In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1168
A NTHONY M ATTHEWS and R OBERT G ILLESPIE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
C ITY OF E AST S T.L OUIS, V INCENT A NDERSON and
L ARRY G REENLEE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 09-CV-870—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 23, 2012—D ECIDED M ARCH 27, 2012
Before F LAUM and T INDER, Circuit Judges, and SHADID,
District Judge.
S HADID, District Judge. Anthony Matthews and Robert
Gillespie appeal the district court’s grant of a motion
The Honorable James E. Shadid, United States District
Court, Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 11-1168
for summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
this case. For the following reasons, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the de-
fendants.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken according to Matthews
and Gillespie. On February 21, 2009, Appellants
Matthews and Gillespie were involved in a phys-
ical altercation with employees of the Club Casino
(“Club”), a nightclub located in East St. Louis, Illinois.
The altercation began when Matthews and Gillespie, an
R&B singer and his promoter, along with a group at-
tempted to enter the club without paying a cover-
charge because they were invited to the club for promo-
tional purposes. When the group arrived, initially they
were informed they were free to enter the club. However,
when entering the lobby, they were confronted by a
large security guard who was screaming at them and
demanding payment. The group decided to pay, and
when Matthews attempted to pay for himself and a
dancer in the group, the club owner, Cedric Taylor,
grabbed his arm and the large security guard who was
screaming at them struck Matthews in the face. A melee
ensued and numerous security staff struck and kicked
Matthews and Gillespie. Both men sustained numerous
visible injuries. After the beating, the employees took
the two outside, handcuffed them and called the police.
The first officer on the scene was Lieutenant Vincent
Anderson, recognized as a superior officer by his white
shirt. Anderson was the acting shift commander that
No. 11-1168 3
night. Anderson repeatedly yelled to Matthews and
Gillespie that he ran this town, in response to the two men
explaining that they were jumped by security staff. After
which they stopped trying to explain themselves and
resigned to be arrested. Another officer, Larry Greenlee,
arrived on the scene to a disturbance call, but did not
know the specific nature of the disturbance. Greenlee
attempted to speak with security staff, but was directed to
speak with Taylor. When interviewed by Greenlee, Taylor
stated that Matthews struck him in the face. Greenlee
stated that he heard one of the two arrestees admit
to hitting Taylor, so he filled out complaints against
both individuals and Taylor signed them. Matthews and
Gillespie were taken to Greenlee’s squad car and placed
in the rear seat, though they were never told they were
under arrest. Both were charged with assault and battery.
At some point during the investigation, Greenlee was
informed that there were video cameras that surveilled
the lobby and presumably would show what happened.
Greenlee chose not to check the video system. Taylor
stated that the video system was maintained by an
outside company and was constantly rolling, recording
over itself every thirty to sixty days, which meant
the altercation was taped-over prior to this action com-
mencing. Taylor stated that he never requested the
video because he felt it was unnecessary.
In October 2009, Matthews and Gillespie filed a five-
count complaint in the district court alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of East St. Louis, and
officers Vincent Anderson, Lester Anderson, and Greenlee
4 No. 11-1168
and La Bon Vie Corporation, d/b/a Club Casino and its
president and owner, Cedric Taylor. In June 2010, they
amended the complaint and the district court granted
their motion to voluntarily dismiss Lester Anderson
without prejudice. They then filed an amended com-
plaint containing five counts. Count 1 alleges Taylor,
acting in concert with Club employees as part of a con-
spiracy with the City through Anderson and Greenlee
used excessive force against them. Count 2 alleges the
same individuals unlawfully seized, detained and prose-
cuted them. Count 3 alleges the City failed to instruct,
supervise, control and discipline its officers. Count 4
was a state law claim alleging negligence against Taylor
and the Club in hiring, retaining and supervising em-
ployees and as alternative to Counts 1-4, Count 5 alleged
assault and battery against Taylor and the Club.
