UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4528
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAVONTA JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:10-cr-00140-RJC-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Elizabeth A. Blackwood,
Research and Writhing Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina; Melissa Louise Rikard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lavonta Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and,
because Jones qualified as an armed career offender under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (2006), the district court sentenced him to
the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’
imprisonment. Jones’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the
reasonableness of Jones’ sentence. Jones was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so.
We affirm.
Because Jones did not object to the Guidelines
calculations in his presentence report, argue for a sentence
different from the one imposed, or challenge the adequacy of the
district court’s explanation of its sentencing decision, we
review it for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
577-78 (4th Cir. 2010). Our review of the record reveals no
procedural error in the district court’s determination of Jones’
sentence. The district court properly noted the applicable
statutory minimum and adopted the proper Guidelines range
calculations for Jones’ conviction. The district court also
properly considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and explained Jones’ sentence in light of this consideration.
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We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, taking into account the “totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). Where, as here, the government has not moved for a
departure from the Guidelines range due to the defendant’s
substantial assistance, the district court lacks discretion to
impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the
imposition of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence is per se
reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th
Cir. 2008). In Jones’ case, his 180-month sentence was the
minimum sentence required by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Accordingly, we find that the sentence was substantively
reasonable, and conclude that the district court committed no
error in its imposition.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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