UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2416
FAYE D. LARRABEE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, NA; FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:09-cv-00712-HEH)
Submitted: February 10, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN, P.C.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Bryan A. Fratkin, Seth A.
Schaeffer, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Faye D. Larrabee appeals the district court’s orders
granting in part Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss and granting Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for
summary judgment in her civil action seeking rescission of two
secured consumer credit transactions (one in 2006 and the other
in 2007) under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1601-1667f (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). Larrabee argues on
appeal that the district court erred in granting Defendants’
motion to dismiss because she adequately pled TILA violations
with respect to the 2006 credit transaction and based on the use
by a lender in connection with the 2007 credit transaction of a
form notice to disclose her right to cancel that transaction.
Larrabee also argues that the court erred in granting summary
judgment to Defendants because an application fee disclosure
made in connection with the 2007 credit transaction rendered
unclear the notice disclosing her right to cancel. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Giarratano v. Johnson,
521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). In this regard, we accept as
true all factual allegations contained in the complaint.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). While a plaintiff’s
statement of her claim “need only give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” id.
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at 93 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), a
complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if it “states a
plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based on “its
judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court properly dismissed Larrabee’s
claim challenging the 2006 credit transaction. Larrabee failed
to state a plausible claim for relief under the TILA because her
proposed reading of the notice disclosing the number and due
dates of payments due under that transaction is not objectively
reasonable. Further, because the disclosure to Larrabee of her
right to cancel the 2007 credit transaction contained all of the
information required by the TILA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a)-(b), and
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)-(b), (d), the disclosure
complied with the TILA. Watkins v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc.,
663 F.3d 232, 238-40 (4th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Larrabee did
not state a plausible claim for TILA relief based on the
lender’s use of the form notice.
Turning to Larrabee’s remaining claim, we review de
novo the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment and
construe the facts in the light most favorable to Larrabee, the
non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
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639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may be
granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must produce competent evidence to reveal the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
After review of the record, we conclude that the
district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants
on Larrabee’s remaining claim. Larrabee did not suggest that
she was confused as to whether she could cancel the 2007 credit
transaction without cost, and she did not put forth any evidence
explaining how or suggesting that an average borrower faced with
both the notice of right to cancel and the fee notice would be
confused as to whether she could cancel the 2007 credit
transaction without cost.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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