The district court granted summary judgment on
Counts 2 and 3 in favor of all defendants and dismissed
the state law claims without prejudice. Matthews and
Gillespie conceded in their response to defendants’
motion that summary judgment should be granted as to
Count 1. As to the remaining counts, the district court
held that at the time of the altercation, Taylor and the
Club were not functioning as state actors for purposes
of § 1983. The district court found that Taylor and the
Club did not have a pre-existing arrangement to use off-
duty police officers as security and the witnesses who
stated that the security staff was comprised of off-duty
officers based their beliefs on speculation. Also, even if
they were off-duty officers, they were not performing a
police function. Lastly the district court found that the
No. 11-1168 5
two failed to show a conspiracy between the City and
Taylor and the Club. The district court also granted
summary judgment as to the City, Anderson and
Greenlee holding that there was probable cause to
arrest Matthews and Gillespie and therefore there was
no unlawful seizure/arrest against Greenlee. Addi-
tionally, the district court held that Anderson had no
personal involvement or an affirmative link to the
arrest and therefore he was not liable. The district court
noted that probable cause defeats a claim of malicious
prosecution and Matthews and Gillespie failed to show
an express policy, widespread practice, or that their
arrests were caused by someone with final policymaking
authority as is required to sustain a claim of municipal
liability.
II. DISCUSSION
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo,
construing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Matthews and
Gillespie. Castronovo v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 571 F.3d
667, 671 (7th Cir. 2009).
Matthews and Gillespie argue that officer Greenlee
lacked probable cause to arrest them both. In support of
this, they offer four arguments: (1) Greenlee failed to
exercise any discretion in assessing the credibility of the
witnesses; (2) Greenlee knew of the existence of a video-
tape which would exonerate the two arrestees and chose
to ignore it; (3) the totality of the circumstances should
have demonstrated to a reasonable officer that there
6 No. 11-1168
was no probable cause to arrest Matthews and Gillespie;
and (4) Greenlee lacked individualized probable cause
for the arrest of the men.
Probable cause is a determination made from assessing
whether, based on the facts and circumstances at the
time of the arrest, a reasonable officer would conclude
that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.
Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).
The sufficiency of the evidence for a determination of
probable cause need not be enough to support a convic-
tion or even enough to show that the officer’s belief is
more likely true than false. Id. As such, “as long as a
reasonably credible witness or victim informs the
police that someone has committed a crime, or is com-
mitting, a crime, the officers have probable cause”. Spiegel
v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998)). Addi-
tionally, “this court has emphasized that once probable
cause has been established, officials have ‘no constitu-
tional obligation to conduct further investigation in the
hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ”
Id. (quoting Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir.
1995)).
Matthews’ and Gillespie’s four arguments will be
addressed in turn, but the facts pertaining to each are
largely duplicative. They first argue that Greenlee failed
to exercise any discretion in arresting the two of them.
In support, they state that the evidence as Greenlee saw
it upon arriving showed two handcuffed men who
were badly beaten and protesting their innocence. Ac-
cording to them, this showed that any reasonable
No. 11-1168 7
officer would have concluded that they were the victims
rather than the aggressors. They further argue that
Greenlee testified that he “takes things at face value”
and believes victims are telling the truth whenever they
talk to him, apparently without thought. This ignores
the fact that when Greenlee arrived on scene, he spoke
with the Club owner Cedric Taylor, who gave him a
seemingly reliable account of what happened. Taylor
stated that the two men tried to enter the Club without
paying and when they were asked to leave, one struck
him in the face. Greenlee did attempt to speak with
M atthew s and Gillespie, but apparently they
were difficult to understand, and Taylor then signed the
complaints against the two men. There is nothing to
indicate that Taylor’s statement was incredible. The
fact that he had no visible injury and the two in hand-
cuffs did means little to Taylor’s credibility. The identity
of the winner of a fight is not always indicative of who
was the initial aggressor. Greenlee’s investigation may
have been brief, but his reliance on Taylor’s statements
was reasonable.
Matthews and Gillespie next argue that Greenlee
refused to view the videotape that conclusively would
show what happened. A videotape is certainly a valuable
piece of evidence and in many cases can be conclusive.
However, as stated above, once an officer has probable
cause, he need not seek out exculpatory evidence. Here,
probable cause was established by Taylor, therefore
he need not continue to investigate. It is correct to say
that all reasonable avenues of investigation must be
pursued, but given the atmosphere with which Greenlee
8 No. 11-1168
was confronted, it was not unreasonable for him to
elect not to view the tape. To hold otherwise would
put an undue burden on police to ascertain whether
a videotape existed prior to making an arrest for an
offense committed outside of their presence. There was
evidence to support probable cause and Greenlee did
not need to conduct any further investigation.
