[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 5, 2012
No. 11-13509
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cr-00089-MCR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
YANCEY JACK GARRINGER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(April 5, 2012)
Before BARKETT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yancey Jack Garringer appeals his conviction for using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
we hold that the district court properly denied Garringer’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.
On July 12, 2010, Garringer was stopped by law enforcement shortly after
exiting the interstate in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. After he was stopped, law
enforcement conducted a search of Garringer’s car. They discovered 750 grams of
cocaine and an unloaded nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol in the car’s locked
glove box, as well as an ammunition magazine for the pistol in the car’s center
console. On appeal, Garringer argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to prove
his knowledge of the firearm’s presence in his car, and was also insufficient to
prove the reason the firearm was present in his car.
We review de novo the denial of a defendant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal, upholding the denial “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all
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reasonable inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the jury’s verdict.
United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), “any person who, during and in relation
to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm” is sentenced to an
additional five year term of imprisonment. To sustain a conviction under this
statute, the government must present sufficient proof that (1) the defendant “used
or carried” a firearm (2) “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime.
United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1250–52 (11th Cir. 2002).
Since the parties agree that Garringer did not use the firearm during this
offense, we consider whether he carried a firearm within the meaning of the
statute. Typically, under the “carry” prong, a defendant need only be aware that a
firearm is present with him in the vehicle, during the course of a drug trafficking
crime, is. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S. Ct. 1911,
1919, (1998); see also United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1427–28 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that the defendant, in driving to a drug deal with a gun beside him
for protection, satisfied the “carry” prong, despite having left the gun in his car
fifty to sixty feet away during the actual transaction); United States v. Range, 94
F.3d 614, 616–17 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that defendant “carried” a gun
when he knowingly had the gun under the floormat of the car he was driving).
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In this case, the evidence shows that Garringer was aware of the cocaine in
his glove box; and the pistol rested on top of that cocaine. Further, the pistol in
the glovebox and the ammunition magazine in the center console were within
Garringer’s reach as he sat in the vehicle, even if accessing the gun would have
required stopping the car. A reasonable factfinder could infer from this evidence
that Garringer knew the pistol was in his car as he ferried the drugs from Texas to
Florida, and could thus conclude that he carried the firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A).
Next, we consider the statute’s second requirement, asking whether
Garringer carried the firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime.
Timmons, 283 F.3d 1251–52. Garringer does not dispute that he possessed the
firearm “during” the alleged drug trafficking offense, but argues that there was no
evidence showing his possession occurred “in relation to” the offense.
To prove the “in relation to” requirement, the government must demonstrate
that the firearm had “some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking
crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or
coincidence.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2059
(1993). “The gun at least must facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating, the
drug trafficking offense.” Id. at 238, 113 S. Ct. at 2059 (citations and internal
punctuation omitted).
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In this case, Garringer admitted he had purchased the cocaine in Texas and
planned to sell it in Florida. The pistol was found resting on top of that cocaine in
Garringer’s glove box. These facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the
government, are sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to infer that the gun
was not entirely unrelated to the drug crime, or in the glove box with the drugs
coincidentally. See id. at 238, 113 S. Ct. at 2059 (observing that “in the ordinary”
§ 924(c)(1) case the gun “facilitates the offense by providing a means of protection
or intimidation” (citation and alterations omitted)). Thus, the evidence can
support the conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the pistol held the
“potential of facilitating” the drug offense. Id. (quotation marks omitted)
For these reasons, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could determine
that the evidence establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Garringer carried a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of Garringer’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
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