10-2244-ag
Reddi v. Holder
BIA
Morace, IJ
A097 533 856
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 29th day of March, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________
MARDAI REDDI,
Petitioner,
10-2244-ag
v. NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Indra Pal, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Michelle G. Latour,
Assistant Director; Nairi S.
Gruzenski, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner, Mardai Reddi, a native and citizen of
Guyana, seeks review of a May 18, 2010, decision of the BIA
affirming the April 14, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) Philip Morace denying her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Reddi, No. A097 533 856
(B.I.A. May 18, 2010), aff’g No. A097 533 856 (Immig. Ct.
N.Y. City April 14, 2008). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of the case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We
affirm the agency’s factual findings if they are supported
by substantial evidence. See Ascencio-Rodriguez v. Holder,
595 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2010).
Reddi does not challenge the agency’s finding that her
asylum claim was untimely or its denial of her CAT claim,
and so she has forfeited review of those claims. See
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Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7
(2d Cir. 2005). The remaining claim, for withholding of
removal, was rejected by the BIA for failure to provide
corroborating evidence. Reddi entirely ignores the
corroboration issue and focuses instead on issues the BIA
did not address. Indeed, it is not clear that the brief
submitted on Reddi’s behalf was written with her case in
mind; at one point, the brief refers to the ability of
petitioner, who is from Guyana, to “relocate within
Bangladesh.” In any event, even if we treat the brief as
challenging the BIA’s holding, that challenge fails.
Although an applicant’s credible testimony alone may be
enough to carry her burden of proof, see 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a), an IJ may nonetheless require that her testimony
be corroborated if one would reasonably expect corroborating
evidence to be available, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant
should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible
testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably
obtain the evidence.” Id.; see id. § 1231(b)(3)(C)
(incorporating this standard, by reference, in the rules
governing withholding of removal); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575
F.3d 193, 196-98 (2d Cir. 2009).
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The agency reasonably found that Reddi’s testimony
required corroborating evidence because it was lacking in
specific detail. Although Reddi testified that she was an
active member of the People’s Progressive Party (“PPP”) in
Guyana and was targeted by the opposing People’s National
Congress (“PNC”), she could not articulate the goals,
platform, or policies of either party. Moreover, her
testimony was inconsistent with her airport interview and
her written application, as she testified that the
persecution she suffered took place in 2001, while she
stated in her airport interview and application for relief
that all of those events took place in 2000. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(C). Given these problems
with the testimony, the agency reasonably concluded that
corroborating evidence was required.
Moreover, the record provides substantial evidence
supporting the agency’s determination that the corroborating
evidence was reasonably available. The agency identified
letters, statements, membership cards, or other
documentation of her membership or work in the PPP, medical
records or other documentation of her injuries, or letters
or statements from her mother, sons, or siblings, or other
supporting documentation of the alleged break-in of her
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home, her hiding from the PNC, or the shooting of her
neighbor’s, as reasonably available corroborating evidence.
As Reddi testified that she was an active member of the PPP,
she received medical treatment after she was thrown from a
car in April 2001 and informed her mother of the incident,
her mother was with her at the time of the shooting, her
sons (including one son now in the United States) were with
her at the time of the break-in, she informed her mother and
her siblings about all of these incidents, and at least one
sibling lived in New York, she could have presented evidence
to corroborate her claim. See Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196-
99. The agency reasonably declined to accept Reddi’s
explanations for the lack of evidence, as she testified that
she never asked anyone in the PPP or any member of her
family to write a statement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)
(providing that “[n]o court shall reverse a determination
made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of
corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . .
that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude
that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
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is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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