UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4636
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LATORY MARFRIA RHINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. James C. Fox,
Senior District Judge. (2:10-cr-00046-F-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Ronald Cohen, RONALD COHEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Latory Marfria Rhines pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to distribution of cocaine base and
being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to
ninety-eight months in prison. On appeal, Rhines challenges the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and avers that his sentence was
improperly inflated based upon uncharged crimes. The Government
contends that Rhines waived his sentencing claims pursuant to a
waiver of appellate rights in his plea agreement. We dismiss in
part and affirm in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if the
waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if the district
court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his
right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed in accordance
with Rule 11, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United
States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). The
question of whether a defendant validly waived his right to
appeal is a question of law that we review de novo. United
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Rhines
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his
sentence in accordance with the written waiver. The district
court described the waiver to Rhines at the Rule 11 hearing, and
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Rhines stated that he understood. Although Rhines contends on
appeal that his illiteracy and the “legalese” of the plea
agreement prevented him from knowingly waiving his rights,
counsel stated at sentencing that he read and explained the plea
agreement to Rhines. Further, at his Rule 11 hearing, Rhines
stated under oath that he understood the consequences of his
plea and had fully discussed his charges with his attorney. In
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
Rhines is bound by his answers to the court at the time he
entered his plea. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74
(1977). Because Rhines has not shown clear and convincing
evidence to support his assertion that his waiver was unknowing,
the waiver is valid. As the sentencing claims on appeal fall
squarely within the scope of the waiver, we dismiss these
claims.
With respect to Rhines’ conviction, he contends that
the district court erred by conducting part of the Rule 11
hearing by addressing a group of unrelated defendants together.
The fact that Rhines pled guilty along with several others in a
“group” plea does not result in a per se violation of Rule 11.
See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1223 (1st
Cir. 1995). Moreover, following the group questioning, the
court addressed Rhines personally, ensuring that he understood
the charges against him and the consequences of his plea and
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that he wanted to plead guilty. As such, Rhines’ claim of Rule
11 error is without merit.*
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss Rhines’ sentencing
challenges and affirm his convictions. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
*
Moreover, because Rhines did not move in the district
court to withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11
hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error,
Rhines must, among other things, show a reasonable probability
that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009).
Rhines does not allege that, had the Rule 11 hearing been
conducted differently, he would not have pled guilty.
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