UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAYNARD D. WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:11-cr-00037-DCN-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Raynard D. Williams pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006), and was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. Williams
noted a timely appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that she has found no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Williams’ guilty plea and whether the sentence imposed was
reasonable. Although informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, Williams has not done so. We affirm.
We have reviewed the transcript of Williams’ guilty
plea hearing and find that the district court fully complied
with the mandates of Rule 11. The court ensured that Williams
understood the charges against him, the potential sentence he
faced, and the rights he was giving up by pleading
guilty. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th
Cir. 1991). Moreover, Williams entered his plea knowingly and
voluntarily, and the plea was supported by a sufficient factual
basis. Id. at 119–20.
We review Williams’ sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires
2
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. We assess whether the
district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
49–50; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir.
2010). If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we apply a
presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 346–56 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for
within-Guidelines sentence).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Moreover, Williams has failed to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness we accord his within-Guidelines
sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
3
We therefore affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Williams, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Williams requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Williams.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4