PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-2267
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAKIRA WILLIAMS,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-03-cr-00776-002)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 15, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and GREENBERG,
Circuit Judges
(Filed April 3, 2012)
Robert Epstein, Esq.
Office of General Counsel
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
Frank R. Costello, Jr., Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
_____________
OPINION
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Shakira Williams brings this appeal from the District
Court‘s May 6, 2011 Order revoking her supervised release
and imposing a 24-month prison sentence. Williams contends
that this sentence exceeds the maximum term of
imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Finding no
error in the District Court‘s sentencing decision, we will
affirm the Judgment of the District Court.
I.
On January 28, 2004, Williams pled guilty to four
counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)
and 2, and one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. On May 3, 2005, Williams was sentenced to 48
2
months‘ imprisonment, followed by a period of three years of
supervised release. Williams completed her original prison
sentence and began supervised release on May 16, 2007.
Since then, she has been charged with numerous violations of
the conditions of her supervised release, including, inter alia:
failure to report for drug testing; failure to report to her
probation officer; positive drug tests; leaving a residence
where she was under house arrest; removing an electronic
monitoring bracelet; expulsion from a halfway house for
failing to follow the rules; lying to her probation officer about
her employment status; and failing to appear for a court
proceeding.
Williams‘ violations led to several modifications and
revocations of her supervised release. On December 7, 2007,
the District Court modified the conditions of her supervised
release to include four months in a halfway house. On
September 24, 2008, following a hearing, the District Court
revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to five
months‘ imprisonment and 31 months of supervised release.
Williams resumed supervised release on December 16, 2008,
but a month later she was charged with further violations. On
February 23, 2009, following a hearing, the District Court
again modified the conditions of her supervised release to
include four months of home detention with electronic
monitoring.
Williams‘ probation officer subsequently charged her
with multiple violations of her supervised release. On July
29, 2009, following a hearing on these violations, the District
Court revoked Williams‘ supervised release and sentenced
her to 19 months‘ imprisonment and twelve months of
supervised release, with six of the twelve month supervised
3
release term to be served in a halfway house, and the
remaining six to be served under home detention.
On appeal of that sentence, Williams argued that her
combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home
detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). She argued that any
term of home detention counts as imprisonment under this
provision, because § 3583(e)(4) states that a term of home
detention ―may be imposed only as an alternative to
incarceration.‖ Since Williams conceded that this issue was
not preserved, this Court applied the plain error standard of
review. United States v. Williams, 387 Fed. Appx. 282, 284
(3d Cir. 2010). Due to a circuit split on the meaning of the
statute—an issue of first impression in this Court—we found
that the alleged error was not plain, and we therefore declined
to review the issue. Id. at 286.
On November 15, 2010, Williams was released from
prison and began confinement in a halfway house. Several
weeks later, she was charged with several new violations of
her supervised release conditions. Williams argued that, in
light of the cumulative revocation imprisonment already
served—27 months and five days, including three months and
five days of home detention1—the maximum prison term the
Court could impose was eight months and 26 days. In
response to Williams‘ arguments concerning the effect of
prior sentences imposed for supervised release violations on
the amount of prison time that could be imposed for her latest
1
Williams did not complete the full six month home
detention period, thus explaining why she claimed credit for
only three months and five days.
4
violations, the District Court concluded that the maximum
prison term it could impose was not reduced by the aggregate
length of previously-served revocation imprisonment. In an
Order issued on May 6, 2011, the District Court revoked
Williams‘ supervised release and imposed what it viewed as
the statutory maximum sentence: 24 months‘ imprisonment,
with no term of supervised release to follow. Williams
appeals this sentence as unlawful, and asks this Court to
vacate and remand for resentencing.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise plenary
review over matters of statutory interpretation. United States
v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).
When interpreting the disputed provisions of a statute,
we look first to the language of the statute to determine the
law‘s plain meaning. United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253,
257 (3d Cir. 2000). ―If the language of the statute expresses
Congress‘s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends
there and the statute is enforced according to its terms.‖ Id.
(citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
241 (1989)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (―If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . .‖).
―Where the statutory language does not express Congress‘
intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the
legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute
was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional
purpose.‖ Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257.
