Case: 21-30196 Document: 00516207668 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 17, 2022
No. 21-30196 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Tyrea Arceneaux,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
American Trucking & Transportation Insurance
Company Risk Retention Group; M V T Services, L.L.C.,
doing business as Mesilla Valley Transportation,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6:20-CV-70
Before Jones, Haynes, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Appellant Tyrea Arceneaux sustained injuries after a tractor-trailer
tire blew out and the dislocated tread struck her vehicle. She filed various
negligence claims against the tractor-trailer’s owner, its driver, and its
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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insurer. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendant-Appellees and dismissed Arceneaux’s claims with prejudice. For
the following reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
Arceneaux commuted from her workplace in Breaux Bridge,
Louisiana to her home in Lafayette by traveling southwest on Interstate 10.
One day in March 2018, a tractor-trailer owned by Appellee MVT Services,
LLC and driven by its employee, Wilson Gonzales, passed Arceneaux and
changed lanes in front of her. 1 Suddenly, part of the tractor-trailer’s
backmost “driver’s side tire failed or blew out, and the tread separated . . . .”
The dislocated tread “struck the front driver’s side of [Arceneaux’s]
vehicle.” 2 Ultimately, it “got caught under [Arceneaux’s] vehicle, halting
her in the middle of Interstate 10 causing severe injury to her knee which
required surgery[.]”
Arceneaux filed suit against MVT, Gonzales, and American Trucking
& Transportation Insurance Company Risk Retention Group (the tractor-
trailer’s insurer) in January 2020. She claimed that Gonzales failed to
properly maintain and control the tractor-trailer and that he otherwise
operated it recklessly, carelessly, and inattentively. She attributed the same
conduct to MVT based on a respondeat superior theory and separately insisted
that MVT failed to properly train and supervise Gonzales.
1
The briefing identifies the “John Doe” driver as Wilson Gonzales. But the record
suggests that Arceneaux never served him and that he never appeared. “[T]he failure to
dispose of unserved, nonappearing defendants does not prevent a judgment from being
final and appealable.” Charles v. Atkinson, 826 F.3d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (
internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2
A responding local police officer described the damage to the front of
Arceneaux’s vehicle as “minor.” And Arceneaux herself said that her car was drivable.
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During the course of litigation, MVT produced repair and
maintenance records for the tractor-trailer involved in the incident. 3 A repair
order from March 18, 2019 (the date of the incident) describes a “blown”
tire and attributes the cause to “Under Inflation.” Another repair order
indicates that the “RR” (presumably right rear) tire failed in February 2019
due to “tread separation.” Yet another order indicates that MVT replaced
the tractor-trailer’s left rear tire on March 2, 2019 (two weeks before the
incident). MVT also replaced the tractor-trailer’s right rear tire in December
2018 (approximately three months before the incident).
Appellees jointly moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Arceneaux failed to satisfy the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code Article
2317.1 because she did not show that the tire had a defect or that MVT or
Gonzales knew, or should have known, of any defect. The district court
granted the motion based on the first argument and dismissed the action
following a hearing. It then entered a short order confirming its oral ruling.
Arceneaux timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law. Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80, 658 S. Ct.
817, 823 (1938). This court reviews applications of state substantive law de
novo. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
3
Six of the nine repair orders pertain to “rear tires.” Most of those identify the
relevant tire placement as first axle right, second axle left, and second axle right. But it is
unclear whether the orders distinguish the left and right sides or the first and second axles
by viewing the tractor-trailer from the front or the back.
3
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“This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as the district court.” Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 599
(5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)
requires a court to enter summary judgment when the movant establishes
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is material if it “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). And a dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence
in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at
477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. Moreover, “[s]ummary judgment is also
proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish an essential element
of his case.” Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F.3d 509, 516 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-
53 (1986)). “Rather, the nonmovant must come forward with competent
evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress his claims.” Id. (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53).
III. DISCUSSION
Arceneaux articulates eleven issues for review. But, at base, all of
those issues center on whether the district court erred by dismissing her
negligence claims because she failed to create genuine issues of material fact.
Arceneaux frames the bulk of her claims as arising under Louisiana’s
general negligence statue, which provides that “[e]very act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to
repair it.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315(A). This statute focuses on an
alleged tortfeasor’s conduct. In that regard, Arceneaux attributes her injuries,
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at least in part, to actions or omissions by MVT or Gonzales. But she also
emphasizes that the “tractor–trailer tire which caused injury to [her] was due
to ‘under-inflation’ of the tire.” The only record evidence Arceneaux cites
to support her arguments is the post-incident repair order discussing the tire.
She cites no evidence suggesting that the conduct of any defendant contributed
to her injuries.
