10-2715-ag
Huang v. Holder
BIA
A077 317 960
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 26th day of March, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
Circuit Judges.1
______________________________________
QIAO XING HUANG, AKA, ENZO KAYOKO,
Petitioner,
v. 10-2715-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Peter S. Gordon, Gordon & Gordon,
P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y.
1
The Honorable Roger J. Miner, originally a member
of the panel, died on February 18, 2012. The two
remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement,
have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d
Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457
(2d Cir. 1998).
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant
Director; Katheryn L. DeAngelis,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Qiao Xing Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a June 14, 2010, order of
the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal
proceedings. In re Qiao Xing Huang, No. A077 317 960
(B.I.A. June 14, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts and procedural history of the
case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517
(2d Cir. 2006)(per curiam). Here, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion by denying Huang’s motion to reopen as untimely
and number-barred, as it was her second motion to reopen and
she filed it seven years after her final order of removal.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(C)(2006); 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(2)(2011).
2
Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be
excused when the movant demonstrates changed country
conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)(2006), the BIA
reasonably concluded that only Huang’s personal
circumstances had changed, as her claim was based on the
fact that she began practicing Falun Gong in the United
States in 2008. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270,
274 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d
143, 151-56 (2d Cir. 2008).
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Huang failed to establish that conditions
in China had changed materially for Falun Gong
practitioners. While the evidence indicated that repression
of Falun Gong practitioners increased around the 2008
Olympics, the evidence also demonstrated that the repression
has been constant and ongoing since the time of Huang’s
hearing in 2001, and Huang did not submit evidence
indicating that any increased repression of Falun Gong
practitioners continued after the 2008 Olympics and into
2009. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.
2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see
3
also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.
2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding
changed country conditions under the substantial evidence
standard).
Finally, given the BIA’s explicit references to the
documentation submitted with the motion to reopen, a
reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude
that the BIA ignored any of Huang’s evidence. See Xiao Ji
Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d
Cir. 2006)(holding that the BIA is not required to
“expressly parse or refute on the record each” individual
argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner as
long as it “has given reasoned consideration to the
petition, and made adequate findings”)(internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion by denying Huang’s motion. See Ali, 448 F.3d at
517.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4