair hearing. Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d
14 No. 11-2648
at 885-86; Firishchak v. Holder, 636 F.3d 305, 311 (7th Cir.
2011). The closest cases are those “in which the ques-
tioning becomes so aggressive that it frazzles applicants
and nit-picks inconsistencies until a petitioner [becomes]
so distraught that the immigration judge [is] forced
to pause the proceedings to give the [non-citizen] a
chance to collect herself.” Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 886
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Giday v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006)).
In Castilho de Oliviera v. Holder, we reasoned that an IJ’s
inappropriate and irrelevant questions, along with his
questionable tone, did not prevent a petitioner from
putting on his case, but did suggest that he may have
been impermissibly biased. 564 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir.
2009). The IJ in Castilho interrupted an expert witness
with inappropriate and confrontational questions, in-
quired into several witnesses’ religious beliefs (de-
spite the fact that the alien was not claiming religious
persecution), and asked whether the alien was infertile,
or, as the IJ put it, might “shoot blanks.” Id. We held
that the IJ’s inappropriate tone, frequent interruptions,
and apparent focus on irrelevant matters led to the im-
pression that the IJ “entered the hearing with his mind
already made up.” Id. at 899-900.
Conversely, the IJ in Apouviepseakoda was deemed not
to have prevented a full and fair hearing, despite
the fact that he used a mocking tone, “demonstrated
intemperance,” and may have “asked a majority of the
questions” at the applicant’s hearing. 475 F.3d at 886-87.
In Apouviepseakoda we emphasized the fact that an IJ’s
No. 11-2648 15
interruption of testimony is not inappropriate as long as
it is aimed at focusing the hearing, excluding irrelevant
material, and ensure clarity in an applicant’s answers.
Id. at 877. We further highlighted that the IJ deferred to
the applicant’s counsel to direct the topics of discussion
and gave applicant’s counsel multiple opportunities to
question the applicant. Id. at 887-88. Similarly, in Barradas
v. Holder we determined that an IJ’s interjections and
questioning of the applicant were not inappropriate,
given that the interjections were aimed at clarification,
the interjections did not concern irrelevant or inappro-
priate matters, and the questioning occurred after the
government had a chance to question the applicant.
582 F.3d 754, 767 (7th Cir. 2009).
Turning to the case at hand, the IJ’s interruptions
and questioning did not rise to the level of those
seen in Castilho. The IJ’s substantive interruptions of
Delgado’s testimony included a question about whether
Delgado had paid a bond ordered by the court, a question
attempting to clarify whether Delgado was referring to
his home in Chicago or his potential future home in
Mexico, and an attempt to determine the import of a
line of questioning involving the living conditions at
Delgado’s parents’ home. All of these questions are
clearly relevant, unlike the questions asked by the IJ in
Castilho. Further, any hostility, impatience, or rudeness
exhibited by the IJ was significantly less than the rudeness
exhibited in Apouviepseakoda, and yet we deemed the
hearing in Apouviepseakoda to be full and fair. In
Apouviepseakoda, for instance, we observed that the IJ
mocked the applicant regarding a cultural difference
16 No. 11-2648
between the United States and her home in Africa. 475 F.3d
at 886-87. The most that can be said about the IJ in this
case is that he might have appeared sarcastic when ques-
tioning why Delgado would choose to live in Morelos
instead of a safer part of Mexico, and that the IJ was
perturbed by Delgado’s lack of evidentiary support for
his belief that there are no jobs in Morelos. Any of the
inquiries on the part of the IJ cannot be labeled as having
prevented Delgado from having a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present his case, and do not support the con-
tention that the IJ harbored any bias toward Delgado.
b. Inability to Present Evidence
An immigration judge has the authority to narrow
the focus of a hearing and exclude irrelevant evidence,
but he may not “bar complete chunks of oral testimony
that would support the applicant’s claim.” Barradas, 582
F.3d at 766 (citing Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th
Cir. 2003)). When excluded testimony goes to the heart
of a petitioner’s claims, and may have had the potential
to change the outcome of the hearing, we must find
that the petitioner did not have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard. See Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422
F.3d 529, 540 (7th Cir. 2005).
In Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, the IJ prevented several key
witnesses—including petitioner’s grandmother, peti-
tioner’s mother, petitioner himself, and an expert—
from testifying about the persecution suffered by the
petitioner’s family and others similarly situated in peti-
tioner’s home country, on the grounds that past persecu-
No. 11-2648 17
tion is unimportant. 417 F.3d 1073, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Ninth Circuit held that this testimony could
have shown that petitioner had a well-founded fear of
future persecution, and thus altered the result of his
hearing, and thus found a violation of petitioner’s
rights. Id. at 1076-77. The IJ also indicated that she did
not believe the petitioner’s story, before his hearing
even began. Id. at 1075.
In Apouviepseakoda, conversely, the IJ’s denial of certain
witnesses’ proposed testimony was not found to be a
violation of the petitioner’s procedural rights. 475 F.3d
at 889. In that case, the IJ declined to hear the testi-
mony of the petitioner’s daughter—which would have
included information about the abuse that petitioner
suffered in her home country—and the testimony of an
expert on the politics of petitioner’s home country.
Id. at 888. The IJ instead accepted an offer of proof.
We reasoned that “[t]he typical context in which
we have found fault with an IJ’s decision to deny corro-
borating witness testimony has arisen where an IJ has
‘made up his mind about the case and was subsequently
unwilling to listen to any testimony,’ despite the diligent
insistence of the alien’s counsel that the testimony
speaks directly to the questions the IJ is supposed to
evaluate in making the decision.” Id. at 888-89 (quoting
Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2002)). Since
the petitioner’s counsel made no objection to the IJ’s
refusal to hear the two witnesses’ testimony and the
petitioner received plenty of time and opportunity to
argue her case generally, we held that she received a
reasonable opportunity to be heard, despite her less
than perfect hearing. Id. at 889.
18 No. 11-2648
Delgado challenges two decisions by the IJ to restrict
the evidence he was permitted to present. First, he chal-
lenges the IJ’s decision not to allow any new evidence to
be admitted at Delgado’s 2007 hearing. This error was
cured when Delgado received a full hearing in 2010, and
thus could not have prejudiced Delgado. Apouviepseakoda,
475 F.3d at 885. Delgado also challenges the IJ’s decision
to permit only one of Delgado’s daughters, Guadalupe,
to testify. As with the exclusions of testimony in
Apouviepseakoda, Delgado’s attorneys did not object to
the IJ’s decision to permit only one daughter to testify
in this case. Further, unlike the decisions made by the IJ
in Zolotukhin, the decision to exclude Daisy’s testimony
does not suggest that the IJ in this case already made
up his mind. The exclusion of Daisy’s testimony is
better explained by a desire to focus the testimony pro-
vided and cut out extraneous, cumulative, or unneces-
sary evidence. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that both Delgado and his daughter Guadalupe testi-
fied as to the likely effects that Delgado’s deportation
would have on Daisy, as well as the IJ’s stated desire
to avoid unnecessary stress and pressure on children
that must testify in proceedings of this nature.
Even if Daisy’s testimony was inappropriately ex-
cluded, Delgado has not shown that he was prejudiced
by this exclusion. He has not suggested any testimony
that she would have provided that was not already re-
vealed through the testimony of Delgado and Guadalupe.
The record reflects that Delgado appears to be a responsi-
ble individual with a strong sense of family and work
ethic who has lived a peaceful and productive life in
No. 11-2648 19
the United States for over 20 years. However, con-
sidering the totality of the circumstances surrounding
his cancellation hearing, it cannot be said that he failed
to receive a full and fair hearing in which he had the
reasonable opportunity to present his case.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we D ENY Delgado’s petition
for review.
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