Because Arceneaux heavily emphasizes the tire itself, Appellees insist
that it, an allegedly defective thing, caused her claimed injuries. Negligence
claims arising out of injuries caused by defective things implicate another
statute that provides:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that
he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage,
that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable
care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate
case. 4
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317.1. Thus, to recover for damages caused by a
defective thing, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that the thing which caused the
damage was in the defendant’s custody or control, (2) that it had a vice or
defect that presented an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) that the defendant
4
A defect “is some flaw or fault or condition of relative permanence existing or
inherent in the thing itself as one of its qualities.’” McBride v. Cracker Barrel Stores, Inc.,
649 So.2d 465, 467. (La. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). A ruin is “‘a building, a
person, or other object that has tumbled down or fallen into decay.’” Myers v. Dronet,
801 So. 2d 1097, 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Webster’s New International
Dictionary 1986 (3rd ed. 1961)). And a vice, “which is thought to be synonymous with
‘defect,’ is defined as “a physical imperfection, deformity[,] or taint.’” Id. (quoting
Webster’s Third at 2549).
5
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knew or should have known of the vice or defect, (4) that the damage could
have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and (5) that the
defendant failed to exercise such reasonable care. If the plaintiff fails to
provide proof any one of these elements, his/her claim fails.” Riggs v.
Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Tr. Auth., 997 So. 2d 814, 817 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
Despite the parties’ disagreement as to the statutory basis of
Arceneaux’s claims, “‘[t]here is essentially no difference between [article
2315 and 2317.1 claims] under Louisiana law[.]’” Renwick v. PNK Lake
Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 616 n.12 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bd. of
Comm’rs of Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.-E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C.,
850 F.3d 714, 729 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La.
Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 420 (2017)
(alterations in original)). Arceneaux must make the same showing
irrespective of whether the tire itself, the conduct of MVT or Gonzales, or a
combination of the two caused her injuries. She has failed to sustain her
burden on the second and third elements listed above.
A.
Arceneaux has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the tractor trailer’s tire had a defect that presented an unreasonable
risk of harm.
At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing, the district court
surmised that “all I have is one piece of paper, really, that says
‘underinflation.’ There’s no [admissible evidence], nothing to explain what
that means or how it was arrived at that or whatever.” The district court
further explained that “[t]here is a scintilla of evidence in this repair order,
but I don’t think that’s enough to prevent a motion for summary judgment.”
To avoid summary judgment, the district court wanted Arceneaux to provide
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“something, even the mechanic or an expert or something, something more
than this one piece of paper[.]”
Arceneaux contends that the district court improperly weighed the
evidence and that MVT’s maintenance records conclusively reveal that the
tire’s “underinflation” was the cause-in-fact of the blow-out and subsequent
incident. 5 She describes the maintenance records as “substantial and
significant” evidence that raise genuine disputes of material fact regarding
her claims. But Arceneaux necessarily relies on one repair order that a
roadside mechanic prepared after arriving on the scene to replace the tire.
The post-incident repair order raised a potential issue as to whether
the tire was defective because of “underinflation.” But even assuming the
underinflation made the tire dangerously defective, there is no evidence to
suggest what or who caused the underinflation. A variety of external objects
and circumstances or internal defects could cause underinflation. Arceneaux
even concedes that some unknown object may have punctured the tire. She
also conceded to the district court that the repair order does not explain how
or why the mechanic deduced the cause of the tire’s failure. Leaving aside
the question of expert testimony (of which there was none), Arceneaux did
not even offer any admissible evidence regarding the tire’s failure or
surrounding circumstances. 6 Indeed, the district court emphasized that she
5
She also maintains that negligence claims are generally not appropriately resolved
at the summary judgment stage. This court, however, routinely affirms summary judgment
rulings in favor of defendants when plaintiffs bring claims under article 2317.1. See Jones
v. Family Dollar Stores of La., Inc., 746 F. App’x 348, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2018); Luna v. PNK
Lake Charles, L.L.C., 725 F. App’x. 297, 299-301 (5th Cir. 2018); Dawson v. Rocktenn
Servs., Inc., 674 F. App’x 335, 339-42 (5th Cir. 2016); Cormier v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 136 F.
App’x 627, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2005); Fruge ex rel. Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558,
565 (5th Cir. 2003).
6
Arceneaux cites Woods v. Morris H. Weinstein, L.L.C., 298 So. 3d 873 (La. Ct.
