UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4776
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BILLY E. LUNSFORD, a/k/a Peg-leg,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:10-cr-00182-1)
Submitted: March 2, 2012 Decided: March 26, 2012
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, William B. King, II,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Billy E. Lunsford appeals his conviction and seventy-
seven month sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006). On appeal, Lunsford argues first that
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the Second
Amendment and because he has an “inability to retreat” due to
medical conditions. Lunsford next argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable, asserting that the Guidelines
enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4),
is invalid because it does not contain a mens rea requirement.
We affirm.
In United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 316-17 (4th
Cir. 2012), we held that Ҥ 922(g)(1) [is] a constitutionally
valid statute.” While we left open the possibility of a
successful as-applied challenge, we noted that the Moore
defendant did not fall within the category of “law-abiding
responsible” citizens that the Second Amendment protects. Id.
(citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008)). Similarly, Lunsford has a record of felony convictions
for uttering, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and delivery of
hydrocodone. Like the defendant in Moore, and notwithstanding
his limited mobility and any difficulty he may have in defending
himself, Lunsford’s criminal history places him outside of the
category of non-violent, law-abiding citizens protected by the
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Second Amendment. See United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d
110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). Lunsford’s constitutional challenge
to § 922(g)(1) therefore fails.
Lunsford next challenges the procedural reasonableness
of his sentence, arguing that the enhancement applied by the
district court is invalid. This court reviews a sentence for
reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In
determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers,
inter alia, whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 49-51. Lunsford’s
sentencing challenge fails because it was expressly rejected in
United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“Taylor asks that we invalidate [USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)] on the
grounds that its lack of a mens rea requirement renders it
inconsistent with federal law. This we cannot do.”).
Lunsford’s sentence is therefore not procedurally unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Lunsford’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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