[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 6, 2012
No. 11-14658
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20896-JAL-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAHMAL AKEEM MARTIN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 6, 2012)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jahmal Martin appeals the district court’s application of a two-level
sentencing enhancement based on his leadership role in the robbery to which he
pled guilty. Finding no clear error on the part of the district court, we affirm.
Martin and several codefendants were charged in a multiple count,
superseding indictment for robberies and related offenses. Martin pled guilty to
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). At sentencing,
the parties stipulated that Martin “directed” his coconspirators to commit the
armed robbery to which he pled guilty. Martin promised them that they would
earn “good money” if they committed the robbery and would not be punished
severely due to their young age. He supplied them with guns from his “drug
hole,” drove them to the scene, and served as the getaway driver. After
completion of the robbery, Martin’s coconspirators gave him the money and
property that they had stolen in return for a “small amount of money.” Based on
these facts, the district court applied, over Martin’s objection, a two-level
enhancement for his aggravating role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
We review the district court’s decision to apply an aggravating-role
enhancement for clear error. United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1025 (11th
Cir. 2009). Under this standard, we will not reverse unless left with a “definite
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and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Poirier,
321 F.3d 1024, 1035 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Facts contained in a
PSI are deemed admitted and may be used to support a guideline enhancement
unless a defendant objects to the facts before the sentencing court. United States
v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 844 (11th Cir. 2009). Similarly, although stipulated
facts are not binding on a district court, they may be used along with the PSI to
assist the court in making factual findings at sentencing. United States v. Forbes,
888 F.2d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1989).
Application of the aggravating-role enhancement requires that (1) the
defendant undertake the role of “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in
the crime and (2) the nature of the offense does not qualify for a higher-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. See United States v. Yeager, 331 F.3d
1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003). To apply, evidence must support a finding that “the
defendant exerted some control, influence[,] or decision-making authority over
another participant in the criminal activity.” Martinez, 584 F.3d at 1026. Thus, a
“defendant who merely suggests committing the offense” is not a leader or
organizer under the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 4. However, evidence
showing that the defendant exerted influence or control over even one other
individual will be sufficient to support an enhancement under § 3B1.1(c). Id. cmt.
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2; see United States v. Lozano, 490 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming a
§ 3B1.1(c) enhancement where the defendant instructed at one least coconspirator
to engage in criminal conduct and was “intricately involved in the offense”).
Martin argues that the district court erred because he merely performed an
assigned role of furnishing guns and driving the getaway car. He further asserts
that he did not recruit his coconspirators, as they were already involved in illegal
activities. And similarly, Martin contends that he was not such a crucial
participant in the crime, which is evident by the fact that his coconspirators
planned multiple other robberies without his participation or supervision.
Martin’s arguments do not establish clear error on the part of the district court
because his contentions do not undermine the facts establishing his role in this
particular robbery, which is the crime for which he received the sentencing
enhancement. Although his coconspirators may have been led by other
individuals when they committed other crimes, that does not change the facts
surrounding this particular robbery offense.
The district court considered the stipulated facts and those uncontested in
the PSI when it applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
Based on these facts, the sentencing court could properly find that Martin planned
the crime, enticed his coconspirators to join him in committing the crime, supplied
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the group with weapons, and collected and distributed the bounty from the
robberies. The commentary to the guidelines recognizes that these factors indicate
that a defendant qualifies for an aggravating-role enhancement. See U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1 cmt. 4. We are therefore not left with a “definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed,” Poirier, 321 F.3d at 1035, and we affirm the
district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement.
AFFIRMED.
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