III.
5
Williams first contends that her 24-month sentence
exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under
18 U.S.C. § 3853, and that the Court misconstrued the statute
by finding otherwise. At the crux of this appeal is the
meaning of § 3583(e)(3), which governs the modification and
revocation of supervised release following imprisonment. It
provides that a court may:
[R]evoke a term of supervised release, and
require the defendant to serve in prison all or
part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in such term of supervised release
without credit for time previously served on
postrelease supervision, if the court . . . finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised
release, except that a defendant whose term is
revoked under this paragraph may not be
required to serve on any such revocation . . .
more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a
class C or D felony . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added). The maximum
statutorily-authorized term of supervised release that a court
can impose on a defendant for ―the offense that resulted in
such term of supervised release‖ is specified in § 3583(b):
(b) Authorized terms of supervised release. –
Except as otherwise provided, the authorized
terms of supervised release are –
...
6
(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more
than three years . . . .
Therefore, under subsection (e)(3), the maximum term
of imprisonment that the District Court could impose in this
case for a violation of supervised release conditions was the
lesser of ―the term of supervised release authorized by statute
for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised
release,‖ i.e., three years, or the cap for the particular class of
felony offense set by the concluding clause, i.e., two years.
Accordingly, the District Court determined that 24 months
was the maximum prison term that it could impose on
Williams for each supervised release revocation.
Williams contends that in cases like hers, where more
than one term of post-revocation imprisonment has been
imposed, ―subsection (b) functions in tandem with a second
provision, subsection (h).‖ (Appellant Br. at 17-18.) Section
3583(h) concerns the term of supervised release that may be
imposed following a term of post-revocation imprisonment,
and provides:
When a term of supervised release is revoked
and the defendant is required to serve a term of
imprisonment, the court may include a
requirement that the defendant be placed on a
term of supervised release after imprisonment.
The length of such a term of supervised release
shall not exceed the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in the original term of supervised
release, less any term of imprisonment that was
imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
7
Thus, subsection (h) provides that the term of supervised
release following a term of revocation imprisonment—also
known as the supervised release ―tail‖—cannot exceed the
term of supervised release that could be imposed for the
original offense (in this case, three years), less the aggregate
length of imprisonment imposed for all prior revocations of
supervised release. In other words, the authorized term of a
supervised release tail progressively diminishes by the length
of successive terms of post-revocation imprisonment.
Williams asserts that the aggregate limit on the
supervised release tail under subsection (h) interacts with
subsection (e)(3) to impose a similar limit on post-revocation
imprisonment. She reasons that under subsection (e)(3), the
statutorily ―authorized term of supervised release is also the
authorized length of post-revocation imprisonment.‖
(Appellant Br. at 19.) She further contends that ―[s]ubsection
(h) is clearly a ‗statute,‘ and thus it—not only subsection (b), as
held by the district court—must inform the meaning of ‗term of
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense.‘‖ (Id.
at 20.) She concludes that, since the authorized term of
supervised release is reduced by the amount of prison time a
defendant served for previous release violations, the maximum
term of post-revocation imprisonment under subsection (e)(3)
is likewise progressively reduced.
We reject Williams‘ interpretation of § 3583 because,
as the District Court aptly observed, it rests on a ―selective
use of statutory language, not the statute itself.‖ (A. 8.)
Subsection (e)(3) refers to the ―term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term
of supervised release.‖ (Emphasis added). This language
unambiguously sets the maximum prison sentence by
8
reference to the length of supervised release statutorily
authorized for the conviction offense, not for the length of
supervised release authorized after a revocation
imprisonment. It is only by ignoring the words emphasized
above—―for the offense that resulted in such term of
supervised release‖—that Williams can maintain that
subsection (h) sets the terms of supervised release for the
purposes of subsection (e)(3).
Indeed, subsections (b) and (h) establish a ―term of
supervised release‖ for different purposes: subsection (b)
defines the term of supervised release for the original offense,
and subsection (h) defines the term of a supervised release
tail. Subsection (e)(3) clearly fixes the term of post-
revocation imprisonment according to the former, and gives
no indication that the aggregate limit of supervised release
time under subsection (h) applies as well to the term of
imprisonment that may be imposed when supervised release
is revoked. We therefore reject Williams‘ construction as
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and agree with
the District Court that subsection (e)(3) is not subject to the
aggregate limit of subsection (h).