App. 2020) several times for the proposition that her claims should survive summary
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could have deposed the mechanic who produced the repair order or obtained
an affidavit explaining his notation. She could have also deposed or obtained
affidavits from the responding police officer, the mechanic(s) who previously
serviced the tractor trailer, or Gonzales himself. Finally, while the record
contains three post-incident pictures of the tire, Arceneaux did not ascertain
its age, mileage, or provenance. The post-incident repair order alone was
insufficient to establish the tire’s “vice or defect” that made it unreasonably
dangerous.
B.
Even if Arceneaux did raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the tire was defective, she still fails to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether MVT or Gonzales knew, or should have known,
of any such defect.
Because Arceneaux offers no evidence suggesting that MVT or
Gonzales actually knew the tractor trailer’s tire was underinflated, she must
establish that they had constructive knowledge. Constructive knowledge
exists “if the conditions that caused the injury existed for such a period of
time that [the owner or custodian of a thing], by the exercise of ordinary care
and diligence, must have known of their existence in general and could have
guarded the public from injury.” Tsegaye v. City of New Orleans, 183 So. 3d
705, 718 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ denied, 188 So. 3d 1064 (citing Boutin v.
Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Baton Rouge, 164 So. 3d 243, 246-47
(La. Ct. App. 2014), writ denied, 159 So 3d 469)).
judgment. But the Woods court considered extensive affidavit and deposition testimony in
determining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether an object that hit the
plaintiffs’ vehicle came from the defendants’ trailer. 298 So. 3d at 878-80. The Woods
decision demonstrates the kind of evidence that Arceneaux could have offered to avoid
summary judgment.
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But Arceneaux also offers no evidence as to whether MVT or
Gonzales could have reasonably discovered any alleged defect in the tractor
trailer’s tire. She did not depose or obtain an affidavit from anyone regarding
the nature or frequency of any inspections performed on the tire at issue,
much less on best practices for maintenance of heavy truck tires. With
respect to maintenance, the sporadic and terse repair records in the record
indicate that MVT had recently replaced the tractor-trailer’s rear tires before
the incident occurred. Those records imply, if anything, that MVT was
attending to the need for proper and properly inflated tires. In sum, there is
no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether MVT or Gonzales knew, or
should have known, of any alleged defect in the tire. 7
C.
Arceneaux’s final argument relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
which was not pled but to which she devoted two paragraphs arguing in her
response to the motion for summary judgment. She barely acknowledged the
theory during the summary judgment hearing. Given this cursory treatment,
the district court understandably did not address the theory. Nonetheless,
the theory is plainly inapposite here.
Louisiana courts apply this doctrine of circumstantial evidence,
allowing an inference of negligence, when:
o First, the injury is the kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence;
o Second, the evidence must sufficiently eliminate other more
probable causes of the injury, such as the conduct of the
plaintiff or a third person; and
7
This lack of evidence also dooms, for summary judgment purposes, her claims
about the Appellees’ alleged negligence in maintaining the tractor-trailer or tire at issue.
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o Third, the negligence of the defendant must fall within the
scope of his duty to the plaintiff.
Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 44 (La.
2007); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (Am. Law
Inst. 1965).
On these facts, Arceneaux cannot show that tire blowouts do not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, because “[t]here are
numberless means or causes other than a defect in the manufacture, which
bring about a blow out of a tire.” Williams v. U.S. Royal Tires, 101 So. 2d 488,
492 (La. App. 1958). Arceneaux attempts to analogize a case where the
plaintiff “was following a tractor-trailer rig when suddenly the rear axles of
the trailer separated from the chassis, striking the [plaintiff’s] vehicle.
Gautreaux v. W. W. Rowland Trucking Co., Inc., 757 So. 2d 87, 89 (La. Ct.
App. 2000). The Gautreaux court did apply res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 93. But
Arceneaux offers no evidence suggesting that a failed tire is anywhere near as
unusual as axles separating from a vehicle’s chassis. Arceneaux fails to
confront the workaday nature of tire failure, the opposite of this component
of res ipsa loquitur.
Further, she cannot and has not attempted to eliminate other potential
causes of the injury, as required by the second element. “Application of the
doctrine is defeated if an inference that the accident was due to a cause other
than defendant’s negligence could be drawn as reasonably as one that it was
due to his negligence.” Montgomery v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 540 So. 2d 312,
320 (La. 1989). By conceding that an open question remains as to whether
“an object was struck in the road causing the tire to blowout,” Arceneaux
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fails to sufficiently eliminate other more probable causes of the injury. 8 There
is no basis in the record to “sparingly appl[y]” res ipsa loquitur. Spott v. Otis
Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 1355, 1362 (La. 1992) (citing Day v. National U.S.
Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 665 (La. 1961)).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
8
She also appears to suggest that the incident occurred in a construction zone, but
that fact, if true, only increases the possibility that an external object contributed to the
tire’s failure.
11