FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 30, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARTIN VASQUEZ ARROYO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 11-3322
TAMMY GROSS, (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03035-SAC)
(D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellee.
_____________________________
MARTIN VASQUEZ ARROYO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 11-3326
v. (D.C. No. 5:07-CV-03298-SAC)
(D. Kansas)
CURTIS STARKS, Police Officer,
Defendant - Appellee
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Martin Vasquez Arroyo, acting pro se, appeals the dismissal of two suits
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm because both
actions are time-barred.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Vasquez Arroyo, a prisoner at the Larned Correctional Mental Health
Facility in Larned, Kansas, filed his first complaint on December 6, 2007, against
Kinsley Police Officer Curtis Starks and Kinsley City Attorney Mark Frame. His
second complaint was filed on January 28, 2008, and named as defendants
Kinsley Police Officer Tammy Gross and Mr. Frame. Both concerned events in
1998. The claims against Mr. Frame were dismissed in 2008 and are not at issue
on appeal.
After we reversed an earlier dismissal of the claims against Officers Starks
and Gross, see Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2009), the
officers moved for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on several
grounds, including timeliness of the complaints. In response, Mr. Vasquez
Arroyo, who was represented by counsel at the time, stated that his only claims
were for false arrest on two occasions in July 1998. See Arroyo v. Gross, No.
08–3035–SAC, 2011 WL 5024262, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2011); Arroyo v.
Starks, No. 07–3298–SAC, 2011 WL 5024214, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2011).
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The district court dismissed both complaints as barred by the statute of limitations
and qualified immunity. See Arroyo v. Gross, 2011 WL 5024262, at *2; Arroyo v.
Starks, 2011 WL 5024214, at *2. We need address only the limitations issue.
Mr. Vasquez Arroyo does not challenge the district court’s ruling that the
applicable limitations period is the Kansas two-year period for personal-injury
claims. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4), (b) (West 2012). Liberally
construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se complaints are
held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”),
Mr. Vasquez Arroyo’s obscure pleadings on appeal argue only that the limitations
period should be tolled because (1) he had not learned until May 2005 that his
signature had been forged on diversion agreements with respect to the charges
against him arising from the two arrests; (2) since May 2005 he has been
unlawfully incarcerated and has not been able to pursue his case because the
defendants have prevented him from conducting his own investigation; and (3) he
has been incapacitated since his arrest in 1998.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, see
Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011), and its
grant of the motion for summary judgment, see Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d
1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Mr. Vasquez-Arroyo’s arguments can be resolved without difficulty. First,
the alleged forging of his signature on the diversion agreements is irrelevant to
his false-arrest claims, so concealment of that act would not delay the accrual of
the cause of action. Second, any impediment that arose in 2005 to his bringing
suit would not save his claim because the limitations period had long since
expired in 2000, two years after the 1998 arrest. And third, even though a Kansas
statute tolls the limitations period while the plaintiff is “incapacitated,” Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-515(a) (West 2012), Mr. Vasquez Arroyo has produced no evidence to
support his claim of incapacitation. See Gideon v. Gates, 611 P.2d 166, 167–68
(Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (“[T]he burden of proving facts sufficient to toll the statute
is upon the plaintiff.”). We conclude that the district court was correct in ruling
that both suits were time-barred.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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