We find support for our holding in United States v.
Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011). In Hampton, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the phrase ―term of
supervised release authorized by statute‖ in subsection (e)(3)
itself imposes an aggregate limit on post-revocation
imprisonment. Id. at 338-39. Although the Hampton Court
did not directly consider whether subsection (h) imposes an
aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment by defining
the ―term of supervised release authorized by statute,‖ it did
conclude that its ―reading of § 3583(e) is harmonious with §
9
3583(h).‖ Id. at 339.2 In this respect, the Court explained the
effects of subsection (h) on post-revocation imprisonment:
Section 3583(h) . . . acts as a cap on the
aggregate amount of post-revocation supervised
release a defendant may receive. This, in turn,
imposes an indirect limit on the aggregate
amount of revocation imprisonment. Once a
defendant has received as much revocation
imprisonment as § 3583(b) authorizes for
supervised release, the defendant is no longer
eligible for post-revocation supervised release.
Because the defendant will no longer be eligible
for supervised release, she cannot be at risk for
―an endless cycle of consecutive terms of
imprisonment and supervised release based on a
single underlying offense.‖
Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir.
2003) (per curiam)). The Hampton Court‘s interpretation of
the statute—and particularly its view of the relationship
between these two subsections—is therefore consistent with
and supports our reading of the statute.
2
Although Hampton did advance this argument about
subsection (h) as an alternative to her principal claim under
subsection (e)(3), the Court did not substantively address it.
633 F.3d at 342, n.4. Instead, the Court briefly dismissed the
argument, observing that ―Hampton provides no support for
her reading,‖ and concluding: ―it is merely a recapitulation of
her aggregation argument, which we have addressed at length
in this opinion.‖ Id.
10
Williams contends that the principle of statutory
construction known as the ―anti-superfluousness canon,‖
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 n.5 (2009),
requires that subsection (e)(3) be read together with
subsection (h) to impose an aggregate limit on revocation
imprisonment. Williams asserts that because the limitation on
revocation imprisonment expressed in the concluding clause
of subsection (e)(3) is always equal to or less than ―the term
of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in such term of supervised release,‖ subsection (e)(3)
must be construed by interpreting ―the ‗term of supervised
release authorized by statute‘ limitation to apply in the
aggregate.‖ (Appellant‘s Br. at 24.) Otherwise, she asserts,
―the ‗term of supervised release authorized by statute‘
language never has any effect.‖ (Id. at 25.)
This argument ignores the legislative history of
subsection (e)(3). The language in question—―to serve in
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized
by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of
supervised release‖—was added in 1994 to authorize courts
―to impose a term of revocation imprisonment without being
limited by the amount of supervised release the original
sentencing court imposed.‖ Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341 (citing
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 (2000)). Prior to
this legislative change, subsection (e)(3) was interpreted to
preclude a court from imposing a revocation term greater than
the period of supervised release initially imposed by the
court. Id. Thus, the provision in question is independent of
the concluding clause of subsection (e)(3), which was
amended in 2003 to plainly establish ―a per revocation limit
on revocation imprisonment.‖ Id. Considered in light of the
―legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute
11
was enacted,‖ Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257, it is evident that
Congress did not intend to set an aggregate cap on successive
revocation imprisonment in subsection (e)(3) when it added
language that authorized courts to impose a term of
revocation imprisonment that exceeded the supervised release
term originally imposed. Accordingly, Williams‘ reliance
upon the anti-superfluousness canon is misplaced. See
Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341.
Finally, maintaining that § 3583 is ambiguous,
Williams argues that the rule of lenity supports her
interpretation. Since we conclude that subsection (e)(3) is
unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this case.
See Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241; Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (―The rule of lenity applies only if,
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we
can make ‗no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.‖) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
3
Williams also challenges her sentence on the ground
that the period of home detention she served must be counted
towards the aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment
under subsection (h). This argument is moot in light of our
finding that subsection (h) does not impose an aggregate limit
on successive revocation imprisonment.
12