Matthews’ and Gillespie’s third argument is that the
totality of the circumstances suggest that a reasonable
officer would find there was no probable cause. As pre-
viously discussed, this is not the case. Matthews and
Gillespie again rely largely on the argument that
because they had visible injuries, a reasonable officer
would assume they were not the aggressors. According
to Matthews and Gillespie, a basic assessment of the
situation would indicate to Greenlee, and presumably
any reasonable officer, that Taylor’s story was obviously
false. A basic assessment of the situation would show
that Matthews and Gillespie were visibly injured
and handcuffed. Nothing about this suggests that
Greenlee was acting unreasonably when he concluded,
after speaking with the owner of the business, that these
two were the initial aggressors. Especially when con-
sidering that the owner of the business outside of
which they were sitting told Greenlee that the two tried
to enter without paying, then refused to leave, and then
started a fight. The district court correctly noted that
the events as described by Taylor indicated that the
two men were involved in a physical altercation with
security staff of the Club and their injuries support
that story; they do not negate its truthfulness. Greenlee’s
No. 11-1168 9
statements to the two men that they should file a report
and that this type of stuff happens all the time do little
to negate the fact that probable cause was established
when Taylor gave Greenlee a credible account of the
altercation.
Finally, Matthews and Gillespie argue that Greenlee
lacked individualized probable cause to arrest the two
men for battery, because Taylor stated only one man
struck him. Matthews and Gillespie argue that a charge
of disorderly conduct cannot be sustained because
there was not a breach of the peace nor did anyone
report to be alarmed and disturbed even though the
two men had to be physically removed from the Club
by security. At a minimum, everyone involved in
the altercation was alarmed and disturbed. And undoubt-
edly, the peace was breached during a fight in the
lobby of a nightclub after which two men had to be
handcuffed and the police were called. Regardless, it
was reasonable for Greenlee to believe that disorderly
conduct occurred, even if later the evidence could not
sustain a conviction. We need not address the issue
of qualified immunity for Greenlee because there was
probable cause to arrest both Matthews and Gillespie.
Contrary to their assertion, Greenlee was not merely
a pawn, he was an officer who reasonably relied on a
credible statement from a witness that was supported
by the totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, there
was sufficient probable cause to arrest each Matthews
and Gillespie.
Matthews and Gillespie next argue that the district
court erred when it granted summary judgment against
10 No. 11-1168
Lieutenant Anderson because he encouraged the false
arrest, condoned it, or turned a blind eye to it. In order
for a supervisor to be liable, they must be “personally
responsible for the deprivation of the constitutional
right.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651
(7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 555, 561
(7th Cir. 1995)). To show personal involvement, the super-
visor must “know about the conduct and facilitate
it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see”. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d
985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988).
Anderson’s involvement was nothing more than re-
porting to the location and telling Greenlee to do his job.
Additionally, Greenlee had probable cause to arrest
Matthews and Gillespie, which means there was no
constitutional violation for Anderson to condone. As
the district court noted, Anderson had minimal involve-
ment, amounting to his awareness that Taylor signed
the complaints against Matthews and Gillespie. Aside
from that, he had little, if any, personal involvement.
We need not address whether he had qualified im-
munity because there was probable cause for Greenlee
to arrest Matthews and Gillespie.
Matthews and Gillespie next argue that the City is
liable for the actions of its officers. A municipality
cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation in
the absence of a custom, policy or practice that effec-
tively caused or condoned the alleged constitutional
violations. See, e.g., Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d
464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010); Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social
No. 11-1168 11
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Further, an inadequacy in
police training can serve as a basis for liability under
Section 1983, but only where the failure to train amounts
to deliberate indifference to the citizens the officers en-
counter. Hollins v. City of Milwaukee, 574 F.3d 822, 827
(7th Cir. 2009); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388 (1989).
Matthews and Gillespie argue that even if the officers
are not liable for false arrest, the City may still be, citing
Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293 (7th
Cir. 2009). Thomas is quite instructive in this instance.
There, Cook County argued it could not be liable if all
its employees were acquitted, relying on Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986), for that proposition. Id. at
304. The Court disagreed, noting that Los Angeles was
a case in which the municipality could not be found
liable when its officers committed no constitutional
violation in arresting the plaintiff. Id. We specifically
noted that the situation would differ if the officers
were acquitted based on a defense of good faith,
because there is still an argument that the city’s policies
caused the harm, though the officer was acting in
good faith. Here, there was no constitutional violation,
therefore no municipal liability.
Finally, a finding of probable cause defeats Matthews’
and Gillespie’s claim of malicious prosecution, regard-
less of whether it was properly developed below.
12 No. 11-1168
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is A FFIRMED
as to all defendants.
3-27-12