UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCELLUS RAYNARD BROOKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00468-PMD-1)
Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: March 28, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, P.A., Darlington, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Robert F. Daley, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcellus Raynard Brooks pleaded guilty to being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006) and was sentenced to 210 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Brooks raises two sentencing issues:
(1) whether the district court erred by sentencing him as an
armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006); and
(2) whether the district court erred by finding that he failed
to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3E1.1 (2010). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we
review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 49 (2007). Brooks first claims that he should not have been
sentenced as an armed career criminal offender, arguing that his
three state drug offenses should have been considered one
offense. A defendant is an armed career criminal and subject to
a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence if he violates
§ 922(g) and has at least three prior convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions
different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see USSG
§ 4B1.4(a). We review a district court’s application of a
statutory sentencing enhancement de novo. United States v.
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Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 334 (4th Cir. 1995). This claim is
without merit as Brooks’ three drug offenses took place on
different dates and were not otherwise related. Id. at 334-35.
Next, Brooks argues that he should have received a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under
USSG § 3E1.1, because he pled guilty. We conclude that the
district court did not clearly err by denying Brooks this
reduction. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir.
2007) (providing standard of review). The burden was on Brooks
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
entitled to the adjustment, United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879
F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1989), and we have previously
upheld denial of the reduction where the defendant continued to
deal drugs after his guilty plea. United States v. Underwood,
970 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1992).
Finally, we note that Brooks’ sentence was at the
bottom of his properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range, and thus is entitled to an appellate presumption of
reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Brooks. Id. at 49; United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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